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PREFACE
Over the past three decades, governments around the world have launched ambitious efforts to 
reform the organisation and functioning of the public sector. Under the broad New Public 
Management (NPM) designation, this trend has challenged the Weberian “classic public 
administration paradigm” (Pollitt, Thiel & Homburg, 2007:1). As a result of these developments, 
new words, concepts and tools of governance have been brought into public administration and 
policy-making. In academic literature, these tendencies have been captured in numerous titles, 
including ‘A Public Management for all Seasons?’ (Hood, 1991), ‘Reinventing Government’ 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), ‘Governance Without Government?’ (Peters & Pierre, 1998), and 
‘New Public Management’ (Lane, 2000). These developments have also been tracked and described 
by various governance indicators and benchmark projects, such as the OECD’s PUMA project and 
the World Bank’s Governance Indicators. Furthermore, in a Danish public administration context, 
scholars have called our time ‘the era of reforms’ (Pedersen & Greve, 2007). 
To a large extent, these public sector reforms have been of a worldwide scope and magnitude, as 
noted by Donald Kettl in ‘The Global Public Management Revolution’ (2000). However, while 
recognising the comprehensiveness and evidence of recent changes, a growing strand of literature 
has challenged the globalisation orthodoxy, which “maintains that NPM is spreading fast around the 
world and generating convergence between civic systems” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002: ix). 
Rather than leading to convergence across administrative systems, this perspective sees public 
sector reforms as shaped by a complex mix of national policy features and historical and 
institutional contexts, which create a great deal of divergence and heterogeneity in the actual 
trajectories of public sector reforms across various national institutional systems (e.g. Barzelay, 
2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg, 2007). Moreover, many scholars now 
argue that we are witnessing a new and more diversified post-NPM and new public governance era, 
which fundamentally departs from the ‘one size fits all’ mentality, which largely characterised the 
NPM epoch during the 1980s and 1990s (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Osborne, 2010). 
This PhD dissertation follows in the footsteps of this growing body of public administration and 
management literature, which stresses the importance of national and institutional contexts in the 
shaping of public sector reform trajectories and the outcomes of such reforms initiatives. The puzzle 
guiding the dissertation is the question of why some countries have chosen to make large-scale use 
vii 
of the public-private partnership (PPP) model, whereas others have been much more reluctant. I 
find this puzzle interesting because of the fundamental question that it begs; if PPPs are really that 
attractive as many politicians and academic scholars would like us to believe, why is it that quite a 
number of countries including Denmark and the remainder of the Scandinavian countries have so 
far only reluctantly adopted the PPP model? I utilise institutional policy process theories to unpack 
and analyse in a comparative perspective the policy processes, decision-making games and broader 
institutional settings within which decisions about PPP policy and regulation were taken in 
Denmark and Ireland between 1999 and 2009. Furthermore, I also utilise a multi-level governance 
perspective to supplement the comparative perspective with multi-level analysis of how various 
levels of government, notably the EU-level, the national level and the local project level, interact to 
support or constrain uptake of PPPs within different national institutional contexts. By this token, 
my aim is both to make a comparative and a multi-level contribution to the academic PPP literature.  
The argument which I will attempt to substantiate is that policy, regulation and application of PPPs 
is in fact a much more heterogeneous phenomenon than commonly asserted in policy practice and 
in the academic literature, and thus is part of a more diversified picture of developments in public 
administration which ‘transcends NPM’ and is part of a new public governance era characterised by 
national translations and adaptations within a global public sector reform context (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2007; Greve & Hodge, 2007; Osborne, 2000).  
At first glance, the arguments presented here which stress the importance of national characteristics 
and institutional context might seem to fit neatly with the “grand” divergence theories, such as the 
‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001)’, or the ‘Welfare-State Regimes’ 
literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, on closer examination, this study provides a messier 
and, I will argue, a more nuanced and detailed account of the forces, interests and institutional 
mechanisms which shape and form national PPP policy and regulation and the formation of 
concrete PPP projects. Future research may use these results along with other case studies to 
determine whether there are emerging archetypes of post-NPM governance in the grey zone 
between public and private sector organisation and regulation. Studying PPPs in a comparative and 
multi-level perspective provides a particularly informative starting point for such an endeavor as the 
phenomenon represents a complex redefinition of public and private interaction, which goes beyond 
the competition and contracting focus in NPM, and thus provides opportunities for understanding 
how and why modern states attempt to govern such interaction. 
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The PhD dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part is a synopsis which provides an 
introduction to the study’s puzzle and research questions, the theoretical frameworks, methodology, 
data collection, conclusions and discussions of the lessons learned. The second part of the 
dissertation consists of five papers, which represent the main body of text and analysis. These 
papers are currently in various phases of writing, review and publication in leading peer-reviewed 
journals; three papers have been published (Papers 1, 2 and 3), one paper is currently in review with 
a journal (Paper 4), and the fifth paper has been accepted for presentation at an international 
conference and will subsequently be submitted to a journal (Paper 5):  
I: Petersen, Ole Helby (2010a). Emerging meta-governance as a regulation framework for 
public-private partnerships: an examination of the European Union’s approach. 
International Public Management Review, 11, 3, pp. 1-23. 
II: Petersen, Ole Helby (2009). Hvorfor så få offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) i 
Danmark? Et ministerielt spil om indflydelse, interesser og positioner. Økonomi og Politik,
82, 1, pp. 60-75.1
III: Petersen, Ole Helby (2010b). Regulation of public-private partnerships: the Danish 
case. Public Money and Management, 30, 3, pp. 175-182. 
IV: Petersen, Ole Helby (2011a). Multi-level governance of public-private partnerships: An 
analysis of the Irish case. Submitted to International Public Management Journal.
V: Petersen, Ole Helby (2011b). Public-private partnerships as converging or diverging 
trends in public management? A comparative analysis of PPP policy and regulation in 
Denmark and Ireland. Accepted for presentation at the 15th International Research 
Symposium for Public Management (IRSPM), Dublin, Ireland, April 2011.2
                                                          
1 Title in English: “Why are there so few public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Denmark? A departmental game about 
influence, interests and positions.” Economy and Politics, 81, 1, pp. 60-75. 
2 Planned submission: Public Management Review.
1PART1:SYNOPSIS
This PhD dissertation studies national similarities and differences in policy and regulation of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), with an empirical focus on Denmark and Ireland. The starting 
point and motivation for the study is the observation that whereas PPPs are often depicted in the 
academic literature and in policy practice as a globally disseminated governance scheme, in reality, 
a closer examination of the PPP reform landscape reveals significant differences in Western 
governments’ policy and regulation of PPPs and in the actual application of the PPP model. By 
comparing the initiatives taken by the Irish government, which has embraced PPPs, with those of 
the Danish government, which has been a PPP sceptic, I draw on in-depth case studies to inquire 
into the fundamental public policy questions as to how, why and to what consequences some 
governments have launched widespread policy and regulation frameworks to support uptake of the 
PPP model, whereas others have been much more reluctant.3
The study addresses a gap in previous PPP literature, which has been dominated by single country 
or single case study research designs, whereas comparative and multi-level aspects of PPPs have 
hitherto been subject to few academic studies (cf. Reeves, 2003; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Koppenjan, 2005; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). The dissertation thus contributes with comparative 
findings about convergence and divergence in national PPP practices in general, and the Danish and 
Irish PPP cases in particular. This is supplemented by multi-level analyses of the interplay between 
various levels of government, notably the EU-level, the national policy-level, and the project level, 
in key decisions about policy, regulation and application of the PPP model, using the schools sector 
as test bed. Jointly, these two perspectives enable me to produce a number of insights about national 
comparative and multi-level aspects of PPP policy and regulation, which have not been adequately 
addressed in the previous PPP literature (see also Section 1.2). Before moving ahead, though, I will 
briefly clarify how three central concepts (‘regulation’, ‘policy’ and ‘PPP’) are used in the 
dissertation. 
                                                          
3 By ‘consequences’ I here refer to the ways in which PPP policy and regulation serve to facilitate or constrain the 
formation of concrete PPP projects (see also Paper 3 and 4). 
2The concept of ’regulation’ is commonly defined in various broader and narrower meanings (cf. 
Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004), and is often also associated with the notion of 
‘governance’ (Rhodes, 1996; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Kooiman, 2003). In the broadest sense, 
regulation can be characterised as “sustained and focused control exercised by public agency over 
activities that are valued by a community” (Selznick, 1985: 363). However, I would tend to agree 
with the editors of the new journal Regulation and Governance, which see regulation as a narrower 
concept than governance: “Regulation can be conceived as that large subset of governance that is 
about steering the flow of events and behavior, as opposed to providing and distributing” 
(Braithwaite, Coglianese & Levi-Faur, 2007: 3). Regulation, in the way that I use the term in the 
dissertation, is thus more about steering, directing and controlling than it is about collecting and 
redistributing scarce resources. Accordingly, I define regulation as the subset of governance that 
involve “every mode of political steering involving public and private actors, including traditional 
modes of government and different types of steering from hierarchical imposition to sheer 
information measures” (Héritier, 2002: 185). This includes command-and-control (hard law) as well 
as broader soft law measures, such as economic incentives, supply of information, self-regulation, 
etc. (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Mörth, 2007). 
The concept of ‘policy’ can be characterised broadly as “A set of interrelated decisions taken by a 
political actor or a group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving 
them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of 
these actors to achieve” (Jenkins, 1997: 30). Furthermore, as argued by Heclo, “As commonly used, 
the term policy is usually considered to apply to something ‘bigger’ than particular decisions, but 
‘smaller’ than general social movements” (Heclo, 1972: 84; also cited in Parsons, 1998: 13). In this 
study, I define a policy as the end-result of a process of public decision-making in which one or 
several actors invest resources and/or engage in strategic decision-making games with the purpose 
of advancing a certain decision-outcome over its alternative specifications (Scharpf, 1997). This can 
for example be the launch of an official PPP programme, the initiation of pilot PPP projects, green 
and white paper initiatives, sector-specific strategies, or budgetary decisions which earmarks money 
to PPP projects. Moreover, it can also be decisions more generally aimed at institutional capacity 
building, such as the launch of a PPP competence unit or an inter-departmental PPP group to 
coordinate government PPP initiatives (see Paper 2 and 4). The actors involved in policy-making in 
relation to PPPs can be both public and private actors (Klijn & Teisman, 2003), and actors at 
multiple levels of government (Jessop, 2005).  
3Finally, in terms of defining the concept of ‘PPP’, I adopt an adjusted version of Van Ham & 
Koppenjan’s (2002) and Koppenjan’s (2005) often cited definition of PPP as ‘A form of 
structured cooperation between public and private partners in the planning/construction and/or 
maintenance and operation of construction and infrastructural facilities in which the partners 
share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities over a long time period´.  
The term ‘structured cooperation’ refers to a relationship with a formal contract-based element, 
(see also Vrangbæk, 2008), and the definition is confined to arrangements between government 
and business that combine various planning, construction, finance, maintenance and operation 
elements, typically for a time-period of 25 to 35 years. This definition corresponds to what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘financial infrastructure PPP type’ in the partnership literature 
(Weihe, 2005; Greve & Hodge, 2010). This means that broader and somewhat looser forms of 
PPP arrangements, such as issue networks or policy communities, are not examined in the 
dissertation (see also Hodge & Greve, 2005). Section 1.3 provides a more lengthy discussion of 
the various PPP approaches and definitions, and of how the study places itself in regard to the 
field of PPP research.  

1.1Introduction:NationalvarietiesofPPPs
The past fifteen years have witnessed a steep upwards trend in the formation of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) for the provision of various types of public services and infrastructure (e.g. 
Linder, 1999; Osborne, 2000; Klijn & Teisman 2003; Wettenhall, 2003; Hammerschmid & Angerer 
2005; Hodge & Greve, 2005, Koppenjan, 2005; Mörth, 2007; Ysa, 2007; Vrangbæk, 2008; Weihe, 
2008). From 2004 to 2005 alone, around 206 PPP deals were signed in the western world, involving 
capital investments of approximately $52 billion (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005: 37). In Europe 
(ex. UK), the capital value of signed PPP contracts rose eight-fold between 2003 and 2006 
(Babcock & Brown, 2008:10), while the total capital value of European PPPs approximates €200 
billion (Blanc-Brude et al., 2007). PPPs are also endorsed by various European Union (EU) 
institutions (e.g. European Commission, 2004; see also Paper 1) and international organisations 
such as the OECD (2008b), the IMF (2006), and the World Bank (2006). Moreover, since the turn 
of the millennium, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has issued more than €2 billion per annum 
4in loans and funds to PPP projects in the member states (EIB, 2005). Thus, significant public and 
private resources are now being redirected to the formation of PPPs in Europe and worldwide4.
These staggering numbers, however, cover significant national differences in PPP policy and 
regulation and in the amount of actually implemented PPP projects. Within an EU context, the 
countries seem to have followed at least three different PPP reform paths. Some governments have 
enacted comprehensive policy and regulation frameworks and formed a substantial number of major 
projects over the last ten to fifteen years. Examples are the UK (Flinders, 2005), Portugal 
(Monteiro, 2005), Spain (Torres & Pina, 2001) and, more recently, also Ireland (Kay & Reeves, 
2004). Other countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Greece, have also 
developed relatively widespread policy and regulation frameworks, but signed a smaller number of 
actual PPP projects (Babcock & Brown, 2008). Finally, some countries have reacted with a 
substantial amount of scepticism towards the PPP concept. These countries, where policy and 
regulation initiatives have been modest and few projects have been signed, include the 
Scandinavian countries (Greve, 2003), Austria (Hammerschmid & Angerer, 2005), Switzerland 
(Lienhard, 2006), Belgium and many of the former eastern European countries (Brenck et al., 
2005). Thus, within a broader framework of global upsurge in PPP activity, we may say that PPP 
policy and regulation and the actual application of the PPP model is in fact a highly divergent 
phenomenon across various national institutional settings. 
The idea of PPP as a globally spread reform trend has to a large extent been formed and repeated in 
the large and rapidly growing international literature on the subject matter (e.g Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002; Ghobadian et al., 2004; Zitron, 2006; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), although more recently, 
scholars have increasingly noted that the manifestation and implementation of PPP initiatives have 
not been the same everywhere (e.g. Greve & Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007). A 
large practice-oriented literature has also emerged, with significant inputs from private consultancy 
firms (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Allen Consulting Group, 2007; Babcock & Brown, 
2008), national PPP units (Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2004; HM Treasury, 
2006), institutions of the EU (European Commission, 2004; EIB, 2005), and international 
organisations (World Bank, 2006; IMF, 2006; OECD, 2008b). Indeed, the very notion of PPPs as “a 
                                                          
4 Although the financial crisis has temporarily limited the availability of risk willing capital in the financial markets, the 
current strains on public finances seems to have made the PPP model even more appealing for governments struggling 
with excessive government deficits (European Partnership Excellence Center, 2009; see also Paper 1).
5very-fashionable concept” (Wettenhal, 2003: 77), which “enjoys remarkable acclaim” (Linder, 
1999: 35), and “with international acceptance” (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007:570), might lead us to 
assume similarity and convergence across countries (see also Paper 5).  
However, this dissertation, on the contrary, proceeds from the observation that if we look beyond 
the reports from a small handful of primarily Anglo-Saxon countries, which have so far attracted 
widespread attention in the PPP literature (Hammerschmid & Angerer, 2005), we observe a much 
more divergent pattern in governments’ policy and regulation for PPP and the amount of actually 
implemented PPP projects. The following two brief accounts, from Ireland and Denmark, elaborate 
on these differing national PPP practices. 
The Irish government officially introduced PPPs in 1999 when the Minister for Finance launched 
eight pilot PPP projects across the roads, schools, public transport and waste treatment sectors to be 
commenced as PPPs (Irish Government, 1999). Later the same year, the Irish government further 
endorsed PPPs in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2000-2006, which set a minimum €2.35 
billion target for PPP activities in the country (Irish Government, 1999). Further Irish initiatives 
included the set-up of a Central PPP Policy Unit within the Ministry of Finance, the launch of an 
Inter-departmental Group on PPPs, enactment of a national PPP law, and the launch of the National 
Development Finance Agency (NDFA): a dedicated government PPP procurement authority. The 
Irish PPP programme has developed rapidly and now embraces more than 70 major PPP projects in 
various phases of planning, procurement and operation (Irish Government, 2010). Thus, when 
taking size into consideration (compare the country’s 4.3 million inhabitants with the UK’s 59 
million), Ireland now boasts one of the world’s most ambitious PPP programmes (see also Paper 4).  
Turning now to the case of Denmark, also a small open economy and long-term member of the EU, 
a highly contrasting story is revealed. The Danish government also launched the PPP model in 1999 
(Danish Ministry of Finance, 1999), but no concrete action was taken in the following years, and no 
money was earmarked for projects. When in 2004 the Danish Government launched a PPP Action 
Plan with ten initiatives to support the formation of PPPs, it was seen by many as an indication of 
the government’s serious commitment to PPPs as a means of investing in large-scale infrastructure 
development. Among the initiatives were the appointment of seven pilot PPP projects, the 
establishment of a national PPP Competence Unit, a universal PPP testing requirement, and pools 
of money to support local and regional authorities in the testing of potential projects for PPP 
6relevance (Danish Government, 2004). In the aftermath, however, it became apparent that the 
initiatives under the government’s PPP action plan were in reality much less ambitious than first 
expected (see also Paper 2 and 3). The pilot projects were only to be tested for PPP relevance, and 
many other initiatives were seriously delayed, partly because fundamental regulatory issues were 
not resolved. Subsequently, the Danish PPP programme has moved slowly, with just five 
implemented PPP projects and a few projects planned (Petersen & Vrangbæk, 2010).  
Thus, although the concept of PPPs was launched more or less simultaneously in Denmark and 
Ireland, which are both small open economies and part of a larger polity (the EU), which makes 
them subject to a common meta-governance framework (Jessop, 2005; see also Paper 1), within a 
time-period of just ten years, PPP policy and regulation and the number of implemented PPP 
schemes developed very differently in the two countries. These empirical examples are not isolated 
stories about differing national PPP practices. Even though recent years have seen an upsurge of 
academic interest in various aspects of PPPs, such as procurement, risk sharing and contracting, we 
still witness a gap in this literature in terms of accounting for these significant and persisting 
national differences in PPP policy and regulation and the actual formation of concrete PPP schemes 
(although see Greve & Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007; Ysa, 2007). In this 
dissertation, I will attempt to open up the ‘black box’ of policy and regulation of PPPs and examine 
how, why and to what consequences, within a broader framework of global upsurge in PPP 
popularity, national governments have chosen particular courses of policy and ways of regulating 
the formation of these PPPs.5
When addressing these national differences in PPP practice and regulation, at least two perspectives 
seem to be relevant (for a similar argument for NPM-reforms, see Pollitt, Thiel & Homburg, 2007: 
Chapter 1). The first relates to the observation that the concept of PPP is in itself a heterogeneous 
and somewhat ambiguous phenomenon with many different forms and meanings (cf. Linder, 1999; 
Weihe, 2005; Hodge & Greve, 2007). The concept of PPP could thus be used in practice for very 
different organisational arrangements in Denmark and Ireland, which could explain the observed 
differences in PPP policy and regulation as well as in the number of implemented projects. This 
perspective, however, is not my focus in this dissertation, and it would also be less interesting in the 
two specific countries, because both the Danish and Irish governments have introduced and defined 
PPPs mainly in relation to physical infrastructure projects such as schools, roads, public buildings, 
                                                          
5 By “black box” I mean a problem which has as yet not been adequately examined and accounted for. 
7etc. (see also section 1.3 for further discussions of the PPP concept). In the study, I therefore focus 
on a significant and well-defined (and thus comparable) form of PPP: the long-term financial 
infrastructure partnership.6
The second perspective, which I find more captivating because it places PPP initiatives within a 
broader comparative and institutional context, is to examine the variety of national institutional 
settings in which this particular type of financial infrastructure PPP arose on the policy agendas of 
governments, and inquire into how and why the specific national trajectories of policy and 
regulation were shaped and formed and how they worked to facilitate or hinder formation of 
concrete PPP projects. This perspective, which corresponds to what Gilardi (2004:67) has called the 
‘institutional side of regulatory change’ emphasises how, within a broader framework of 
institutional settings, various public and private actors and policy entrepreneurs engage in strategic 
‘games’ in order to promote their preferred solutions on the policy agenda (Scharpf, 1997; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). This approach is different from much previous research on PPPs, which has 
adopted single country or single case study research designs (cf. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; 
Reeves, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), or focused on legal, financial or 
technical issues of PPPs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Bing et al., 2005; Tvarnø, 2006; Zitron, 2006), 
and generally treated the broader institutional environment as something external to the formation 
of PPPs (although see Klijn & Teisman, 2005; Greve & Hodge, 2007). 
The remainder of this synopsis is divided into six parts. In the following section (1.2) the aims and 
research questions of the dissertation are presented. Section 1.3 then discusses the origins and 
differing meanings of the PPP concept, and clarifies how the dissertation theoretically positions 
itself within the literature. Subsequently, Section 1.4 examines the objectives reported in a broad 
range of literature for governments’ formation of PPPs. This is followed in Section 1.5 by a 
discussion of methodology, case choice and data collection. Then, Section 1.6 presents an overview 
of the five papers and extended abstracts of each paper. Finally, Section 1.7 provides an overall 
conclusion to the dissertation and a discussion of the implications and contributions, and I close the 
synopsis with an epilogue discussing PPPs in the context of the recent financial crisis. 


                                                          
6 This was one of the main points in Guri Weihe’s PhD dissertation; that in order to be able to say anything meaningful 
about PPPs, we need to define and keep separate various partnership types (see Weihe, 2008).  
81.2Aimsandresearchquestions
This PhD dissertation examines a number of issues related to how, why and to what consequences, 
within a broader institutional context, some governments have developed policy and regulation 
frameworks to support the formation of PPPs, but equally importantly, also why other governments 
have been more reluctant towards these PPPs. The empirical puzzle addressed in the study thus 
concerns the discrepancy between the global proliferations of the PPP concept as a reform receipt 
and the major difference in actual PPP practice in different groups of countries, with a focus on 
Denmark, which has been a PPP sceptic, and Ireland, which has embraced PPPs. At the theoretical 
level, the study attempts to grasp and account for the factors that lead to differences and similarities 
in governments’ PPP initiatives across various national institutional settings; the puzzle being how 
we can start account for the observed divergence in policy, regulation and application of PPPs 
within a global context of largely converging PPP reform rhetoric (Linder, 1999; Hodge & Greve, 
2007).  
It should be noted, though, that the differing practices of governments in the adoption and 
implementation of different public sector reform formula is widely discussed in comparative public 
administration and management literature (cf. Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; 
Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Previous research regarding various types of NPM, privatisation and 
contracting reforms has thus revealed a great deal of heterogenity and national translations within a 
broader reform context (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Pollitt, Thiel & Homburg, 2007). The 
discrepancy between convergence in reform rhetoric and divergence in concrete reform initiatives 
has thus been discussed in the broader public administration literature (cf. Pollitt, 2002), but it is a 
topic which has hitherto been subject to few studies in the PPP literature. Consequently, while 
major financial commitments are continuously being made under PPP schemes in a number of 
countries throughout, there seems to have been little academic and political debate about these 
significant national differences in policy, regulation and actual application of PPPs (although see 
Greve & Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007).  
The dissertation addresses the issue of diverging national PPP practices from a comparative as well 
as multi-level perspective. In the comparative dimension, I examine two countries that display 
highly contrasting PPP policy and regulation approaches within a common framework of EU-
regulations (see also Paper 1). Moreover, in the multi-level dimension, I analyse how various levels 
of government interact to support or constrain the formation of concrete PPP projects, using the 
9schools sector as test bed. The comparative and multi-level dimensions constitute supplementing 
analytical perspectives in regard to the overall focus of the dissertation: differing national PPP 
practices. The empirical focus is on the period from 1999-2009. This starting point was chosen 
because both Denmark and Ireland officially introduced PPPs in 1999, and the end point was 
chosen to allow time to write up the dissertation. I will attempt to answer the following research 
questions:
1. What are the key actor-constellations, policy-games and institutional conditions that created 
decisions about policies and regulations for PPPs in Denmark and Ireland?  
2. How did PPP policies and regulations in Denmark and Ireland develop in the period from 
1999-2009, and how can the national similarities and differences be explained? 
3. How do multiple levels of government interact to facilitate or hinder the formation of 
concrete PPP projects, exemplified by four case studies from the schools sector? 
4. What framework conditions does the EU set for PPP activity at national and sub-national 
levels of government, and why has this common regulatory framework not lead to more 
convergence among the countries?  
The first two research questions concern the comparative analytical dimension, whereas the latter 
two relate to the multi-level analytical dimension. The first aim of the dissertation is to study 
comparatively how and why national PPP policy and regulation developed from 1999-2009, with a 
focus on the empirical cases of Denmark and Ireland (research questions 1 and 2). At the national 
government level, the study thus contains both diachronic and synchronic analysis. Moreover, I also 
argue that decisions about PPPs at the national government level also influence – and are influenced 
by – decisions at supra-national and sub-national levels of government, and thus is part of a multi-
level governance system where decisions are influenced by actors at several levels of government 
(Scharpf, 2001; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Jessop, 2005). Hence, in order to fully grasp and account 
for the causes and contours of PPP policy and regulation, in the study I use the comparative and 
multi-level approaches as supplementing analytical perspectives. The second aim of the dissertation 
is thus to conduct multi-level analysis of (i) how various levels of government interact to support or 
finder uptake of the PPP model, with an empirical focus on the schools sector (research question 3), 
and (ii) what the EU’s role has been in regard to regulation of PPPs at national and sub-national 
levels of government (research question 4).  
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The need to examine at various policy and regulation aspects of PPPs has been identified by several 
scholars, especially within the Dutch network school (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005), as well as Greve and Hodge (2010), Ysa (2007) and Flinders 
(2005). But studies dealing with regulation and governance issues have typically operated with 
single country research designs (cf. Spackman, 2002; Reeves, 2003; Deakin, 2003; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003; Flinders, 2005; Koppenjan, 2005; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), whereas 
comparative approaches are generally rare in this field of research. Indeed, when reference is in fact 
made to experiences in other countries, these stories tend to be rather anecdotal, and they are 
seldom based on actual empirical studies in more than one country (although see Greve & Hodge, 
2007; Ysa, 2007; McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010). Hence, as more governments rush forward to 
implement PPPs, endorsed by numerous policy entrepreneurs, including the private consultancy 
industry (cf. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Babcock & Brown, 2008), institutions of the EU 
(European Commission, 2004; EIB, 2005), and international organisations (World Bank, 2006; 
IMF, 2006; OECD, 2008b), I will argue that a careful analysis of the actor constellations, policy-
games and institutional settings that create policies and regulations for PPPs is timely and 
warranted.  
The first analytical dimension, which corresponds to research questions 1 and 2, is comparative and 
is designed as a comparative case study of the Danish and Irish governments’ development of PPP 
policy and regulation from 1999-2009. I use institutional policy-process theory (Kingdon, 1995 
[1984]; Scharpf, 1997) and qualitative methods to examine the decision-making processes in which 
PPP policies and regulations developed in the two countries. Institutional policy process theories 
provide a meso-level analytical perspective which deals with “how problems are defined, agendas 
set, policy formulated, decisions made and policy evaluated and implemented” (Parsons, 1998; 
xvii). For PPPs, this can for example be how the PPP idea arose to the policy-agendas of 
governments by the late 1990s; the formulation of different initiatives to support or constrain uptake 
of PPPs; the choice of specific courses of PPP policies and regulations; the implementation and 
formation of PPP projects; and evaluation and revision of PPP policy-programmes and projects (see 
also Paper 2, 4 and 5).7 The theoretical framework of institutional policy-process theories, which I 
further discuss in Section 1.3, allows me to conduct an in-depth examination of the processes of 
public policy-making and regulation for PPPs in Denmark and Ireland in the period from 1999-
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the long-term relationship in PPPs means that the time-horizon for evaluation/termination is 
often between 25 and 35 years.     
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2009, and thus account for the factors that may explain their comparative differences and 
similarities (see Figure 1).  
Figure1.Thefirstanalyticaldimension:comparativecaseanalysis.
Furthermore, while the academic literature is rich in studies which either focus on the project level 
(Hurst & Reeves, 2004; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), the national level (cf. Spackman, 2002; 
Flinders, 2005; Greve & Hodge, 2007) or, in a few instances, the EU level (Teisman & Klijn, 2000; 
Mörth, 2007), few studies combine analysis at the project level and the national level, and none 
combine analysis at the project level with the national level and the EU level, although several 
studies note the existence of common EU-wide procurement procedures and government 
accounting regulations for PPP projects (Eurostat, 2004; Tvarnø, 2006). Thus, although the 
existence and importance of a multi-level perspective on PPPs is to some extent recognised in the 
academic literature, in reality, very little is known about how policies and regulations at the EU 
level and the national level plays together with decisions at the project level to facilitate or constrain 
the formation of concrete PPP projects (see also Paper 1).  
The second analytical dimension in this study, which corresponds to research questions 3 and 4, is a 
multi-level analysis of how the EU-level, the national policy-level, and the project level, interact to 
support or constrain the formation of PPPs, using four PPP schools projects as case examples.8 For 
this part of the analysis, I use multi-level governance theory (Scharpf, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 
2003; Jessop, 2005; Peters, 2010) to analyse the interplay between various levels of government in 
                                                          
8 The reasons for choosing the schools sector are discussed in section 1.5.1: the main reason being that it is a primary 
PPP sector in both countries and that PPP experience in Denmark was very limited within other sectors. 
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decisions about PPP policy, regulation and formation of PPP projects in Denmark and Ireland (see 
also Paper 3 and 4). Multi-level governance theory provides an analytical focus on decision-making 
within a “system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – 
supranational, national, regional and local” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 234). For PPPs, this can for 
example be how EU procurement and budgetary regulations play together with national policies and 
regulations concerning finance and implementation of PPPs; and the consequences of this for the 
formation of concrete PPP projects at the local level. The multi-level governance perspective, which 
is also further discussed in Section 1.3, enables me to supplement the comparative analysis with 
findings about the interplay between various levels of government in policy, regulation and the 
formation of PPPs (see Figure 2).  

Figure2.Thesecondanalyticaldimension:multilevelanalysis.
The aims of this dissertation can thus be summarised as follows: to utilise comparative and multi-
level analytical perspectives to examine how, why and to what consequences PPP policy and 
regulation developed so differently in Denmark and Ireland in the time period from 1999-2009. The 
different parts of the dissertation contribute to this endeavour in the following way: (i) the
comparative analysis, which draws on institutional policy process theories, provides diachronic and 
synchronic accounts of the actor-constellations, policy-games and institutional settings that created 
diverging PPP policies and regulations in Denmark and Ireland from 1999-2009 (research questions 
1 and 2); (ii) the multi-level analysis, which draw on multi-level governance theory, illustrates how 
the EU’s common regulation framework for PPPs interact with the differing national policy and 
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regulation frameworks in the two countries to produce regulatory framework conditions for the 
formation of concrete PPP projects, using four case examples from the schools sector (research 
questions 3 and 4). Figure 3 merges these two dimensions to display the comparative and multi-
level research design of the dissertation.  
Figure3.Thedissertation’scomparativeandmultilevelresearchdesign.

1.3ReviewofthePPPliterature:Trendsandgaps
Following the resurgence of PPPs in modern public administration, a large and rapidly growing 
academic literature on the subject matter has developed over the past ten to fifteen years. This 
literature is extensively cross-disciplinary with significant inputs from a number of research fields, 
including public management (Ysa, 2007), public administration (Koppenjan, 2005), construction 
management (Koch & Buser, 2006), legal studies (Tvarnø, 2006) and accounting (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2003), just to mention a few. Most PPP studies link the concept of PPP with new forms of 
cross-sector collaboration, in which traditional forms of government are gradually being replaced 
with less hierarchical forms of governance. Many PPP studies also see society as becoming more 
complex, which creates a need for joint decisions-making in the mixed sphere between public and 
private (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Pongsiri, 2002; Ysa, 2007).  
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However, a closer look at the literature also illustrates that various researchers use the PPP term for 
very different kinds of organisational arrangements (Hodge & Greve, 2005), and in largely different 
contexts (Weihe, 2005). The literature also contains a number of interpretations of the objectives 
pursued by governments with PPPs (Linder, 1999; McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010), and thus of the 
drivers behind their recent popularity (Hodge & Greve, 2007). All in all, the previous PPP literature 
seems somewhat fragmented, and as previously mentioned, it has not sufficiently addressed PPP 
policy and regulation in a comparative and multi-level perspective, with the consequence that our 
knowledge about these important PPP issues has so far been rather limited. 
In this section, I do three things. First, I examine the origins and various meanings of the PPP 
(Section 1.3.1). Second, I propose a taxonomy that divides previous PPP studies into seven different 
approaches (Section 1.3.2). Third, I present and discuss the theoretical approaches utilised in the 
dissertation (Section 1.3.3).  
1.3.1TheoriginsandmeaningsofPPP
A review of the academic literature illustrates that the concept of ‘PPP’ is an ambiguous term with a 
number of differing meanings and usages in various contexts (cf. McQuaid, 2000; Wettenhall, 
2003; Hodge & Greve, 2005; Weihe, 2005). Moreover, the partnership notion seems to serve as a 
semantic magnet for a broad and quite diffuse range of public-private interaction forms (Vrangbæk, 
2006). A common definition of PPP is that it concerns ‘co-operation of some sort of durability 
between public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share 
risks, cost and resources which are connected with these products’ (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002: 
598; see also Klijn & Teisman, 2005). This definition, however, is rather broad and embraces a 
variety of different institutional arrangements between public and private sector organisations. It is 
also common in the academic literature as well as in policy practice to see PPP as an umbrella 
concept for a broad range of public-private arrangements (Mörth, 2007). Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004), for example, identify at least ten different types of PPPs, while the European Commission 
operates with three primary forms of PPP: contract PPPs, concession PPPs, and institutional PPPs 
(European Commission, 2004; Petersen, 2010a). 
In order to clarify the various meanings and approaches, a number of scholars have talked about 
different ‘PPP families’ or ‘PPP approaches’ (Hodge and Greve 2007; Weihe 2008). A further 
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distinction has been made between ‘economic type partnerships’ and ‘social type partnerships’, 
respectively (Hodge & Greve, 2005: Chapter 1). Economic partnerships involve projects where a 
private sector entity contracts with the public sector to take on the responsibility to design, finance, 
build, operate and maintain for instance a road, a hospital or a school over a long-term period 
(typically 25-35 years). The essence of this form of PPP is the involvement of private finance and 
the sharing (a PPP) or transfer (a PFI) of risks, in a process where the private sector is paid to take 
onboard risks related to various phases of the project (Bing et al., 2005; Johnston & Gudergan, 
2007). Social partnerships, according to Hodge and Greve, involve softer and somewhat less 
formalised partnerships, as found in issue networks and policy communities (2005: Chapter 1; see 
also Deakin, 2002). 
There are also a number of scholars who discuss the ideological origins of the PPP concept (cf. 
Linder, 1999; Wettenhall, 2003; Hodge & Greve, 2005; Mörth, 2007). There seems to be a general 
agreement in the literature that PPP (i.e. the economic version of it) has its roots in the privatisation 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Linder, 1999; Savas, 2000; Hodge & Greve, 2005), and 
moreover, that the NPM reforms of the past decades produced a shift from government to 
governance (Rhodes, 1996; Kooiman, 2003), which fuelled the further dissemination of the 
partnership idea (Mörth, 2007). Many scholars also trace the roots of PPP back to the Blair 
government’s third way partnership rhetoric (e.g. Hodge, 2004; Flinders, 2005). Furthermore, 
Linder (1999) argued that the emergence of PPP was in line with the neoliberal focus on efficiency 
gains, often with an implicit – but sometimes also explicit - assumption about the public sector 
ceding territory to the private sector. Other commentators, especially within the 
construction/infrastructure PPP approach, have suggested that the ideological roots can be found in 
the partnering movement of the 1990s, where PPPs were launched as a means of overcoming the 
adversarial relationships in the construction industry, whereby added value could be realised 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005).  
Looking at partnerships in a historical perspective, Wettenhall (2003, 2005) has been a proponent of 
the view that PPP, though not originally so called, has in fact existed from as early as in the 
privateer shipping of the Spanish War of 1585-1603, in mercenary armies of many subsequent wars 
and in the tax collection systems of previous centuries (see also Hodge & Greve, 2005: Chapter 1). 
Although these historical examples often differ from the specific organisational forms that PPPs 
most often take today, they remind us that the idea of partnership between public and private sector 
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parties might in fact not be all that new. Indeed, Hodge (2004: 37) notes that questions about what 
should be public and what should be private have existed for centuries, and that “PPPs are simply 
the latest chapter in the book”. Savas (2000), in his book about privatisation and PPPs, argues that 
the term partnership might indeed carry less controversial connotations than ‘privatisation’ and 
‘contracting out’. Indeed, as noted by Weihe (2008: 8), “The political power of the PPP label is 
strong and, immediately, it seems to dissolve the traditional left-right ideological debates about pro-
against private service delivery and ownership of public assets”.  
The PPP concept thus carries a lot of ideological luggage, and it seems fair to say that it has been 
surrounded by a certain amount of ‘hype’, ‘neologism’, and ‘language games’ (Linder, 1999; 
Weihe, 2005; Hodge & Greve, 2005: chapter 1). It is also apparent that different studies use the PPP 
concept in very different meanings and contexts, which sometimes leads to perplexities about what 
kind of partnership is in fact examined in the concrete circumstance (Petersen & Weihe, 2007). 
Hence, rather than talking about a single PPP literature, it seems that we are talking about a large 
and relatively disjointed research field that embraces a number of different partnership approaches, 
which I shall discuss in more detail in the following.  
1.3.2SevenapproacheswithinthePPPliterature
In this section, I provide an overview of the field of PPP research. In so doing, I distinguish 
between seven distinct approaches, each with a particular empirical focus and/or set of theoretical 
assumptions. This typology draws on and extends previous classifications of the PPP literature 
developed by Weihe (2005; 2008) and also used by Hodge and Greve (2007) and Vrangbæk (2008), 
which operated with five different PPP approaches; a policy-sector approach; a governance 
approach; a development approach; a local regeneration approach; and a financial infrastructure 
approach.9 In comparison with previous categorisations of the PPP literature, my classification adds 
two additional dimensions: a classification approach and a historical approach (see below). 
Moreover, I suggest that a distinction can be made within the PPP governance approach between 
studies that focus on the governance of operational PPP projects (cf. Hodge, 2004; Ysa, 2007), and 
studies which focus on the formation phase of PPPs (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005). 
This division is important because it highlights that different policy and regulation issues can be 
studied in regard to the operational phase or the formation phase of PPPs: the latter being the focus 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that Weihe (2005) first discussed five PPP approaches, but subsequently narrowed the typology 
down to four approaches (Weihe, 2008). Other PPP scholars, for example Vrangbæk (2008) and Hodge & Greve 
(2007), operate with the five approaches originally developed by Weihe (2005).   
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in this dissertation (for a similar argument; see Koppenjan, 2005). The seven PPP approaches are as 
follows: 
First, a policy sector approach, which studies PPPs within specific policy sectors often with an aim 
of evaluating existing partnerships and facilitating policy-learning (e.g. Rosenau 2000; Hurst & 
Reeves, 2004). The definition of PPP is often broad in this literature with a focus on formal as well 
as informal interaction between government, business and non-profit interest organisations within a 
given policy sector (Deakin, 2002). The lessons drawn from empirical research within this approach 
often have a primary focus on evaluating what kinds of cross-sector collaboration works and do not 
work within the specific policy sector examined. Hence, while many of these studies use the 
concept of PPP, they often position themselves within and contribute to a specific policy sector 
literature rather than the broader PPP literature (cf. Trim, 2001; Martinez et al., 2007).  
Second, a governance approach, which views the upsurge of partnerships in line with a more 
general shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1996), in which various actors at local, 
national and above-state levels need to collaborate to achieve joint decision-making (Van Ham & 
Koppenjan, 2002; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). Studies within the PPP 
governance approach can be broadly divided into two types of contributions: first, studies that focus 
on the governance of operational (i.e. already established) PPP projects. Key issues examined 
within this strand of research include the steering of risks (Hodge, 2004), formal contract structures 
and the incentive systems (Ysa, 2007), and issues regarding financial rewards and payment systems 
(Johnston & Gudergan, 2007: 575), just to mention a few; second, studies which focus on the 
formation phase of PPPs (Koppenjan, 2005). Here, various public and private actors are seen as 
strategic actors that engage in policy-making games about the formation of PPPs within a broader 
institutional decision-environment, defined as the ‘rules of the game’ (Scharpf, 1997; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). Although these two branches of research share an interest in regulation and 
governance of PPPs, in reality, they are thus relatively different in terms of empirical and 
theoretical focus. 
Third, a classification approach, which examines the various meanings of the PPP concept, and 
attempt to make mainly descriptive categorisations of the PPP literature. Hodge and Greve (2005: 
6), for example, draw a distinction between PPPs with loose and tight organisational and financial 
structures, whereas Weihe (2008) makes a distinction between four different PPP approaches based 
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mainly on the empirical context in which they are used. Other classification attempts focus on the 
different usages of the partnership concept in a NPM reform context (Linder, 1999; Hammerschmid 
& Angerer, 2005), while yet again others differentiate between PPPs as mainly contractual or 
‘softer’ partnership arrangements (Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007). A number of both broad and 
narrow taxonomies have thus been developed within the PPP literature, often with a focus on 
different organisational, economic and financial aspects of the partnership relationship (Hodge & 
Greve, 2005: Chapter 1).  
Fourth, a local regeneration approach, which is concerned with partnerships between local 
authorities and corporations as regards local development projects such as urban renewal plans, 
joined commercial and public use of land, combined housing and office projects, etc. (Pierre, 1998; 
Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Ysa, 2007). The understanding of PPP within this approach is relatively 
broad with a focus on the mutual interests of local authorities and private business in developing 
joint regeneration and development projects. Studies within the regeneration PPP approach 
sometimes overlap with the construction/infrastructure approach (see below) in terms of the 
empirical focus on asset-based physical infrastructure development (cf. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 
2002). However, these types of partnerships are often more ad-hoc based and less formalised than 
the commercial financial infrastructure PPP projects. 
Fifth, a third-world development approach, which focuses on partnerships between various national 
and international donor organisations and public authorities in third-world countries in regard to 
economic and institutional development, medical programmes and humanitarian aid (Buse & 
Waxman, 2001; Jamali, 2004). This approach often has a strong normative emphasis on PPPs as 
something qualitative better than previous means of providing development aid (cf. Buse & 
Waxman, 2001). Studies within this approach often use the partnership concept broadly to include 
virtually all kinds of public, private and non-profit organisations that collaborate in a third-world 
development context (Fife & Hosman, 2007). Some of these initiatives labelled as PPP resemble 
broader Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, while others are facilitated by the United 
Nations Office for Partnerships10. Most research within the third world development PPP approach 
is published in the development literature, and is seldom referred to in the broader PPP literature; 
and vice-versa. 
                                                          
10 http://www.un.org/partnerships/
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Sixth, a financial infrastructure approach, which has its roots in the UK Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), which was launched by the Conservative government in 1992 and subsequently adopted by 
the Labour government as PPP (Spackman, 2002; Flinders, 2005).11 This approach embraces the 
alphabet soup of various DBF (Design, Build, and Finance), DBFOM (Design, Build, Finance, 
Operate, and Maintain), and BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, and Transfer) models (Bing et al., 2005). 
It is thus rather narrowly confined to construction and infrastructure schemes, such as schools, 
roads, railways, public buildings, etc. Financial infrastructure PPPs are perhaps the most formalised 
type of PPP within the partnership literature, and they are typically awarded after a bidding round 
according to the EU’s ‘Competitive Dialogue Procedure’ (Tvarnø, 2006; see also Paper 1). The 
contracts are typically long – between 25 and 35 years – and include several or all of the following 
elements: planning; construction; operation; maintenance; and private finance. Research within this 
PPP approach often focus on economic, technical and legal aspects, such as risk sharing (Bing et al., 
2005), contractor bidding (Zitron, 2006) or procurement (Tvarnø, 2006), whereas studies that 
examine broader political and regulation issues is more seldom (although see Flinders, 2005; Greve 
& Hodge, 2010). 
Seventh, a historical approach, which examines partnerships in a broader historical and public 
sector reform context (cf. Linder, 1999; Savas, 2000; Wettenhall, 2005). Studies within this 
approach often link the resurgence of PPPs with the privatisation and NPM movements of the 1980s 
and 1990s (Mörth, 2007), and also as part of a broader trend towards a market-based form of public 
governance (Osborne, 2010), or a ‘leaner’ government (Linder, 1999). Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2003) focus rather narrowly on the development of PFI research, while Flinders (2005) applies a 
broader political perspective with a focus on the development of PPPs within the UK context. Greve 
and Hodge (2007) have made the perhaps most theoretical contribution in a comparative analysis of 
the Danish and Victorian (Australia) PPP initiatives; asking if PPPs “represent a continuation of or 
a break with NPM?” (ibid: 179). They apply a historical institutional theoretical approach to analyse 
PPP policy and institutional change processes within a theoretical framework of path dependencies 
and critical junctures (Pierson, 2004). Other scholars apply a longer historical (and mainly 
descriptive) perspective to trace partnerships centuries back in time (Wettenhall, 2003), although it 
can be argued that these types of arrangements were quite different from the present forms of PPPs 
(Hodge, 2004). 
                                                          
11 See www.privatefinance-i.com.
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These different PPP approaches cover a broad territory of empirical approaches and theoretical 
assumptions, and they can be distinguished from one another mainly on a mix of: (i) empirical 
substance (policy sector studies, local regeneration projects, third world development, financial 
infrastructure schemes); (ii) which actors participate (government, business, non-profit, local 
organisations, donor countries etc.), and; (iii) the organisational characteristics (formal contracting 
or loose organisational arrangements). Another difference is that whereas the governance PPP 
approach builds on an explicit set of theoretical assumptions about strategic actors and 
interdependencies within a broader institutional decision-environment (Klijn & Teisman, 2003), the 
remainder six approaches often build on a less well-defined set of theoretical assumptions, which 
generally gives these studies a more descriptive than explanatory character (cf. Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002; Hurst & Reeves, 2004; Bing et. al, 2005; Martinez et al., 2007).  
In practice, there are also a number of scholars who combine and cut across several of these 
approaches. For example, in a study of PPPs within Danish health-care, Vrangbæk (2008) combines 
the policy sector approach with a governance perspective, where in a comparative study of UK and 
US urban development projects, Ysa (2007) combines the local regeneration and the governance 
perspectives. Many scholars within the Dutch network schools also combine a theoretical 
governance perspective with an empirical focus on local regeneration and 
construction/infrastructure PPP projects (cf. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Koppenjan, 2005). Moreover, book contributions such as Osborne (2000), Hodge and Greve (2005), 
and Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson (2006) also combine various PPP approaches, such as financial 
infrastructure, governance and historical PPP perspectives. This illustrates that the different PPP 
approaches should not be conceived as water-tight compartments, but as empirical and theoretical 
approaches from which various elements can be combined and supplemented, depending on the 
specific context and research questions posed (Weihe, 2005).  
1.3.3TheoreticalframeworksforcomparativeandmultilevelPPPanalysis
My focus in the study, as previously mentioned, is on the significant financial infrastructure type of 
PPP, which emphasises long-term commitment (typically 25-35 years), a systematic sharing of risks 
and responsibilities (Bing et al., 2005), and various combinations of construction, maintenance and 
operation elements into a single contract (Hodge, 2004; Zitron, 2006). I thus operate with a 
relatively narrow understanding of PPP, which I analyse using a broader theoretical framework of 
institutional policy process theories and multi-governance theory (see below). Moreover, I draw on 
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elements from the second branch of the governance PPP approach, which focuses on strategic 
decision-making related to the formation phase of PPPs (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Koppenjan, 
2005; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007).12 The governance PPP approach is where the study mainly places 
itself, although my use of institutional policy-process theories means that this study has a more 
explicit focus on processes than most previous research within this approach (although see Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). Finally, in addition to the financial infrastructure and governance PPP approaches, 
the dissertation also feeds into the policy PPP approach with four PPP case studies from the schools 
sector, although it should be noted that in contrast to for example Rosenau (2000) and Hurst and 
Reeves (2004), my aim is not to evaluate what works and what does not work with PPPs within the 
school sector, but rather to examine four specific PPP projects as case examples of PPP formation 
processes in two different countries (see also Paper 3 and 4).  
The theoretical starting point for the dissertation is the assertion within policy-network and 
governance literature that we are witnessing a change from classic government towards the new 
modes of public governance with participation of various public and private actors drawn from 
below and above central governmet (Rhodes, 1996; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Peters & 
Pierre, 1998; Kooiman, 2003). This trend from government to governance has resulted in a 
dispersal of decision-making authority vertically as well as horizontally; thereby creating a poly-
centric and multi-level governing system (Stoker, 1998; Scharpf, 2001; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Jessop, 2005). The upsurge of the new modes of governance in general, and public-private 
partnerships in particular, has thus been interpreted as a result of the gradual erosion of boundaries 
between market and hierarchy (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Tenbensel, 2005). As this makes 
governments and the private sector increasingly interdependent, it has resulted in a search for 
cooperation, joint decision making and public-private partnerships (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; 
Ysa, 2007). Thus, as noted by Hooghe and Marks, “Modern governance is – and, according to 
many, should be – dispersed across multiple centers of authority.” (2003: 233). 
The academic literature provides various explanations for why we see this development towards a 
poly-centric and multi-level governing system (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005). 
A common argument in the network-governance literature is that modern society is becoming more 
complex, which creates both a possibility and a need for working together across the traditional 
                                                          
12 It should be clear by now that my empirical and theoretical focus in the study is on the development of policies and 
regulations for the formation phase of PPPs, rather than regulation of operational PPP projects.   
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sector-boundaries (Rhodes, 1996; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Edelenbos & Klijn,   
2007). Thus, as argued by Teisman and Klijn, “Partnerships are seen as the best way, in the end, to 
govern the complex relations and interactions in a modern network society” (2002: 198). Yet other 
scholars emphasise the citizens’ increasing demands for high quality public services and the limited 
public resources with which to meet these expectations (Kickert, 1997), which has resulted in a 
search for new organisational arrangements that can deliver better ‘value-for-money’ (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). There are also a number of EU-policy studies which stress the vertical transfer of 
decision-making authority to the EU (Scharpf, 2001; Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004), while others link 
the strains on national policy-making and regulation with the growing significance of the global 
economic markets (Peters & Pierre, 1998).  
The flux in the modes and locus of regulation and governance is also discussed in political science 
literature about regulation of state and markets (cf. Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Minogue, 2004). 
Scholars of regulation have suggested that we today live in a ‘regulatory state’ meaning that “(…) a 
new institutional and policy style has emerged, in which government’s role as regulator advances 
while its role as a direct employer or property-owner may decline through privatization and 
bureaucratic downsizing” (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001: 4). Others speak of ‘regulatory 
capitalism’ or ‘regulatory governance’ (Minogue, 2004), and common to these various prescriptions 
is the assertion that the relationship between market and state is changing with the consequence that 
the characteristics of the state is itself in flux (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). Furthermore, regulatory 
reform is today not as much about deregulation and ‘rolling back the state’ of the neo-liberal eras of 
Thatcherism and Reaganism, as it is about a change in the modes of regulatory governance, with re-
regulation and co-regulation becoming more pronounced in the mixed spheres of public and private 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; see also the penultimate section of Paper 1). 
The changing relationship between government and market has also been examined in the public 
management and administration literature concerning the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 
1991 Lane, 2000; Barzelay, 2001). From the early 1990s onwards the NPM epoch fashioned a 
series of public administration reforms with a focus on privatization, ‘managerialism’, performance 
management, contract-steering, results orientation, efficiency and value for money (Hood, 1991). 
Hence, as noted by Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg (2007: 2), “in many Western states, the preference 
for policy implementation by monolithic bureaucracies has changed in favour of alternative 
arrangements, such as privatization, or the creation of quasi-autonomous organizations or public-
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private partnerships.” However, after the turn of the millennium, scholars began to talk about post-
NPM (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007), and new public governance (Osborne, 2010), within a field of 
increasingly comparative research which critically examined the national similarities and 
differences in the actual implementation and manifestation of these reforms (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg, 2007). Moreover, although 
the focus has so far mainly been on public sector reforms in a national comparative perspective, 
there now seems to be a growing awareness in this literature about multi-level governance issues as 
well (cf. Osborne, 2010; Peters, 2010).  
Previous PPP literature, as I mentioned in Section 1.2, has seen an upsurge of interest in various 
partnership aspects such as procurement, risk sharing, contracting and performance, whereas studies 
of broader policy and regulation issues of PPPs have so far been few, although the literature has to 
some extent recognised the significance of these aspects (cf. Pongsiri, 2002; Flinders, 2005; Greve 
& Hodge, 2010). Moreover, previous PPP studies have largely operated with single case or single 
country research designs, with the consequence that our knowledge about comparative and multi-
level aspects of PPPs has hitherto been limited (although see Greve & Hodge, 2007; Ysa, 2007; 
Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007). PPP research has also, with the PPP governance approach as the 
exception, been primarily descriptive and less explanatory in nature (Greve & Hodge, 2010). All in 
all, as PPP practices do in fact vary considerably across different countries, especially if we look 
beyond a small handful of primarily Anglo-Saxon countries, it seems timely that we intellectually 
start to address comparative and multi-level aspects of policy, regulation and application of PPPs.  
In this study I begin addressing this gap in the literature by using institutional policy process 
theories and multi-level governance theory to analyse PPP policy and regulation in a comparative 
and multi-level fashion. Both analytical dimensions focus on PPP policy and regulation, but in 
different ways. In the comparative dimension, which is mainly informed by the institutional policy-
process theories, the focus is on the emergence and development of PPP policy and regulation over 
time. Compared to previous research in regard to PPP policy and institutional change, which have 
applied macro-level historical institutional theories of path dependency (Greve & Hodge, 2007) and 
sociological institutional analyses of PPP-enabling fields (Jooste & Scott, 2011), my theoretical 
approach is more sensitive to the process characteristics of policy-making, which makes it suitable 
for diachronic and synchronic analysis. Policy and regulation for PPPs is here analysed in a process 
perspective, with a focus on examining and accounting for comparative differences and similarities 
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(see Paper 2, 4 and 5). Conversely, in the multi-level dimension, I mainly use multi-level 
governance theory to examine the interplay between various levels of government in decisions 
concerning policy, regulation and the formation of PPPs (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Jessop, 2005). 
PPPs are here analysed in a governance perspective, with a focus on how different levels of 
government interact and the consequences this has for concrete PPP activity in the two countries 
(see Paper 1, 3 and 4). In conjunction, these theoretical perspectives, which I shall discuss in more 
detail below, enable me to address the overall topic of this dissertation: PPP policy and regulation in 
a comparative and multi-level perspective.  
Policy-process theories include a number of approaches to the analysis of public policy-making, 
including the classic ‘stages model’ as well as theoretical frameworks with a stronger emphasis on 
institutional features of the policy process; hereafter institutional policy process theories (Sabatier, 
1999). In this study, I apply two different frameworks of institutional policy-process theory, which 
present two relatively different pictures of the process of public policy-making (Kingdon, 1995; 
Scharpf, 1997; see also below). The dissertation follows the strategy of ‘filling out’ (Antonsen, 
Greve & Jørgensen, 2000; see also Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007), which means that I analyse the 
same empirical material using various theoretical angles. In so doing, I do not attempt to test which 
of these theory frameworks ‘works better’, or is most ‘fit’ in terms of accounting for the differing 
national PPP approaches, but to gain a breadth and depth in the study’s overall theoretical 
explanatory framework that would not have been achieved using a single theoretical approach 
(Allison, 1971). The relation between the different theoretical frameworks in the dissertation is thus 
that they provide supplementing theoretical perspectives, each of which contributes to elucidate the 
empirical data that I have collected. In the following, I present these theoretical framework 
structured according to how they are used in the five papers.  
Paper 1 draws on the concept of meta-governance to analyse the EU’s common framework of 
policies and regulations for PPP activity at national and sub-national levels of government. The 
notion of meta-governance is a special variant of the multi-level governance discussion, which 
views public policy-making and regulation as a multi-level activity involving local, national as well 
as international players in complex networks of interrelated decision arenas (Scharpf, 1997; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005). Meta-governance is broadly defined as “a regulatory 
framework and environment, and umbrella, for PPP networks” (Koch & Buser 2006: 548). Meta-
governance is thus the common and overall framework of conditions, structures, rules and 
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guidelines - an overarching framework - which taps into and sets the ‘rules of the game’ (Scharpf, 
1997) for PPP activities at national and sub-national levels of government in the EU’s member 
states. The paper illustrates that this EU framework has hitherto been characterised by 
contradictions between budgetary and procurement regulations, which has prevented any direct 
regulations of PPP at national and sub-national levels. The meta-governance analysis thus 
establishes a first account of differing national PPP practices in Denmark and Ireland: the absence 
of a consistent regulatory meta-framework at the EU-level.  
Paper 2 and 3 examine the Danish PPP approach using the theoretical framework of Actor-
Centered Institutionalism (ACI) that was developed by Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz (Mayntz & 
Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1994, 2001) based upon a combination of rational choice institutionalism 
and a more sociological model of the actor. The actor model within this framework thus includes 
both motives based on self-interest and more subjective norms and value-systems (Scharpf, 1997: 
62-66). The ACI framework, or at least the game-theoretic version of it (Scharpf, 1994, 1997), 
views the process of policy-making as a series of games that takes place within one or several 
relatively well-defined decision-arenas. Each arena is characterised by limited substitutability, 
which makes the policy-players interdependent (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
This is reflected in the Danish case where the ministries must continue to play the policy-games 
although they fundamentally disagree on what outcome is desirable, and some ministries such as the 
Tax Authority would even prefer not to play the game at all (see Paper 2). In ACI, institutions are 
seen as the ‘rules of the game’ (Scharpf, 1994; Stoker, 1998), and an important assumption is that 
the institutional settings differ in their capacity for conflict resolution between the policy-players   
(Scharpf, 1997: 47).  
Thus using the ACI framework, in Paper 2, I find a fundamental interest-conflict inside the Danish 
government between budgetary concerns (Ministry of Finance) and pro-PPP solutions (Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs), while the institutional capacity for conflict resolution is too low to 
solve these fundamental interest disputes between the two key policy-player within the decision-
arena (see also Section 1.7.3). This has resulted in the development of a partly uncoordinated PPP 
policy and regulation framework at the national level in Denmark, which is given strategic and 
institutional explanations. These findings are extended in Paper 3, which also includes the local 
project level and procurement regulations at the EU-level. The paper supplements the strategic actor 
perspective with a multi-level analysis of the interplay between policy and regulation and the 
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concrete formation of two PPP projects in the schools sector. The reluctant Danish PPP approach 
are here also given strategic explanations, and the multi-level analysis supplements these findings 
by illustrating how the unresolved policy- and regulation games at the national level, and to a minor 
extent the EU level, creates significant difficulties for public and private actors engaging in PPP 
activity in Denmark.13
Paper 4 analyses the Irish PPP approach using also the theoretical framework of Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism (Scharpf, 1994; 1997), but as the interplay between supra-national, national and the 
sub-national levels turns out to have played a stronger role in the development of Ireland PPP 
approach, in this paper I combine the ACI framework with multi-level governance theory (Marks, 
Hooghe & Blank, 1996; Scharpf, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005). The 
theoretical backbone of the analysis is thus the assumption that the complexity of decision-making 
in PPPs occurs not only in the horizontal (public-private) dimension, which has been the focus of 
previous governance PPP research (e.g. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; 
Koppenjan, 2005), but also in the vertical dimension, where strategic actors at multiple levels of 
government engage in decision-making games about policy, regulation and application of PPPs. I 
argue in the paper that the ACI and the multi-level governance frameworks provide inputs that can 
be combined to create a more realistic (although more complex) picture of the policy-making 
process in a political system characterised by vertically interdependent decision-arenas.  
The ACI framework contributes with a theoretical focus on strategic decision-making in policy-
arenas characterised by limited substitutability, which makes the actors and arenas interdependent 
(Scharpf, 1997; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). The multi-level governance perspective does not refuse 
decision-making at the national arena as important, but it asserts that recent years have not only 
witnessed a horizontal (which is the assumption in mainstream governance theory) but also a 
vertical dispersion of decision authority to supra-national and sub-national levels (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005). The constellation of actors and their strategies is complex in 
the Irish case, because actors are drawn from above and below central government, and moreover, 
from the Irish business sector and the labour unions (although the latter have been less active). The 
paper identifies a tension in the EU between on the one hand supporting the procurement of PPPs, 
and on the other ensuring that PPPs are not merely used as a financial tool with which to circumvent 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that Paper 3 conduct multi-level analysis across the EU-level, the national level and the project 
level, but due to space limitation it does not contain an explicit discussion of multi-level governance theory.  
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appropriate budget procedures in the member states. The course of action taken by the Irish 
government, and in particular the Ministry of Finance, is largely motivated by the prospects of 
removing major capital investments from government balance sheets. The analysis thus reveals a 
direct conflict of interest here between the budgetary concerns at the EU-level and the strategies of 
national policy-players. At the project level, the two case studies from the schools sector reveal that 
the EU level and the national level have in fact only partly played together to support the formation 
of PPPs in Ireland. In paper 4, in line with the analyses of PPPs in Denmark, the development of 
Irish policy and regulation and application of PPPs are given strategic explanations, but the vertical 
interdependencies and institutional complexities created by the multi-level governance structure are 
here emphasised more than in Paper 2 and 3.  
Paper 5 builds on Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams model of public policy-making and 
Barzelay’s event-centered method which I use as a as a structuring device for keeping track of 
events and contextual factors that can influence the three process streams in Kingdon’s model 
(Barzelay et al., 2003; see Section 1.5.3 for a discussion of Barzelay’s event-method). Drawing on a 
revised version of the ‘garbage can’ model of organisational behavior (Cohen, March & Olsen, 
1972), Kingdon sees the policy process as a function of three distinct streams: (i) the problem 
stream, where a given situation is identified and formulated as a problem or issue that calls for 
political attention; (ii) the policy stream where ideas and alternatives float around, waiting to be 
turned into policy alternatives and proposals; (iii) the political stream operates separately from the 
other two streams, and political events in this stream can reshuffle the environment in which 
problems and policies battle for attention (Kingdon, 1995; see also Zahariadis, 1999). The three 
streams are separate with their own logics, dynamics and dominant policy-entrepreneurs, but 
occasionally, policy-entrepreneurs successfully link a problem with a feasible solution that is salient 
in the political environment (Zahariadis, 2003). If such a coupling is successful, a policy window 
opens, which makes a decision feasible (Kingdon, 1995; Travis & Zahariadis, 2002). For example, 
supporters of a given PPP policy may use a political context that is prone to market-based solutions 
in the public sector, while claiming that they present a solution to an existing problem of financing 
essential infrastructure development. However, policy-windows can be unforeseeable, and they can 
close again without any decisions being taken if policy-entrepreneurs are not successful in coupling 
the problem to a feasible solution that can be supported by the political environment. This makes 
the policy process inherently ambiguous and dependent upon the temporal coupling of the three 
process streams (Zahariadis, 1999).  
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The notion of three separate streams that each work on their own terms provides a useful 
framework for supplementing the ACI framework as it paints a considerably more ambiguous 
picture of the policy process. Kingdon’s model has more focus on agenda-setting and broader 
politico-economic context events, and the overall system-rationality is significantly lower than 
in the ACI framework. It should be kept in mind, though, that the multiple-streams model was 
originally developed to explain major policy change within a North-American two-party 
system with changing majority rule of a single party, whereas policy-making in Denmark and 
Ireland is characterised by shifting coalition governments, which may render policy-change 
more incremental here than in the US system. Several scholars have illustrated the usefulness 
of the multiple streams model for a European context (cf. Zahariadis & Allen, 1995; 
Zahariades, 2003; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007; Brunner, 2008), and for the analysis of more 
incremental policy-change as well (Travis & Zahariades, 2002). The general points about 
attention as a limited resource and the temporality/timing as key features of policy-change thus 
seem relevant in a European setting too, although in the present cases I would expect a more 
incremental policy-change than the “irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and 
our society, pushing aside everything that might stand in its path”, which was originally 
envisaged by Kingdon (1995:1).  
Thus using the multiple-streams model, in Paper 5 I supplement the findings from the previous 
papers with a comparative analysis of how PPPs emerged and developed on the policy-agendas 
in Denmark and Ireland, the temporal couplings and the opening of decision-windows, the 
influence of broader context variables such as economic situation or changes in the political 
elite, the consequences of shocks in the political system caused by contemporaneous events 
(such as a major sale and lease-back scandal in Denmark), and the historic preference for public 
versus private provision of public services and infrastructure in both countries. The explanation 
of the different development of PPP policy and regulation in the two countries here focus on 
temporality/timing, broader politico-economic context events, and ambiguity in the policy 
process.  
Table 1 summarises my use of theories in the dissertation’s five papers. 

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Table1.Theoreticalframeworksinthefivepapers.
Paper Litterature Empirical 
focus
Theoretical assumptions 
Paper 1 Meta-governance and 
EU governance theory 
(Stoker, 1998; Scharpf, 
2001; Bórras & 
Jacobsson, 2004; Jessop, 
2005; Koch & Buser, 
2006; Peters, 2010).  
EU-level Blurring of boundaries between public and private has led 
to a dispersal of decision-making authority to actors drawn 
both from above and below central government. This 
makes PPPs policy and regulation subject to a multi-level 
governance situation. Meta-governance is the overarching 
level within this multi-level governance system, which taps 
into and sets the ‘rules of the game’ for PPP activities at 
national and sub-national levels of government. The 
assumption is that actors at various national and sub-
national levels of government - to various degrees - will 
comply with this meta-governance framework. 
Paper 2 
and 3 
Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism  
(Scharpf, 1994, 1997; 
Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995; 
Stoker, 1998; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003; Jensen, 
2003). 
Denmark Strategic actors pursue organisational self-interest within 
an institutional framework defined as the ‘rules of the 
game’.  Policy-games are being played within one or 
several relatively well-defined decision-arenas. Limited 
substitutability makes the actors interdependent. The 
institutional settings differ in their capacity for conflict 
resolution, which means that the solving of interest 
conflicts between policy-players requires a strong 
institutional framework.  PPP policy and regulation and 
application of PPPs are given strategic and institutional 
explanations.  
Paper 4 Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism  
and multi-level 
governance theory  
(Scharpf, 1994, 1997, 
2001; Hooghe & Marks, 
2003; Bache & Flinders, 
2005; Jessop, 2005). 
Ireland Actors are assumed to be strategic policy-players pursuing 
their preferred policy-outcomes within an institutional 
framework that sets the ‘rules of the game’. Decision-
making for PPPs is assumed to be subject to an 
institutional and a strategic complexity both in the 
horizontal dimension and in the vertical dimension where 
decision-arenas are interconnected. The development of 
PPP policy and regulation and application of PPPs are 
given strategic explanations, but the vertical 
interdependencies and institutional complexities created by 
this multi-level governance are more strongly emphasised 
here than in paper 2 and 3.  
Paper 5 Multiple-Streams 
Framework (and 
Barzelay’s event 
centered approach) 
(Kingdon, 1995; 
Zahariadis, 1999; Travis 
& Zahariades, 2002; 
Barzelay et al., 2003; 
Zahariades, 2003; 
Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 
2007). 
Denmark and 
Ireland
The policy process consists of a problem stream, a policy 
stream and a politics stream. The three streams operate in 
independent ways, but can be successfully coupled by 
policy-entrepreneurs to open a ‘policy-window’. When this 
happens, it increases the likely-hood of policy-change, but 
the window can also close without any decision is taken. 
The process of policy-making is characterised by bounded 
rational policy-entrepreneurs and a fundamental ambiguity. 
Development of PPP policy and regulation is here 
explained as a function of temporality/timing, successful 
policy-entrepreneurs, and broader politico-economic 
context events in the political stream. 
The use of - and link between - the theoretical frameworks in the dissertation can thus be 
summarised as follows. First, I apply meta-governance theory to examine the common framework 
of EU regulations for PPP activity in all the EU member states including Denmark and Ireland 
(Paper 1). The insights thereby gained concerning the lack of a common regulatory meta-framework 
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at the EU-level provide the starting point for examining and accounting for the differing PPP 
practices at the national level. For this part of the analyses, I draw on ACI to analyse how and why 
PPP policy and regulation developed at the national level in Denmark (Paper 2). These insights are 
extended by in a further analysis of the Danish PPP case, which examines the interplay between 
various levels of government, notably the national and local levels and to a minor extent the EU-
level, in the formation of Danish PPP projects exemplified by two case studies from the schools 
sector (Paper 3). Turning then to Ireland, I also apply theoretical elements from the ACI framework, 
but as the EU turns out to have played a significant role in the development of Irish PPPs, I combine 
the ACI framework with elements from multi-level governance theory in the analysis which 
includes the EU-level, the national level, and the local project level (Paper 4). Jointly, Paper 2, 3 
and 4 draw on strategic and institutional explanations with emphasis on interdependencies and 
institutional complexity in the horisontal as well as the vertical (multi-level) dimensions. Finally, 
these analyses are supplemented by an additional theoretical framework in Paper 5, where I use 
Kingdon’s (1995) multiple-streams model to comparatively examine how and why PPP policy and 
regulation developed so differently in Denmark and Ireland in the period from 1999 to 2009.  
Figure4.Overviewofthefivepapersinrelationtothedissertation’sresearchdesign.
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Figure 4 outlines how the five papers informed by the theories, which I discussed in the above, each 
relates to and jointly covers the dissertation’s research design, which was outlined in Section 1.2.
1.4TheobjectivesofPPPs
My comparative and multi-level interest in studying national PPP policy and regulation arises both 
from an interest in understanding their similarities and differences, and from an interest in the 
fundamental question as to why governments would in the first place choose to resort to PPPs (or 
not) rather than the traditional public provision, or the ‘pure’ privatisation alternative (see also 
Hodge & Greve, 2005: Chapter 1). Not surprisingly, like the discussions about the various forms 
and meanings of the PPP concept, the question about governments’ rationales for forming PPPs has 
also been subject to heated debate in the academic literature (cf. Linder, 1999; Mörth, 2007; Hodge 
& Greve, 2009). Having made this observation, finding a path between the most upbeat reform 
language and the fiercest criticism is constructive, as I would argue that understanding the various 
objectives of PPPs is fundamental to understanding and accounting for their different usages and 
regulations in various national institutional contexts.  
Accordingly, in this section I review a broad selection of literature regarding the objectives of PPPs 
from the perspective of governments, which is summarised in Table 2. These objectives include 
economic and political aspects as well as broader societal issues, although my focus here will 
mainly be on the political and economic rationales (see also McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010).14
Table2.PPPobjectivesfromtheperspectiveofgovernments.
Objectives Examples/Key findings Reference 
Macro-
economic
Placing capital 
investments off 
balance sheet 
Address
underinvestment 
in public 
infrastructure 
“Limiting the Government’s financial deficit...is often the motivation for favouring 
public-private partnerships.” (p. 596) 
Van Ham & 
Koppenjan (2002) 
“the overriding attraction of the PPP model…has been the opportunity of keeping 
capital investments off balance-sheet.” (p. 164) 
Reeves (2003) 
“In political and popular debate - in the UK as elsewhere - the fact that privately 
financed capital spending is off-budget is often the main reason advanced for 
private financing.” (p. 288) 
Spackman (2002) 
PPP/PFI “address the under investment in public assets to secure the long-term 
future of public services.” (p. 6)  
Ghobadian et. al. 
(2004) 
“Faced with pressure to reduce public sector debt and, at the same time, expand and 
improve public facilities, governments have looked to private sector finance.” (p. 
107)  
Grimsey & Lewis 
(2002) 
Micro-economic  “the principal aim for the public sector is to achieve value-for-money in the Grimsey & Lewis 
                                                          
14 I here use the words ‘objectives’ and ‘rationales’ interchangeably. 
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Value for money 
Risk sharing/ 
transfer 
Reduce costs and 
time overruns 
Competition for 
public services 
services provided...” (p. 117) (2002) 
“In all but a few cases the project would proceed only if the figures showed that the 
PFI option gave better value.” (p. 296) 
Spackman (2002) 
“PPPs may have the potential to provide infrastructure at more reasonable prices 
than comparative delivery…” (p. 46) 
Hodge (2004) 
The authors note ten different government objectives for forming PPPs but focuses 
exclusively on “better value for money in the provision of public infrastructure.” 
(p. 548). 
Hodge & Greve 
(2007) 
“The ethos of allocating risks in a contract is that they go to the party best able to 
control them.” (p. 39)  
Hodge (2004) 
“PPP/PFI are now being seen as essentially a new approach to risk allocation in 
public infrastructure projects” (p. 25) 
Bing et al. (2005) 
The microeconomic argument used to justify the PFI is that efficiency savings 
accrue in PFI deals due to the transfer of risk to the private sector. 
Flinders (2005) 
“PPP/PFI arrangements are founded on the transfer of risk from the public to the 
private sector under circumstances where the private sector is best placed to 
manage the risk.” (p. 117) 
Grimsey & Lewis 
(2002) 
An important element of PPP/PFI is to “effect risk transfer” (p. xiii)  Ghobadian et. al. 
(2004) 
“UK government procurement policy rests on Treasury claims that the private 
finance initiative (PFI) has reduced cost and time overruns “ (p. 127) 
Pollock, Price & 
Player (2007) 
“ There is a long history of publicly procured contracts being delayed and turning 
out to be more expensive than budgeted” (p. 346) 
Grimsey & Lewis 
(2005) 
“the main rewards from partnering…are improvement of programme performance, 
cost-efficiencies, better service provisions…” (p. 489)  
Pongsiri (2002) 
“Also supporting the PPP case is the reality that traditional public sector 
infrastructure project delivery has hardly been a model of efficiency” (p. 38) 
Hodge (2004) 
“PFI/PPP is quite simply best-practice procurement of goods and services from 
private sector providers.” (p. 29) 
Glaister (1999) 
 “All PPPs must go through a competitive tendering process…any PPP project 
is…contingent on the public sector receiving enough acceptable bids” (p. 53) 
Hodge & Greve 
(2007, 2009) 
PPP is “a new governance tool that will replace the traditional method of 
contracting for public services through competitive tendering.” (p. 545) 
Zitron (2006) 
Achieving 
collaborative 
advantage  
Innovation 
Mutual added 
value 
Cooperative 
behaviour  
Private partners “possess the market experience and innovative creativity which 
public parties often lack.” (p. 597) 
Van Ham & 
Koppenjan (2002) 
PPP may provide “the essential pre-conditions to support innovation and embed 
changes in practice” (p. 284) 
Diamond (2006) 
“Because assets and services provided under the PPP model are designed on the 
basis of open output specification…there is potentially scope for greater private 
sector innovation” (p. 166) 
Reeves (2003) 
“PPPs…are based on the idea of mutual added value.” (p. 137) Klijn & Teisman 
(2003) 
“The achievement of the goals of each individual actor requires activities by the 
other actors” (p. 199) 
Teisman & Klijn 
(2002) 
PPP “can be seen as an appropriate institutional means of dealing with particular 
sources of market failure…through co-operative behavior” (p. 487)  
Pongsiri (2002) 
“public and private products and services are increasingly complex…partnerships 
are increasingly viewed as a solution for bundling and juxtaposing the necessary 
material and immaterial elements of products and services (p. 550) 
Koch & Buser 
(2006) 
Political  
Minimising the 
size of the public 
sector 
Improving public 
sector legitimacy
PPP is a means of moving activities from public to private; both operation and 
financing of services and infrastructure. 
Spackman (2002) 
The PPP/PFI “reflects a re-evaluation of the appropriate role of the state, nothing 
less than ‘a seismic switch in the business of government itself’.” (p. 227)  
Flinders (2005) 
“If privatization is a story about private organizations delivering government 
services over the past few centuries, PPPs appear to be the latest chapter in the 
book” (p. 3)  
Hodge & Greve 
(2005) 
‘Partnership gives the government new legitimacy: the efficiency of the private 
sector and the involvement of civil society” (p. 197) 
Teisman & Klijn, 
(2002) 
PPP has a “focus on delivery and output legitimacy. From a liberal democratic 
point of view this emphasis on efficiency is problematic.” (p. 605) 
Mörth (2007) 
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Private sector 
objectives 
“…the private sector expects to have a better investment potential…reasonable 
profit, and…more opportunities to expand business” (p. 489) 
Pongsiri (2002) 
PPPs “open up new markets and offer investment opportunities.” (p. 507) Van Ham & 
Koppenjan (2002) 
What can be learned from Table 1.2? It is apparent that a broad array of PPP rationales from the 
perspective of governments is reported in the academic literature, with many studies reporting 
several potential objectives for using the PPP model. These objectives encompass a wide range of 
economic and political aspects, including the following: macro-economic objectives (placing 
investments off balance sheet, addressing underinvestment), micro-economic objectives (value-for-
money, risk sharing15), achieving collaborative advantage (innovation, mutual added value, 
cooperative behaviour), and political objectives (minimising the public sector, improving public 
sector legitimacy). The review moreover illustrates that the rationales for forming infrastructure 
PPPs have gradually changed over time since they were originally introduced in the UK under the 
PFI prescription (Flinders, 2005), and that even within the relatively confined PPP/PFI approach 
various (and sometimes conflicting) objectives are reported (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010).  
There seems to be a general agreement in the literature that, when introduced by the UK 
Conservative government in 1992, the primary rationale behind the PPP/PFI model was to attract 
private investments in order to remedy macro-economic constraints on public capital budgets by 
placing major investments off government balance sheets (cf. Osborne, 2000; Spackman, 2002; 
Ghobadian et al., 2004; Kay & Reeves, 2004). However, recent academic literature which 
increasingly discuss PPP in a broader legitimacy and accountability context, has been overtly 
critical towards the macro-economic rationales because, it is argued, there is always a bill for the 
public sector to pay for the asset in the long run (Spackman, 2002; Pollock & Price, 2008; Hodge & 
Greve, 2009) 16. Thus, as noted by Hodge and Greve, “The early claim that private financing of 
public infrastructure reduces pressure on public sector budgets and provides more infrastructure 
than is otherwise achievable is seen, therefore, to be largely false. A mechanism through which 
governments may turn a large, once-off capital expenditure into a series of smaller, annualized 
expenditures has simply been provided.” (Hodge & Greve, 2007: 549). It was thus only later, when 
                                                          
15 As opposed to merely risk transfer, which was one of the core principles of the PFI (Spackman, 2002). 
16 Although, as noted by Hodge and Greve, “There is one important exception, however. In the case in which a 
government enters into an infrastructure deal requiring users or citizens to pay directly, such as tolls on a new road, it is 
clear that there is little impact on public budgets. Such an arrangement does reduce pressure on public sector budgets, 
but only because government has essentially purchased the infrastructure through the private credit cards of future road 
users rather than using its own resources.”(Hodge & Greve, 2007: 549) 
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the Blair government came into office in 1997, that PPP came to be commonly associated with a 
broader range of micro-economic and political objectives, which are now often seen as rationales 
for implementing PPPs (Flinders, 2005).  
Furthermore, although PPPs clearly involve both public and private partners (see also Section 1.5), 
it is noticeable from Table 2 that only few public administration and management studies actually 
discuss the objectives of PPPs from the private sector partners’ perspectives. Further, when private 
rationales are indeed examined, they are often associated relatively narrowly with maximising 
profit, access to new markets, and new investment opportunities (Pongsiri, 2002; Van Ham & 
Koppenjan, 2002; European Commission, 2004). This is somewhat paradoxical since several of the 
objectives discussed on the public sector side explicitly or implicitly assume a less profit-oriented 
and more collaborative private sector approach (for example sharing of responsibilities, 
collaborative advantage, mutual added value, etc.). Against this background, in this study I have 
chosen to examine both the rationales and opinions of the public and private organisational 
representatives engaged in PPP activity (see Section 1.5.2).  
So, based on this review of a broad array of literature, it is clear that not only the meaning of the 
PPP concept but also the objectives of PPPs are characterised by greatly differing interpretations 
and meanings. Clearly, the objectives reported in the literature are much wider in nature than simply 
macro-economic ones, and to see the PPP concept merely as a specific management, procurement 
or financing tool would thus seem to greatly underestimate the range of objectives and interests 
which are potentially pursued with PPPs. Although I would tend to agree with Linder (1999) and 
Mörth (2007) that PPP is not a neutral concept, and furthermore, that it does seem to bear a 
resemblance to earlier waves of NPM and privatisation, it is overtly difficult to draw a single 
statement or conclusion about the rationales of governments in resorting to PPPs. Accordingly, in 
this dissertation, I will make this issue subject to empirical analysis by use of qualitative methods 
and in-depth case studies, which I shall present in the following section.  
1.5Methodologyanddatacollection
In this section, I present the dissertation’s methodology and empirical data collection. First, the case 
method is outlined and the choice of cases is discussed (Section 1.5.1). Second, an overview of the 
collected data and a discussion of the methods of data collection are provided (Section 1.5.2). Third, 
I present the various techniques of empirical data analysis utilised in the study (Section 1.5.3). 
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1.5.1Casemethodandcasechoice
The research questions of this dissertation were addressed by means of a comparative case study 
research design17, drawing in particular on the comparative political science tradition (e.g. Lasswell, 
1956; Lijphart, 1971, 1975; Peters, 1998), and the literature on qualitative case study research (cf. 
Kvale, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Barzelay et. al., 2003; Yin, 2003). According to Yin (2003), the case 
study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin, 2003: 13). The case study method has an advantage compared with large-N-studies “in respect 
to the ‘depth’ of the analysis, where depth can be understood as empirical completeness and natural 
wholeness or as conceptual richness and theoretical consistency” (Blatter, 2008). Moreover, the 
case study approach allows for the use of multiple sources of empirical data through the method of 
data triangulation, which increases the reliability of the results and conclusions because “any 
finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is 
based on several different sources of information” (Yin, 2003: 98; see also Flick, 1992; Peters, 
1998).  
Furthermore, in terms of choosing cases for comparison, the case study method is fundamentally 
different from the statistical method by relying on fewer cases which have been strategically 
chosen, based on “expectations about their information content” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). This PhD 
dissertation is designed as an embedded multiple case study (Yin, 2003: 40) with seven cases in 
total: two country cases (Denmark and Ireland), four schools sector cases (two in each country), and 
the EU18. What I find especially interesting is a comparative study focusing on countries that are at 
the same time members of the EU and vary with regard to the use of PPPs. EU member states all 
carry out PPP projects within a common overall regulatory framework of the Single Market, fiscal 
convergence criteria, common public procurement rules and value-added tax. Placing the study 
within the EU gives a common general economic regulatory framework to the cases, thereby 
holding some factors constant while studying variance in national modes of PPP regulation. 
Moreover, choosing cases within the EU brings with it some unique opportunities for boosting our 
knowledge on the interplay between multiple levels of policy and regulation: 1) the national level; 
2) the specific project level, and; 3) the EU level (see also Figure 3 in Section 1.2). 
                                                          
17 This is equivalent to what Yin refers to as a ‘multiple case study design’ (2003: 39).  
18 The EU can be seen as a case study of the roles of international organisations in influencing, both directly and 
indirectly, policy-making and regulation of PPPs at the national and sub-national levels. 
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
The choice of Denmark and Ireland for the comparison was motivated by their display of 
differences in PPP policy and regulation and the number of actually implemented PPP projects. The 
two countries have thus been chosen because they offer a contrasting empirical situation, which 
means that in this dissertation I seek a theoretical replication; i.e. contrasting results across the two 
cases but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003: 47; see also Greve, 1997). Although I would ideally 
have chosen a ‘most similar cases’ or a ‘most different cases’ research design (Peters, 1998), this 
was not possible because the cases were both similar and different across a number of dimensions 
(see Table 3). For example, both countries are small, open economies with a population of 
respectively 5.5 million (Denmark) and 4.3 million (Ireland), they were both late adopters of PPPs 
as well as wider privatisation measures (Greve, 1997; Reeves, 2003), and they are both part of a 
larger polity (the EU), which makes them subject to common EU regulations such as the public 
procurement directive and on/off balance sheet regulations for PPP projects (Eurostat 2004; see also 
paper 1).  
But the two countries also differ in a number of dimensions. Whereas Denmark has a strong 
tradition of decentralised local government, Ireland still has a centralised state structure in spite of 
recent decentralisation initiatives (Coakley & Gallagher, 2008).19 Another difference lies between 
the civil law (Denmark) and the common law (Ireland) traditions, and likewise, in terms of public 
administration and civil service cultures, the difference between an Anglo-Saxon ‘public interest’ 
model and a Scandinavian20 public administration model (Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004: 52). Thus, on balance, I will argue that the two countries primarily display 
differences in relation to the explanandum, and both differences and similarities in regard to the 
explanans. Accordingly, in line with Christensen and Lægreid (2007), the research design of this 
PhD dissertation can be characterised as a “mixed system research design”, which means that there 
are variations both in regard to the explanandum and the explanans (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007: 
14). Thus, to sum up, Denmark and Ireland have been chosen because they provide contrasting 
empirical situations in regard to PPP policy and regulation and the number of actually implemented 
PPP projects, while holding constant a number of background variables, which were assumed to be 
                                                          
19 For PPPs this means that whereas most PPP projects in Denmark would potentially be carried out by local 
governments, in Ireland most PPP projects would be carried out by sector departments and agencies in direct 
collaboration with the management of a school (this is, for example, the case in both the two Irish PPP school cases). 
20 In Pollitt and Bouckaert’s classification, Denmark could thus be compared with the Swedish, Finnish and Dutch 
models, which are a form of hybrid between the German Rechtsstadt model and the Anglo-Saxon ‘public interest’ 
model (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 52-54). 
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important (such as long-term membership of the EU, small, open economies, late introduction of 
PPPs).    

Table3.KeyfeaturesofDenmarkandIreland’spoliticalandadministrativesystems.
Denmark Ireland 
Population 5.5 million 4.3 million 
GDP per capita 
(current prices) 
€42.300 €41.800 
State system Unitary state Unitary state 
Membership of EU  Yes Yes 
Legal system Civil law Common law (with some moderations) 
Centralised versus 
decentralised structure 
Decentralised (major structural reform 
strengthened local governments but weakened 
regional authorities) 
Centralised (although with some recent reforms 
towards more decentralised government) 
Government
composition and 
ideology 
Coalition governments: 
1993-2001: Centre-Left government 
2001-present: Liberal-Conservative 
government 
Coalition governments: 
1993-1994: Fianna Fáil and Labour  
1994-1997: Fine Gael, Labour and     
Democratic Left 
1997-2007: Fianna Fáil and Progressive 
Democrats 
2007-present: Fianna Fáil, Green Party, 
Progressive Democrats/Independent 
Public sector reforms Reluctant adoption of privatisation measures  
Reforms primarily directed at the internal 
functioning of the public administration 
 Slow adoption of privatisation measures until 
1999 
 More comprehensive market reforms adopted 
after the turn of the millennium 
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Schools sector case studies
In terms of case choice at the project level, as previously mentioned, four schools sector PPP 
projects, two in Denmark and two in Ireland, were researched. The schools sector was chosen 
because, at the time this PhD project was commenced in January 2007, this was the only sector in 
Denmark where two PPP projects had in fact been considered as PPPs. In Denmark, two primary 
schools projects of similar size and scope were chosen: Vildbjerg School in the western part of the 
country, and Hoeng School in the municipality of Kalundborg in the middle of the country. These 
two projects were the only two schools sector projects in Denmark at the time (although a third PPP 
school project has now been built). In Ireland, even though PPP activity was more widespread, most 
projects had been seen in the roads sector, whereas just three projects had been finished in the 
schools sector: a bundle of five PPP primary schools, Cork School of Music and the National 
Maritime College of Ireland (located in the suburbs of Cork in southern Ireland).  
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In order to maximise variance among the cases and thus elucidate both how policy and regulation 
can facilitate and hinder the formation of concrete PPP projects, I chose a school project where PPP 
had been successfully implemented, but very importantly, also a project where the PPP model had 
been seriously considered but not chosen or had run into serious problems in the formation stage 
(see Table 4). Using cases with both decisions and non-decisions allowed me to carefully examine, 
in both Denmark and Ireland, how PPP policy and regulation facilitated or hindered the decisions as 
to whether or not to initiate a PPP project. Clearly, the cases cannot be statistically representative of 
the total population of PPP projects in the two countries, but they can provide the basis for applying 
analytical concepts and theories to the empirical case studies and thus provide the basis for 
“analytical generalisation” about how and why PPP policy and regulation served to support or 
hinder the formation of concrete PPP schemes (Yin, 2003: 32; see also Flyvbjerg, 1999). 
Table4.Caseschosenfromtheschoolssector.
Successful formation of PPP 
project 
PPP project cancelled/ran into serious 
problems in formation phase 
Denmark Case 1: Vildbjerg school Case 2: Kalundborg school 
Ireland Case 3: National Maritime College of Ireland Case 4: Cork School of Music 
1.5.2Datacollection
The data collected for the purpose of the study consists mainly of qualitative sources, which is 
supplemented by Eurostat archive data containing key economic figures about government sector 
spending and deficits in the two countries. In accordance with the comparative and multi-level 
analytical framework of the study (see Section 1.2), I have collected written sources and conducted 
interviews at the EU-level with key informants in the Commission and other EU bodies involved 
with regulation of PPPs; at the national level in Denmark and Ireland with centrally placed civil 
servants in the ministries developing policy and regulation of PPPs as well as key representatives of 
affected interest organisations; and, finally, at the project level with public and private projects 
managers involved in the planning and formation of the four PPP projects and, if relevant, civil 
servants in local or national administrations involved in the concrete projects.  
These data were collected for the period from 1999 (when PPPs were introduced in the two 
countries) to the end of 2009, when I stopped collecting new empirical data except for material on 
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how the financial crises has affected PPP, which was collected during 2010 (see Section 1.7.4 on 
PPPs and the financial crisis). I have collected the following sources:  
 Semi-structured expert interviews (with public as well as private informants at national 
level, project level and EU level) 
 Official policy documents, government reports, legislation, guidance material, press 
releases, private reports and background notes 
 Government archives of speeches, questions to ministers, parliamentary debates, etc.  
 Secondary sources, in particular background information regarding the Irish political and 
economic system 
 Material relating to the four case studies of schools sector projects: project outline, tender 
material, consultant reports, press releases, background documents, etc.  
 Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and the Organization for 
Economic Development (OECD) Outlook archive data containing key economic figures 
about government sector spending and deficits 
To organise and keep track of the large body of data, I formed a database to register central 
information including type of source; date of publication; and the responsible authority (see Table 
5). This database was gradually extended during the data collection phases, and by giving an 
overview over and easy access to the written sources, it subsequently provided the basis for a 
common and systematic analytical treatment of the collected material (see also Section 1.5.3).  
Table5.Overviewofdocumentsinthedatabase
Type of source Ireland Denmark EU 
Policy papers 12 10 6 
Dedicated PPP legislation and binding decisions 4 2 - 
Other legislation and binding decisions of relevance to PPPs 3 8 7 
Government guidance papers 14 7 2 
Major reports and analyses 15 8 3 
Framework contracts and comparator tools 4 5 - 
Press releases and transcripts of speeches etc. 12 4 1 
Documents and reports related to schools sector PPP cases  25 6 - 
Total number of sources (sum) 89 50 19 
The collection of empirical data started with a course of broad desk research with searches on, for 
example, ‘Public-Private Partnerships Ireland’, ‘Public-Private Partnerships European Union’, and 
40 
‘Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber Danmark’ [Public-Private Partnerships Denmark]. This first round 
of searches established an overview of the relevant public and private organizations, web pages, and 
of the type and amount of material available online. This was followed up by a second phase of 
systematic searches on all official government material in relation to PPPs in the two countries and 
in the EU. By using this method, I in a manner of speaking ‘emptied’ all government and business 
websites for relevant PPP material, which was stored in a database (see below). Then, in the third 
search phase, I turned the focus from government material to material on PPPs published by 
business confederations, major consultancy firms21, labour unions etc. (see Appendix 4-6 for an 
overview of all the collected sources). In the fourth phase, the written sources were supplemented 
by face-to-face expert interviews in the EU (Brussels and Luxembourg), Denmark and Ireland (see 
discussion of interviewing below). This was, finally, followed up by a round of shorter follow-up 
talks and telephone-interviews to validate facts and interpretations that came up during the course of 
interviewing, and collection of additional collection of written sources, which came up during the 
rounds of interviewing. Table 6 summarises the five phases in my data collection process. 
Table6.Thefivephasesofdatacollectioninthestudy.
Data 
collection
step 1 
Broad searches on ‘Public-Private Partnership’ 
in Denmark, Ireland, and at the EU-level. 
Results: A preliminary overview of relevant web-pages, 
significant PPP policy papers and regulations, and public 
and private organizations which were subsequently 
appointed for interviews.  
Data 
collection
step 2 
Detailed search on all official government web-
pages, including Danish, Irish and EU-level 
organisations. 
Results: Systematic overview of all official written PPP 
sources, including guideline material, legal sources, 
reports, project descriptions, technical notes about tax and 
value-added tax, competition regulation, green and white 
papers, etc.  
Data 
collection
step 3 
Detailed search on all private sector 
organisations’ web-pages, including interest 
organisations and private PPP companies 
involved in the four school projects. 
Results: Collection of analyses, reports, policy-papers, 
project descriptions, position papers, press releases, etc. 
published by private PPP organisations. 
Data 
collection
step 4 
Face-to-face expert interviewing with public 
and private interviewees at the EU-level, the 
national policy-level in Denmark and Ireland, 
and in relation to the four PPP school projects.  
Results: Digital recordings of 29 face-to-face sessions with 
PPP experts covering all aspects of the empirical research 
design. Interviews in the EU and Ireland were conducted in 
English, the remainder in Danish.  
Data 
collection
step 5 
Follow-up talks and shorter telephone 
interviews with respondents, and additional 
collection of material which came up during the 
rounds of interviewing. 
Results: Validation of facts and interpretations from the 
interviews and additional written material, including 
material handed out by the respondents, which was not 
publicly available (for example internal documents and 
notes).  
In terms of how the data collection strategy is linked to the topic of the study, an important 
observation in this respect concerns compared way in which the institutional organisation of PPP 
                                                          
21 I chose three major consultancy firms for this search: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte. 
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regulation deviates from a ‘classic’ government-industry set-up, because this makes it fundamental 
to source both public and private PPP partners (see also Weihe, 2008). Compared to a ‘classic’ 
industry regulation set-up, a PPP involves not only a public regulator and a private partner, but 
actually two public sides and a private partner. The public side is divided into, first, regulatory 
authorities operating at the national level with formation of the regulation framework for PPPs, and 
second, public partners that engage in concrete PPP projects together with a private partner (see 
right handside in Figure 5). Accordingly, in order to collect material about the various actors that 
are participating in decisions about policy, regulation and application of PPPs, I have sourced 
organisations from both the public and private sectors and at multiple levels of government for 
interviews and written sources. 
Figure5.TheinstitutionalorganisationofPPPregulationversustraditionalindustryregulation.
The expert interviews and the primary documents display a certain division of labour in the 
dissertation. For example, a government green paper or guideline document can provide detailed 
information about the official government initiatives and the formal regulation of PPPs, but such 
documents provide little if any information about the policy processes, negotiations and informal 
procedures which are an essential part of public policy making (Barzelay et. al., 2003). The 
interviews contained such process knowledge about policy negotiations, interest positions, and 
intermediate outcomes of processes, bargains, compromises and differences of views among key 
policy actors and institutions, which do not display in the final texts of official government material. 
Thus, while the written sources provided the primary source information in terms of addressing 
National regulation of PPPs 
Public partner Private partner 
Public-Private Partnership 
Classic regulatory setup 
National regulation 
Industry 
EU regulation EU regulation of PPPs  
    PPP-regulatory setup 
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‘what’ and ‘when’ types of questions (what happened, when did it happen?), the interviews 
provided the primary sources of information related to answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of 
questions (how was a specific decision taken, why was it taken?).  
Interviewing 
The use of in-depth, semi-structured expert interviews provides one of the fundamental sources of 
obtaining knowledge in case study research, because it allows access to empirical information 
accumulated at the personal level and therefore not necessarily appearing in official policy 
documents (Kvale, 1997; Barzelay et al., 2003). In this study, interviews were utilised as a means 
of:
 Getting access to information about processes: for example, how often an intergovernmental 
group on PPPs meets; how the relationship between various government departments is 
organised; how major decisions are taken. 
 Consolidating and cross-checking facts about specific events. 
 Identifying critical events in the data set and establishing relationships between events, 
sequences of actions, and changes in actor positions. 
 Identifying and understanding intermediate outcomes of processes and negotiations which 
often do not appear in the final documents that are officially available. 
  Interpreting differences and conflicts of views among various key actors. 
The interviews were elite interviews in the sense that they were conducted with official 
representatives of government departments and agencies and senior managers in the private 
companies, which had been closely involved in the specific decisions, and not, for example, with 
end users of a PPP school facility, such as teachers, pupils, parents, etc. (see Greve, 1997). A total 
number of 37 respondents were interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation in 29 sessions. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face at the location of the respondent’s workplace, because I 
considered it important to meet the respondents in their surroundings to establish a trust-based 
interview situation (Kvale, 1997). These interviews were supplemented by around 15 shorter 
interviews and follow-up talks over telephone or email to verify or discuss specific facts or issues, 
or to collect additional information on developments and decisions which took place after the 
interview.  
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The interviews were conducted in three rounds. In the first round of interviewing, which concerned 
the EU’s common regulation and policy framework for PPPs, interviews with EU representatives 
were conducted in Brussels and Luxembourg in July 2008. Next, interviews relating to the Danish 
PPP policy and regulation as well as the two PPP school projects were carried out in Copenhagen, 
Århus, Herning and Kalundborg between September and November 2008. Finally, I travelled to 
Ireland in November 2008 and again in December 2008 to conduct interviews at the national level 
with government ministries and departments as well as private sector representatives in Dublin and 
Belfast (Northern Ireland), and to Cork and Tullamore to conduct interviews regarding the two Irish 
PPP school cases (see Table 7).  
Table7.Listofinterviews.
Organisation Number of 
respondents 
Location of interview Date of interview 
DG Energy and Transport (DG Tren) 1 Brussels, Belgium July 1. 2008 
DG Internal Market and Services (DG 
Markt) 
1 Brussels, Belgium July 2. 2008 
DG Research 1 Brussels, Belgium July 3. 2008 
Joint Assistance to Support Projects in 
European Regions (Jaspers) 
1 Brussels, Belgium July 3. 2008 
Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (Eurostat) 
1 Luxembourg, Luxembourg July 4. 2008 
European Investment Bank (EIB) 1 Luxembourg, Luxembourg July 4. 2008 
Danish PPP Competence Unit  1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 6. 2008 
Danish Construction Association 1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 6. 2008 
Danish Tax Authority 3 Copenhagen, Denmark October 6. 2008 
Danish Chamber of Commerce 2 Copenhagen, Denmark October 8. 2008 
Danish Ministry of Finance 2 Copenhagen, Denmark October 8. 2008 
Local Government Denmark 2 Copenhagen, Denmark October 10. 2008 
Danish Ministry of Transport 1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 15 2008 
Danish Ministry of the Interior 1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 21 2008 
Danish Transport and Logistics 
Association
1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 22. 2008 
Confederation of Danish Industry 1 Copenhagen, Denmark October 28. 2008 
Irish Central PPP Policy Unit 3 Dublin, Republic of Ireland November 4. 2008 
Irish National Roads Authority 1 Dublin, Republic of Ireland November 4. 2008 
Ernst & Young 1 Belfast, Northern Ireland November 6. 2008 
Irish Ministry of Education and Science 2 Tullamore, Republic of Ireland November 7. 2008 
Local Municipality of Herning 1 Herning, Denmark  November 10. 2008 
MT Højgaard 1 Århus, Denmark November 11. 2008 
DanEjendomme A/S 1 Århus, Denmark November 12. 2008 
Local Municipality of Kalundborg 1 Kalundborg, Denmark November 13. 2008 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 1 Copenhagen, Denmark November 17. 2008 
Irish National Development Finance 
Agency 
1 Dublin, Republic of Ireland December 15. 2008 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions  1 Dublin, Republic of Ireland December 16. 2008 
Irish Business Confederation 1 Dublin, Republic of Ireland December 16. 2008 
Cork Institute of Technology 1 Cork, Republic of Ireland December 18. 2008 
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The interviews were conducted according to a semi-structured interview guide (Kvale, 1997), which 
gave them a similar overall format and structure to provide a common knowledge basis for 
conducting comparative analysis (Peters, 1998). Moreover, the semi-structured interview method 
also allowed the respondents to bring up topics and points that I initially did not ask them about, 
and they could thus supplement with new knowledge and different interpretations of the various 
decisions and events, which I could later utilise for the intra-event and cross-event analysis (see 
below). Prior to the interview, each interviewee was contacted with a letter including a short 
introduction to the PhD project, the overall aim of the research, and the purpose of the interview 
(see Appendix 1). This facilitated a pre-interview dialogue process (over the telephone or email), in 
which the questions were further qualified and refined to fit the specific organisational context of 
the interview. The final interview protocol was sent to the respondent(s) two or three days in 
advance of the session, which allowed the respondent to prepare, for example by checking 
background information or bringing relevant material to the interview, which I could later utilise in 
the analysis (see Appendix 2 for an example of the interview guide).  
The choice of respondents for the interviews was based on two criteria: (i) public and private 
organisations which had previously published documents or reports on PPPs or been involved in the 
four PPP school projects were contacted; (ii) organizations pointed out through introductory 
telephone interviews with representatives of a number of ministeries and organisations (some of 
which turned out not to be involved in regulation of PPPs; for example the Danish Competition and 
Consumer Authority). Furthermore, to validate the list of respondents, at the end of each interview, 
I asked the interviewee about other relevant actors and organisations in the field. Through this 
process, a list of key respondents was constructed with representatives of public and private 
organisations in both Ireland and Denmark and at various levels of government (EU, national level, 
sub-national level) in accordance with the comparative and multi-level design of the study. 
Interviewees in public organisations generally held the title of head of unit, head of department, or 
similar, whereas representatives of private business were typically senior managers or similar.  
The duration of the interviews was between 50 to 100 minutes, with most lasting between 60 and 75 
minutes. The respondents in public and private organisations were generally willing to participate in 
interview sessions, although many requested a partial anonymity as a condition for participating. I 
decided to promise the partial anonymity to the respondents after a number of informal negotiations 
over telephone or mail, which took place before the first round of interviewing, because it turned 
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out that my access to respondents would otherwise be limited. The partial anonymity meant that I 
could not make direct quotes of passages from the interviews, but instead of using direct quotes, I 
informed the respondents that I would use all statements, information and opinions gained during 
the interviews. These conditions were eventually accepted by all the respondents, although one 
interviewee in Ireland suggested that he would be able to ‘say more’ under full anonymity. I 
handled that by first conducting the semi-structured interview and thereafter having a more informal 
talk (which turned out to bring little if any additional information which had not already been 
brought up in the interview). It is thus my impression that the interviewees were generally ‘willing 
to talk’, also about more controversial issues such as differing interests and strategies among 
ministries, although especially the civil servants in the ministries strongly preferred that I use my 
own words to interpret and present what they had said during the interview, rather than quote them 
directly.  
As seen in Table 7, most organizations were represented by one interviewee while a few 
organizations were represented by two or three. The varying numbers of interviewees reflects the 
internal division of work and dispersal of knowledge in each organization, and was thus not a 
choice that I made. For example, in the Danish Ministry of Finance, two employees were sharing 
the responsibility for the work with PPPs, and when I contacted the ministry both wished to 
participate in the interview session. Likewise, in the Irish PPP Policy Unit under the Ministry of 
Finance, three people worked with the area at the time of my interview there, and all three 
participated in the interview. Another example is the Danish Tax Authority, where tax treatment of 
PPPs is seen as a technical issue with specialised knowledge dispersed among different persons, or 
in the Irish Ministry of Education and Science, where two civil servants worked with PPPs and both 
participated in the interview session. 
The use of a single (or a few) individuals as ‘spokespersons’ of the whole organisation raises some 
methodological issues, which relates to the question about methodological individualism when 
engaging interviewees representing organisations or groups of individuals (Rutherford, 1994; 
Scharpf, 1997). By assuming that only individuals are perceived as being capable of performing 
action, the dissertation belongs to the methodologically individualistic research paradigm 
(Rutherford 1994: Ch. 3). However, at the same time, I have an explicit focus on examining and 
explaining the policy decisions of composite actors such as ‘the Finance Ministry’, ‘the Tax 
Authority’, ‘DG Internal Market and Services’, ‘local municipality’, etc. This data collection issue 
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is basically what Scharpf (1997) refers to as the composite actor question: “In other words, the use 
of actor-theoretic concepts above the individual level presupposes that the individuals involved 
intend to create a joint product or achieve a common purpose” (ibid.: 54).  
This generalization, as a leap from the interviewee(s) to the composite actor level basically is, is 
based on the assumption that there is consistency between the expressions of individual and the 
organization which they represent (Scharpf, 1997). It will in practice always be an approximation to 
reality to interview one or two representatives of a given organization and subsequently use those 
statements to make interpretations on the overall organization. The official appointment of the 
respondents as representatives of their respective organisations would make it more plausible to 
interpret knowledge accumulated at the personal level as representing collective perceptions 
compared, for example, to a more loosely organised network of actors. But I cannot exclude the 
possibility that due to informational and cognitive limitations (and perhaps also personal interests), 
my respondents will speak from the place and the level in the organisation, where he or she is 
located (see also Kvale, 1997).  
Another delimitation regarding the use of interviews in the dissertation relates to the presence – or 
rather, lack – of the political level in the interviews. As previously noted, interviews with public 
sector officials (at local, national and supra-national levels) were carried out at the administrative 
level (central government departments, regulatory agencies, local municipalities, General 
Directorates, etc.), rather than at the political level (ministers, local mayors, EU commissioners, 
etc.). I realised early on in this project that it would not be possible to get interview appointments 
with currently sitting political leaders and ministers in Denmark and Ireland and Commissioners in 
the EU, at least not for a PhD dissertation project.22 I did not interpret this as a lack of willingness 
or openness, but rather as a reflection of the priority of scarce time and also as a reflection of the 
actual division of labour between the political and administrative level: whereas ministers and other 
high-level politicians set out the general policy directions, in reality, the daily business of regulating 
PPPs is a technical issue which is basically carried out at the administrative level without much 
political interference (see also Paper 2). Moreover, while in speeches, policy papers etc., 
government ministers commonly express rather enthusiastic views about the use of PPPs, but at a 
pretty general level, it became clear that the administrative level was the primary holder of 
                                                          
22 Thus, when I contacted the Danish PPP Competence Unit, where I had my best contacts, it was strongly indicated that 
an interview appointment with the responsible minister – the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs – was very 
unlikely. Therefore, I chose to carry out the interviews at the administrative levels instead. 
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knowledge about how and why specific events occurred and decisions about policy and regulation 
for PPPs were taken, as well as how concrete PPP projects were formed (or not). Access to 
respondents at the political level thus turned out to be less important than first anticipated, and this 
information was instead sourced from the large number of policy documents, archive data of 
parliamentary discussions, press releases, etc., and thereafter triangulated with the more detailed 
information collected through the interviews at the administrative level (Barzelay et al., 2003).  
1.5.3Dataanalysisanddisplays
I have worked with the empirical data using various techniques of data analysis and displays, which 
I discuss in this section (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Dahler-Larsen, 2002). A first, and rather 
rudimentary, analysis was conducted utilising the database of written sources, which I read through 
one by one while taking notes about content and key events. By utilising visual methods for data 
analysis including time-lines and time-ordered matrix (Eisenhardt, 1989), I produced a 
chronological overview of the flow of events in each of the cases (see for example Paper 4). The 
preliminary analysis was then followed up by interpretation of the semi-structured expert 
interviews. After returning from each round of interviewing, I listened through the interviews (one 
or several times) and prepared summaries while I still had the interview fresh in mind, as 
recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994:76). Thus using the method of data triangulation 
(Peters, 1998), I compared the interview notes with findings from previous interviews and the 
content from the database.  
Further, to provide a basis for systematic assessment and comparison of the cases, the heuristic 
displayed in Figure 6 was adopted to establish relations between various events in the data set 
(Barzelay et al., 2003: 36). 
Figure6.Heuristicfororderingcaseevidencewiththeeventcentredapproach(Barzelayetal.,2003)
Later 
events 
Contemporaneous events 






Prior events 


The episode 
Related events 
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The primary object of analysis is denominated as the episode. Each case is constructed as an 
episode, which is the development of policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland between 1999 
and 2009. Each episode is constituted by a number of events, that is, specific decisions about policy 
and regulation for PPPs. Furthermore, to contextualise the episode, the concepts of prior events and 
contemporaneous events are introduced. Prior events occur before the primary object of study, the 
episode, and provide the background settings for studying the episode. Politico-economic 
background settings are, for example, prior events that condition the episode. Contemporaneous 
events occur in the same time setting as the episode, and are events that are not part of the episode 
but influence the events constituting the episode. Change in the political elite is an example of a 
contemporaneous event. Together, prior and contemporaneous events are sources of explanans of 
the episode (the explanandum), and are used to provide theory-based explanations of Denmark and 
Ireland’s development of PPP policy and regulation.23 Further, related events occur in the same 
time frame as the episode, but are more affected by the episode than vice-versa. The concrete PPP 
projects in the schools sector (and other sectors) are examples of such related events.  Finally, later 
events designate events that happen after the episode, which means that including the later events is 
merely relevant in the study of historic episodes, as noted by Barzelay et al.: “Later events are 
sometimes included in the study frame for purposes of exploring the contemporary relevance of 
historical episodes” (2003: 24 [italic in original]). Hence, in this study, where I examine PPP policy 
and regulation in a contemporary context, the consequence is that I pay less attention to the later 
events in Barzelay’s model (see also examples in Paper 5 and Appendix 3 of this synopsis).  
In the final process of data analysis, two techniques were in particular utilised, as recommended by 
Barzelay et. al. (2003:36): (i) a method of intra-event analysis was used to track and analyse the 
development of single events, such as the launch of a new regulation or policy initiatives; (ii) 
furthermore, cross-event analysis was used to track interrelations between events in the data set, and 
to provide comparative and theory-based explanations of case outcomes. Reflecting the comparative 
and multi-level aim of this dissertation, this process of cross-event examination included 
comparisons at the central government level in Denmark and Ireland, and multi-level analysis at the 
                                                          
23 It should be noted that this dissertation actually has more than one explanandum. The developments over time of 
national PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland, as previously mentioned, constitute the dissertation’s main 
explanandum. However, in the parts of the dissertation which deal with how the policy and regulation framework 
facilitates or hinders the formation of concrete PPP projects, policy and regulation becomes the explanans, while the 
formation or not of a concrete PPP projects becomes the explanandum. Finally, Paper 1 has a third explanandum, which 
is the EU’s policy and regulation initiatives for PPPs (this paper is mainly descriptive). 
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project level, the national level and the EU-level. To support the methods of intra-event analysis 
and cross-analysis, a scheme was constructed for each of the cases with information sourced from 
the interviews. Thus, by using a cross-referring technique inspired by a relatively simple versions of 
policy network analysis (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997), each interviewee was interviewed 
both about the organisation which he or she represented, but also about the action orientations and 
action resources of other relevant actors in the decision-arena. Table 8 presents a generic version of 
this scheme (this method is in particular applied in Paper 2). 
Table8.Genericdisplayofthecrossreferringmethod.
Respondents 
Respondents’ statements about the other actors within the decision-arena 
Actor 1 Actor 2 Actor 3 .... …. Actor N 
Actor 1       
Actor 2       
….       
….       
….       
Actor N       
Source: Own compilation. 
In the vast majority of instances, the respondents pointed towards the same interpretation of a given 
event, even when the specific event was considered controversial by some of the respondents. For 
example, all respondents in the Danish ministries pointed out a conflicting approach taken by the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs as a major reason for 
Denmark’s reluctant adoption of the PPP model (see Paper 2 and 3). However, in a few instances, 
the analysis displayed a direct mismatch between various sources. These occurrences in most 
instances related to simple errors in sequences of events, facts concerning certain decisions, etc. 
This was, for example, the case in relation to the case study of the National Maritime College of 
Ireland, where various sources indicated different years for the final decision to erect the project 
under the PPP model (see Paper 4). Another example was the Cork School of Music case study, 
where different figures about the total project value were indicated. In these and other instances, the 
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triangulation method insured that additional sources were consulted, and thereby, the information 
could be verified (Peters, 1998; Yin, 2003). 
Yet another, and essentially more intriguing, issue arose when the collected data contained directly 
opposite interpretations of the same phenomena. This was for example the case in some of the 
interviews with senior civil servants in the Irish Government, where the representatives of the 
Ministry of Finance clearly stated that the primary objective of forming PPPs in Ireland was to 
achieve value for money, whereas representatives from other ministries and agencies clearly 
expressed that a major reason for introducing PPPs was to make government budgets look better in 
the annual government spending reports to the EU Commission (see also Paper 1 and 4). A similar 
observation was made regarding the Danish national regulation, where senior officers from the Tax 
Authority considered Danish tax regulation of PPPs rather uncontroversial, whereas most other 
respondents pointed to the tax and value-added tax issue as a major impediment to formation of 
PPPs in Denmark. Such instances of conflicting statements in the data material contained vital 
information about the various interpretations, interests, and potential conflicts among key actors, 
which required careful triangulation and interpretation.  
In these situations, I went back to my empirical sources and went through all interviews and 
primary documents which contained information regarding the specific issue. In the instance of the 
Danish Tax Authority, I went through my interview notes and re-listened pieces of the interview 
recordings again. I also went through my written sources, where two documents that announced the 
tax status of the two first Danish PPP projects turned out to be the central sources. Subsequently, I 
plotted all these information into a Context Chart, which is a flexible form of visual network display 
that maps various actors/organisations within their social environment (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 
103). The key principle in the context chart is that a specific event must always be interpreted 
within its context (ibid.: 102). In the example of the tax authorities, which is illustrated in Figure 7, 
it now became visible that the Tax Authorities are located in a central position within the policy-
network because both general policy-formulation (link to Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs) and Denmark’s firs two PPP projects (link to Vildbjerg School and 
the National Archive) were in fact dependent upon the tax authorities for finding a solution to the 
tax and value-added tax issue. This explains why the tax authorities are assessed by the other 
respondents to be in a rather conflictual position, and this became the interpretation of the specific 
event which I subsequently was using in the analyses (see Paper 2 and 3). 
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
Figure7.ExampleofaContextChart.
1.6Summaryofthefivepapers
The dissertation contains five papers each with its own empirical and analytical focus within the 
overall context of the dissertation’s four research questions. Paper 1 covers the EU’s role in 
regulating PPPs, and serves as a background analysis to the remaining four papers. Paper 2
provides an analysis of the Danish government’s development of PPP policy and regulation. Paper
3 also focuses on Denmark, but extends the findings with the local government level and two case 
studies from the schools sector in addition to discussions about the EU’s role in regulating PPPs in 
the country. Paper 4 covers the Irish case, with a multi-level focus on the interplay between the EU 
level, policy and regulation at the national level, and the formation of two schools sector PPP 
projects. Paper 5, finally, provides synchronic and diachronic analysis of Denmark and Ireland’s 
development of PPP policy and regulation at the national level.  
Danish Tax 
Authority 
Ministry of 
Economic and 
Business Affairs
Ministry of 
Finance 
Liberal-
conservative 
government with 
pro-marketisation 
program 
Private business 
federations 
Relatively well 
developed 
physical 
infrastructure 
Strong short- 
and long-term 
fiscal 
indicators 
Ministry of 
Transport 
Ministry of the 
Interior 
First local 
government 
PPP project 
(Vildbjerg 
School) 
First 
government 
pilot PPP 
project 
(National 
Archive) 
Major tax 
avoidance 
scandals in the 
1990s 
PPP 
Competence 
Unit
Palaces and 
Properties 
Agency 
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Each of the papers has been written and targeted for peer-reviewed journals in the field, and are 
currently in various phases of review and publication (see Table 9). In the following, I provide an 
extended abstract of each of the five papers.

Table9.Summaryofthefivepapers
 Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 Article 4 Article 5 
Title Emerging 
meta-
governance as 
a regulation 
framework for 
public-private 
partnerships: 
an
examination 
of the 
European 
Union’s 
approach  
Why are there 
so few 
Public-Private 
Partnerships 
(PPPs) in 
Denmark? – 
A
departmental 
game for 
power, 
interests and 
positions24   
Regulation of 
Public-Private 
Partnerships: 
the Danish 
Case  
Multi-level 
governance of 
public-private
partnerships: 
an analysis of 
the Irish case 
Public-private 
partnerships as 
converging or 
diverging trends in 
public 
management? A 
comparative 
analysis of PPP 
policy and 
regulation in 
Denmark and 
Ireland 
Summary The paper 
examines the 
EU’s role in 
regulation of 
PPPs, based 
on a notion of 
the EU as a 
meta-
governance 
framework for 
PPP activity 
in the member 
states
The paper 
analyses the 
policy games 
and
institutional 
settings in 
which 
Denmark’s 
PPP policy 
and
regulation 
have been 
formed 
The paper 
examines the 
Danish 
Government’s 
partly failed 
attempt to set 
out PPP 
regulations, 
supplemented 
by two case 
studies from 
the schools 
sector   
The paper 
studies how 
Ireland’s PPP 
programme has 
developed with 
a focus on the 
interplay 
between the 
national level, 
the EU level, 
and two 
projects from 
the schools 
sector   
The paper 
comparatively 
examines how 
and why PPP 
policy and 
regulation 
came to 
develop so 
differently over 
time in 
Denmark and 
Ireland 
Publication 
status 
Published in 
November 
2010 
Published in 
April 2009 
Published in 
May 2010 
Submitted in 
March 2011  
Accepted for 
presentation at 
the 15th IRSPM 
conference, 
Dublin, April 
2011 
Journal International 
Public 
Management 
Review 
Økonomi og 
Politik 
[Economy 
and Politics] 
Public Money 
and 
Management 
International 
Public 
Management 
Journal
Public
Management 
Review
(Planned 
submission) 
PaperI
“Emerging meta-governance as a regulation framework for public-private partnerships: an 
examination of the European Union’s approach” examines the EU’s role in regulating the formation 
of construction/infrastructure PPPs in the 27 member states. Based on a notion of the EU as a meta-
                                                          
24 Title as published in Danish: ”Hvorfor så få offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) i Danmark? - Et ministerielt spil 
om indflydelse, interesser og positioner”. 
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governance framework that guides, steers, and controls PPP activity at national, sector and project 
level, the paper draws a number of lessons on the EU’s role in regulating the formation phase of 
PPP (Jessop, 2005; Koch & Buser, 2006). The analysis demonstrates that this meta-governance 
framework provides the EU with no direct regulations for the use of the PPP model in the 27 
member states, but two sets of regulations which apply in case a public authority (national, regional 
or local) decides to sign a PPP deal. 
The first regulation is the EU’s Procurement Directive, which requires that all PPP projects above 
the threshold limit of approximately €5.15 million are procured within a common EU procurement 
market for PPP projects. By the regulatory design and enforcement of a common PPP market across 
the EU area, this signifies the idea that public regulatory bodies can promote competition by 
imposing various market-enhancing measures. The second regulation comprises the accounting and 
on/off balance sheet principles that follow from the Excessive Deficit Criteria, which were imposed 
to hinder the PPP model being chosen by member states as a means of disguising public deficits by 
placing major capital investments on the private partner’s balance sheet. In 2004 the Commission 
and Eurostat decided that assets included under a PPP agreement may be registered off government 
balance sheets only if two conditions of risk sharing are met: (i) the private partner bears the 
construction risk, and (ii) the private partner bears at least one of either availability or demand risk 
(Eurostat, 2004). Furthermore, the EU has launched a number of initiatives of the soft governance 
type to support the formation of PPPs in the member states. Important among these initiatives is the 
launch of a European Partnership Excellence Centre (EPEC). With the launch of EPEC, the 
Commission and the EIB have created an institutional platform for practice exchange, formulating 
codes of conduct and building expert communities, thereby promoting more evidence-based 
learning among the member states. In line with previous research on EU governance, the findings 
suggest that, faced with limitations to the classic (hard law) Community Method, the central 
regulatory actors gradually turn to soft governance mechanisms, such as advice services, 
competence building, and learning among the EU member states (Bórras & Jacobsson, 2004).  
Despite the pro-PPP rhetoric, which the Commission embraces in several policy documents and 
green and white papers, the empirical analysis reveals that the EU institutions have been struggling 
with two concerns which were not always compatible: to promote an EU-wide procurement market 
for PPP projects (a regulation-for-market logic) and to make sure that governments do not resort to 
the PPP model as a means of bypassing the Stability and Growth Pact criteria for responsible fiscal 
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policies (a regulation-of-markets logic). The latter has been a sober concern, especially seen against 
the recent economic crisis, which could potentially make it more tempting for national governments 
to make use of PPPs as a way of overcoming short-term budget restraints. As the EU hitherto has 
engaged in regulation of PPP at a somewhat abstract and conceptual level, the paper concludes that 
this meta-governance framework leaves considerable room for manoeuvre for national governments 
to craft policy and regulation frameworks that are more or less supportive towards the formation of 
PPPs.

PaperII
“Why so few Public-Private Partnerships in Denmark? – A Departmental Game for Power, Interests 
and Positions”25 proceeds from the observation that, whereas PPPs are being used by many 
governments in Europe and beyond, Denmark has been a PPP sceptic. The paper addresses why this 
has been the case, with a focus on the development of PPP policy and regulation at the Danish 
central government level. Decisions about PPPs are seen as a series of ‘games’ in which actors 
engage strategically to maximise their preferred policy solutions within a broader institutional 
environment, defined as the “rules of the game” (Scharpf, 1997; Stoker, 1998). The decision arenas 
in which PPP policy and regulation are developed are thus seen as “activated game fields” (Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003: 138), characterised by a high level of strategic and institutional complexity and 
limited substitutability of the actors.  
The paper demonstrates that games about PPPs in Denmark are played in two separate – yet closely 
related - decision arenas. The first is a regulatory policy arena, in which policies and regulations are 
formed through negotiations and political bargains, primarily between central government 
departments and agencies. This policy network is dominated by two strong policy-players, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, with fundamentally 
differing actor positions in terms of supporting or hindering uptake of PPPs in Denmark. Whereas 
the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs conceives PPPs as a mechanism with which to 
establish new business opportunities while improving public services – basically a plus-sum game - 
the Ministry of Finance has argued that the lending of private money is more expensive than the use 
of public money, and it has also expressed concern about the long-term fiscal consequences of these 
PPP contracts. The analysis shows that hitherto the Ministry of Finance has been the stronger of the 
                                                          
25 Title as published in Danish: ”Hvorfor så få offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) i Danmark? - Et ministerielt spil 
om indflydelse, interesser og positioner”. 
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two, and it has effectively served as veto-player in a number of key decisions concerning Danish 
PPP policy and regulation.  
The second game field is an administrative decision-arena, where guideline material, legal 
framework contracts and pools of money are administered, and pilot PPP projects are developed.  
The paper shows that this decision arena has been characterised by a highly controversial tax and 
value-added tax issue, which relates to the question as to who the real owner of a PPP asset is when 
the private partner finances and operates it, while it is the public partner which formulated the 
output specification in the first place and which subsequently uses the asset. Despite fierce criticism 
from Danish business and industry organisations, the Danish tax authorities insist that the legal 
ownership of the asset can only be decided on after careful review of the transfer of risks under a 
concrete PPP scheme, which in practice means that a project must proceed all through the planning 
and procurement phases before tax and VAT registration can be issued to the private partner. The 
analysis of the institutional settings around these two decision-arenas reveals that the institutional 
framework around Danish PPP is loosely organised. The institutional framework merely supports 
uncoordinated games, such as unilateral action and negotiated agreements, whereas more 
compulsory agreements are not supported due to the weak institutional organisation of the 
regulation framework (Scharpf, 1994, 1997).  
The main finding of the paper is that the interest conflicts among the key policy players override the 
institutional capacity of problem-solving in the system. An explanation as to why the Danish 
government has not resolved these issues and set out a stronger policy and regulation framework is 
that Denmark’s strong public finances (until recently) made the financial aspect of PPPs largely 
redundant. Also, a major local government scandal in the late 1990s concerning sale and lease-back 
arrangements seems to have planted a fundamental concern with long-term private finance 
arrangements, which suggests a path dependency (Pierson, 2004). Finally, although international 
organisations such as the EU, OECD and IMF have recently endorsed PPPs, in reality, they have 
had little actual influence on national PPP policy and regulation decisions, which are still dominated 
by domestic policy entrepreneurs and policy veto-players. 

PaperIII
“Regulation of Public-Private Partnerships: the Danish Case“ extends the findings of Paper 2 by 
linking developments at the national policy and regulation level with concrete decisions about the 
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formation of PPPs at the project level, exemplified by two case studies of primary schools PPP 
projects in the Danish local government sector. The paper starts out by reviewing the background 
settings for introducing PPPs in Denmark: a combination of strong public finances, a long tradition 
of public service delivery, reluctant adoption of broader privatisation and marketisation measures, 
and a relatively successful state-owned model utilised for the two Belt Bridges and the Copenhagen 
Metro made the case for introducing PPP in Denmark less favourable to a large-scale adoption of 
PPPs than elsewhere.  
The PPP concept was first introduced in Denmark in 1999 by the Ministry of Finance, but the 
introduction went largely unnoticed by the public. In the subsequent years, a number of official 
government reports and documents mentioned PPPs as a means of investing in large-scale physical 
infrastructure, but no concrete initiatives were launched and no money was earmarked for projects. 
When the Danish government launched its “Action Plan for Public-Private Partnerships” with ten 
initiatives to support the uptake of PPPs, it was seen as a serious indication of the government’s 
commitment to the PPP model. In the aftermath, however, Danish PPPs were not realised at the 
expected speed: this was largely due to unresolved regulations at the national government level. The 
analysis reveals that Danish regulatory authorities have moved slowly and demonstrated little 
determination in resolving fundamental regulatory issues, such as local government reservation and 
the tax and value-added tax treatment of Danish PPPs. 
The two case studies from the schools sector are the first internationally published analysis of 
Danish PPP projects. The analysis reveals that, whereas the first project proceeded relatively 
quickly to become Denmark’s earliest PPP project, the second one never made it to the procurement 
phase. The empirical data collected on the case studies reveals that, in both cases, the primary 
reason for choosing the PPP model instead of a traditional procurement of the project, was that the 
local municipalities expected to receive relief from the Danish central government’s regulations on 
local government asset-based investments. However, whereas the first project was finally saved by 
the Minister of the Interior and Social Affairs, who issued a one-time exemption from the restriction 
on local government PPPs, the second PPP school project fell through because the minister was not 
this time willing to issue an exemption from these regulations. In both cases, the lack of a clear and 
well-tested model for tax and VAT treatment of PPP projects marked the PPP solution with 
uncertainty for both public and private partners.  
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A main finding from the two case studies is that Danish PPP projects in the schools sector have 
largely been driven by local governments’ expectations on receiving relief from the general limits 
on asset-based spending, which is subject to detailed regulation by the Danish government in order 
to avoid over-investments in the local government sector. A second result is that the unresolved 
regulatory issues and the interest conflicts among the key policy-players at the national level, in 
particular the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, lead to 
uncertainty for public and private partners considering engaging in PPP activity in Denmark. The 
regulatory authorities should get the regulations straight if they want to support the formation of 
Danish PPPs. However, as rather mixed evidence about the value for money of PPPs is increasingly 
reported in the academic literature (Pollock, Price & Players, 2007; Hodge & Greve, 2009), the 
paper argues that a reluctant approach to PPPs might after all prove to be a rational strategy. 

PaperIV
“Multi-level governance of public-private partnerships: an analysis of the Irish case” adopts a multi-
level governance perspective (Scharpf, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005) to 
analyse the interplay between the national policy-level, the EU-level, and the formation of concrete 
PPPs, illustrated by two case studies of third level (further education) PPP projects. Compared to 
many other countries Ireland was slow to adopt measures of marketisation and privatisation, and as 
a result of this, only a handful of public enterprises had been made subject to privatisation 
considerations before 1999. However, by the late 1990s Ireland was facing a major infrastructure 
deficit as a consequence of years of underinvestment in the physical infrastructure combined with 
the serious strains on public capital budgets following on from the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact. 
As a result of these combined events, the Irish government was in search of alternative ways of 
remedying Ireland’s infrastructure gap while attempting to steer clear of excessive deficits on 
government capital budgets. 
PPPs were officially introduced in Ireland in 1999, when the Irish government launched an 
ambitious PPP programme: a comprehensive policy and regulation framework was launched, a 
Central PPP Policy Unit was established under the Ministry of Finance, eight major pilot PPP 
projects were announced, and a pool of money was earmarked for PPPs. In the aftermath, however, 
when projects were not realised at the expected speed and the European Commission launched a 
new decision about risk-sharing and on/off-balance sheet treatment of PPP projects, the Irish 
government launched a number of amendments which largely centralised PPP policy and regulation 
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within the Ministry of Finance. Also, procurement functions and financial expertise were 
centralised in the National Finance Development Agency (NDFA), a new procurement unit 
established via specific legislation in 2002 and 2007. The paper examines a number of policy 
players that are involved in PPP policy and regulation and/or specific decisions about particular PPP 
projects.  
The constellation of actors and their strategies is complex in the Irish case, because actors are drawn 
from above and below central government, and moreover, from the Irish business sector and the 
labour unions (although the latter have been less active). The paper identifies a tension in the EU 
between on the one hand supporting the procurement of PPPs, and on the other ensuring that PPPs 
are not merely used as a financial tool with which to circumvent appropriate budget procedures in 
the member states. The course of action taken by the Irish government, and especially the Ministry 
of Finance, on the other hand turns out largely to be motivated by the prospects of removing major 
capital investments from government balance sheets. The analysis thus reveals a direct conflict of 
interest here across multiple levels of government. At the project level, the two case studies from 
the schools sector reveal that the EU level and the national level have in fact only partly played 
together to support the formation of PPPs in Ireland. The on/off balance sheet issue turns out to be 
of central importance to the Cork School of Music project, because the Irish government suddenly 
realised that the project would have to be counted against general government debt at the same time 
as Ireland was going through a mini recession which was putting a strain on public budgets. 
Obviously, the policy and regulation framework here was a hindrance to PPP, mainly because the 
on/off balance sheet regulations were not coordinated between the EU Commission and Eurostat on 
the one hand, and national governments (in Ireland and elsewhere) on the other. Accordingly, 
because of this lack of coordination across the EU level, the national level and the project level, the 
music school project that was otherwise at an advanced stage was seriously delayed and 
subsequently downscaled after intense negotiations between the Ministry of Science and Education 
and the Ministry of Finance. The second PPP project, the National Maritime College of Ireland, was 
financed through issuance of a loan application to the European Investment Bank, and proceeded 
much easier though the planning and procurement phases. 
PaperV
“Public-private partnerships as converging or diverging trends in public management? A 
comparative analysis of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland” comparatively 
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examines the development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland over time. The 
paper draws on Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, with a focus on the problem streams, the 
policy stream and the politics stream, and their temporal coupling incertain points in time (Kingdon, 
1995). Kingdon’s framework is supplemented by Michael Barzelay’s event-centred approach to 
public management policy-making (Barzelay et al., 2003; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006). The analysis 
shows that the launch of PPPs in Denmark took place against a combination of strong fiscal 
indicators, a relatively built-up infrastructure, the existence of a well-tested and successful public 
building-model, and a local government scandal relating to the sale and lease-back model, which 
generated a general unease with private finance arrangements within the Danish government. In 
Ireland, the fiscal indicators were also relatively strong, but Ireland moreover faced a major 
infrastructure gap due to years of underinvestment in the country’s physical infrastructure. 
Furthermore, EU funds were declining due to the forthcoming enlargement, and public demands for 
an upgrade of Ireland’s physical infrastructure were rapidly increasing. Thus, despite their relative 
similar points of departure in terms of fiscal indicators and being late adopters of PPPs, the 
systematic breakdown of the context events illustrates a number of differences in the background 
settings against which PPP policy and regulation developed over time in Denmark and Ireland.  
Drawing on Kingdon’s (1995) framework, the paper then moves on to analyse the streams and the 
role of policy entrepreneurs and policy veto-players in the development of Ireland and Denmark’s 
PPP policy and regulation. In Denmark, as a result of the context within which PPPs were 
introduced, no clear problem was identified in the problem stream, which PPP as a solution in the 
policy stream could potentially be linked to. Moreover, in Denmark the political attention to PPPs 
was generally low, and although the incoming liberal-conservative government announced a focus 
on marketisation and private sector involvement, the focus was more on free choice (in the delivery 
of welfare) and traditional contracting out. Accordingly, the streams were not coupled in any 
sufficient way to open a policy window, which resulted in a merely symbolic launch of PPPs in 
Denmark. The launch of PPP in Denmark was in itself somewhat paradoxical, because a problem 
was not identified in the problem stream. Subsequently, the Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit, which in the meantime took over the Ministry of Finance’s 
role as policy entrepreneurs, attempted to redefine the problem as a matter of improving value-for-
money and innovation in major public construction and infrastructure projects. Not least because of 
a rising attention to PPPs in the political stream, the policy entrepreneurs this time partly succeeded 
with coupling the streams and opening up a policy window in which the PPP Action Plan was 
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launched. In reality, the Danish government took no concrete PPP initiatives before 2004, with the 
launch of the PPP Action Plan. 
This was very different from the Irish case, where a clearly identified problem – to remedy Ireland’s 
major infrastructure deficit – became a major issue in the problem stream as Ireland saw its share of 
EU funds dropping. In the meantime, the political stream was highly influenced by the popular 
dissatisfaction with the state of the infrastructure and strong lobbying from the Irish business 
federations. Accordingly, under the influence of strong policy entrepreneurs from within 
government and the private sector, the three streams were successfully coupled to open a policy 
window which stayed open for a long time, during which several decisions were taken to launch 
comprehensive PPP policy and regulation and money was earmarked for PPP projects. A successful 
coupling of the three streams thus produced a number of decisions which step-by-step embedded 
Ireland’s PPP programme within the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, in contrast to the Danish 
case, where policy and regulation competencies were split between the Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit serving as policy entrepreneurs, and the Ministry of 
Finance as a strong policy veto-player. A main finding of the paper is that the primary rationale for 
forming (or not forming) PPPs was a macro-economic one in Ireland, with a focus on placing major 
infrastructure investments off government balance sheets, whereas Denmark’s strong public 
finances and well-built infrastructure made such a manoeuvre largely redundant. 

1.7Conclusions,discussionsandcontributions
The starting point for this PhD dissertation was the observation that, whereas PPPs are often 
depicted in the academic literature and in policy practice as a globally disseminated governance 
scheme, in reality, a closer examination of the PPP reform landscape reveals significant differences 
in national governments’ PPP policy and regulation and in the amount of actually implemented PPP 
projects. This led to the formulation of four research questions for the dissertation: 
1. What are the key actor-constellations, policy-games and institutional conditions that created 
decisions about policies and regulations for PPPs in Denmark and Ireland?  
2. How did PPP policies and regulations in Denmark and Ireland develop in the period from 
1999-2009, and how can the national similarities and differences be explained? 
3. How do multiple levels of government interact to facilitate or hinder the formation of 
concrete PPP projects, exemplified by four case studies from the schools sector? 
61 
4. What framework conditions does the EU set for PPP activity at national and sub-national 
levels of government, and why has this common regulatory framework not lead to more 
convergence among the two countries? 
These questions are addressed in Section 1.7.1, followed by a discussion of the empirical findings 
and future PPP research in Section 1.7.2. Next, a discussion of the theoretical implications of the 
study follows in Section 1.7.3. The majority of the empirical data for this dissertation was collected 
either before or in the early phase of the financial crisis, when the consequences for PPPs were not 
yet very visible.26 To address this issue, Section 1.7.4 provides an epilogue which discusses the 
findings of the dissertation in relation to the financial crisis. 
1.7.1Addressingtheresearchquestions
In line with previous research within the governance PPP perspective (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 
2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koch & Buser, 2006; Greve & Hodge, 2010), this dissertation has 
investigated how and why, within a broader institutional framework, various actors and policy 
entrepreneurs have engaged strategically in policy-making that created differing national PPP 
policy and regulation frameworks in the period from 1999-2009 (research questions 1 and 2). The 
focus on Denmark and Ireland provided two highly contrasting cases in this respect. The analysis of 
the Danish case reveals that decision games about policy and regulation of PPPs have been 
characterised by major conflicts of interest among key policy players, with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs taking fundamentally different actor positions 
in terms of supporting or hindering the uptake of PPPs in Denmark: whereas the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs conceives of PPPs as a mechanism to establish new business 
opportunities and improve public services at the same time, the Ministry of Finance has been much 
more sceptical towards the concept. The finance ministry’s argument has been that the lending of 
private money is more expensive than using public money for the same projects, and it has also 
expressed concern over the possibilities that sector departments and local governments would 
attempt to use PPPs primarily as a financial instrument to initiate projects that they would otherwise 
not be able to fund, rather than for achieving value-for-money and innovation in major construction 
and infrastructure projects. 
                                                          
26 Indeed, during the interviews with key actors, such as officials in the finance ministries in both countries, the 
respondents did not once mention the financial crisis. The interviews were conducted in autumn 2008. I subsequently, 
in February and March 2010, carried out follow-up phone calls and email correspondence with some of the respondents 
to cover this issue. 
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Further, the study reveals that PPPs in Denmark have been subject to a number of unresolved 
regulatory issues regarding tax and value-added tax, which is handled by the Tax Agency, and also 
concerns over the use of PPPs in the Danish local government sector. While the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs and the Danish PPP Competence Unit have sought to promote the 
uptake of PPPs in Denmark, the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Agency have on the other hand 
shown a considerable reluctance towards setting out policy and regulation supporting a more 
extensive use of PPPs in Denmark. The analysis of the institutional settings reveals that the 
institutional framework around Danish PPP is loosely organised. The institutional framework 
merely supports uncoordinated games, such as unilateral action and negotiated agreements, whereas 
compulsory agreements are not supported due to the weak institutional organisation of the 
regulatory framework (Scharpf, 1997). Hence, the conflicts of interest among the key policy players 
in the setting of Danish PPP policy and regulation overmatches the institutional capacity of 
problem-solving in the framework, which results in a loosely organised and partly incoherent policy 
and regulation framework for the formation of PPPs. While the Danish government could change 
the institutional settings and thus support PPPs further through a more coordinated policy and 
regulation framework, the analysis points out that Denmark’s strong public finances and built-up 
infrastructure seem to have made the private finance element in PPPs largely redundant. 
In Ireland, PPPs were launched against a major infrastructure gap combined with serious strains on 
public budgets due to falling shares of EU funds, which hitherto had been a major source of finance 
for investments in Ireland’s physical infrastructure. Accordingly, the course of action taken by the 
Irish government, and especially the Ministry of Finance, thus turned out largely to be motivated by 
the prospects of removing major capital investments from government balance sheets. The Irish 
government’s PPP strategy encompassed a broad span:  a Central PPP Policy Unit was established 
within the Ministry of Finance, an interdepartmental group on PPPs was launched, eight pilot PPP 
projects were commissioned, and further €2.35 billion investments in PPP projects were reserved in 
the National Development Plan 2000-2006. Moreover, in contrast to the Danish case, Irish business 
were indeed very active in terms of placing PPPs on the policy agenda through several submissions 
to the Irish government from the Irish Business and Employers Confederation and the Construction 
Industry Federation, and the voices were heard with the establishment of an ‘Informal advisory 
group on PPPs’ with the participation of Irish business and labour unions (although the latter were 
less active within this policy-area). 
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In the subsequent years, the Irish PPP policy and regulation framework gradually developed 
towards a more centralised institutional set-up, with policy and regulation functions located under 
the Central PPP Policy Unit and tasks related to the planning, procurement and financing of PPP 
projects assembled under a new unit, the National Development Finance Agency, which was 
launched through specific legislation in 2002 and 2007 to procure Irish PPPs government-wide 
(except for the roads and railways sectors). The NDFA subsequently hands over the projects to the 
relevant authority after the PPP contract has been procured and signed and the project has become 
operational. This institutional organisation is indeed very different from the Danish, where PPPs are 
procured individually by local governments (which there are 98 of), by the five regions, and so far 
also by three different central government agencies. While the strategy in the Irish case has clearly 
been to gather competencies, partly to secure oversight over the specific implementation of projects 
and partly to reduce the transaction costs, in the Danish case the development of PPP policy and 
regulation has been more pragmatic with ongoing adjustments to the long-standing tradition of 
decentralised local governments.  
In both cases, this study identified the macro-economic objective relating to the on/off balance sheet 
discussion as instrumental to the development of PPP policy and regulation with the finance 
ministries in the two countries as key actors, yet in quite contrasting ways. Based on the 
comparative analysis, the dissertation reveals that the primary rationale for embracing PPPs was a 
macro-economic one in Ireland, with a focus on placing major infrastructure investments off 
government balance sheets, whereas Denmark’s strong public finances and comprehensive and 
well-functioning infrastructure did not create an immediate need to use PPPs. Furthermore, the 
Ministry of Finance was concerned that PPPs from a macro-economic perspective would reduce the 
scope for steering public finances due to the long term commitment of typically 25-35 years. Hence, 
in line with research on the UK and Dutch PPP cases (Spackman, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007), the comparative analysis reveals that the finance ministries were 
indeed determining in setting PPP policy and regulation, although in inverse ways in Denmark and 
Ireland. In Ireland, the Ministry of Finance clearly resembled Kingdon’s concept of a policy 
entrepreneur, and worked actively to couple the problem, policy and political streams to open a 
policy window within which further PPP initiates were launched (Kingdon, 1995). In contrast, the 
Danish Ministry of Finance served actively as a policy veto-player by dissembling the three streams 
and thus only partly opening a policy window. Another major difference between the two cases was 
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that PPPs were linked to a clear problem in Ireland (remedying the infrastructure gap without 
imposing further strains on public finances), whereas a clear problem was never identified in the 
Danish case. Thus, the introduction of PPPs in Denmark came to resemble symbol-politics, with 
few concrete policy and regulation initiatives to support the uptake of PPPs. PPP became a solution 
promoted in rhetoric, but where the central actors were reluctant to allow the decentralized actors to 
link this solution to specific local problems, except for a few demonstration projects.  
Turning then to the multi-level analyses of how the differing national policy and regulation 
frameworks serve to support or hinder the formation of PPP projects (research question 3), the four 
case studies from the schools sector illustrated that the framework conditions for PPPs work very 
differently in practice in Denmark and Ireland. In Denmark, as a result of the partly uncoordinated 
and unresolved regulation framework at the national level, engaging in PPP activity has been a 
troublesome and risky venue for public authorities and private partners alike. Both the studied PPP 
schools cases in Denmark ran into serious problems due to unresolved regulation issues at the 
national level: whereas the first PPP school was finally saved by the Danish Minister of the Interior, 
who issued a one-time exemption from the restrictions on local government PPPs, the other project 
failed because fundamental regulatory issues had not yet been resolved, and the minister was 
unwilling to issue an exemption again. Moreover, the two case studies illustrate that the tax and 
value-added tax treatment of PPPs in Danish legislation has comprised a major challenge for the 
players in the Danish PPP market, and imposed additional costs and delays on Danish PPPs, which 
is illustrated by the fact that so far only four projects have become operational.  
In Ireland, the framework conditions for forming PPPs turns out to have been very different, both 
because from the outset the Irish government established a comprehensive policy and regulation 
framework and because of the centralised character of the Irish state. The two PPP schools cases in 
Ireland were not carried out by local governments, as was the case in Denmark, but by the Irish 
Ministry of Education and Science with advice from the National Development Finance Agency. 
These two cases illustrate that the implementation of the first PPP projects do in fact require the 
resolution of a number of regulatory aspects, such as tax, legal issues, financial aspects, 
procurement, etc., but in the face of serious strains on public budgets and a major infrastructure gap, 
the Irish government solved these issues along the way. Indeed, when the first PPP ran into 
problems and was seriously delayed, the research illustrates that this was mainly due to changed EU 
regulations concerning the on/off balance sheet issue, which meant that the Irish government would 
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have to count this project against the General Government Deficit. While this issue was avoided for 
the second project, because the Irish government petitioned the European Investment Bank for loans 
for the construction of this scheme, the findings from the two school projects illustrate that policies 
and regulatory framework conditions have largely served the purpose of supporting PPP projects 
procured off balance sheet. 
Turning finally to the question about the EU’s role in regulating PPPs in the member states 
(research question 4), the dissertation has shown that the EU has as yet mostly engaged in 
regulation of PPPs at a rather abstract and conceptual level, thereby giving national and sub-
national administrations considerable room for manoeuvre in drafting policy and regulations to 
facilitate or hinder the formation of PPP projects. Further, the analysis displayed an inherent 
dilemma in the EU’s institutions between two conflicting concerns: on the one hand the 
establishment of an EU-wide PPP procurement market to attract private capital investments and 
thus develop the physical infrastructure in the member states, which is seen as fundamental to the 
effective functioning of the Single Market; and on the other, the Commission and Eurostat has been 
concerned that some member states would utilise the PPP model to sidestep the EU’s budget 
procedures for responsible fiscal policies by removing major infrastructure investments from the 
public sector’s balance sheets. The latter seems to be a sober concern, as the analysis revealed that 
removing major infrastructure investments from the public sector’s balance sheet has indeed been a 
primary rationale for embarking on large-scale PPPs in Ireland but also in the UK and elsewhere 
(Spackman, 2002; Flinders, 2005). Recently, the European Commission has launched a number of 
‘soft governance’ initiatives, including the European Partnership Excellence Centre (EPEC), to 
support policy learning and the spread of best practice among the member states. The findings 
within this policy area are thus in line with the broader trend towards soft modes of governance in 
the EU, although it still remains to be seen whether EPEC and other soft governance initiatives will 
in fact lead to a greater degree of policy coordination across local, national and EU levels in the 
regulation of PPPs.  
1.7.2EmpiricalimplicationsandfurtherPPPresearch
The findings of this dissertation have a number of implications. In this section I try to condense the 
overall empirical contributions of the study, which span across the papers and serve as a starting 
point for considering how further research may make use of the findings. Subsequently, in Section 
1.7.3, I turn to a discussion of the study’s theoretical implications. 
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It is common in scholarly literature which discusses the rationales of governments for resorting to 
PPPs to assume that governments pursue innovation, collaborative advantage, mutual added value, 
etc. Further, it is often assumed within the governance branch of the PPP literature that PPPs 
comprise a new governance scheme, which is based on trust, collaboration and joint decision-
making as opposed to ‘classic’ contracting out and privatisation, which was endemic in the NPM 
epoch (cf. Linder, 1999; Hammerschmid & Angerer, 2005; Osborne, 2010). Thus, in academic 
literature and indeed also in the large practice oriented literature on the subject, the reasons for 
governments to form PPPs are often connected with a number of positively charged objectives and 
a new way of thinking about governance in the public-private interface. However, the findings 
brought to the fore in this dissertation suggest that in reality the introduction of PPP is to a large 
extent determined by the state of public finances. PPPs are more likely to be favoured in situations 
of constrained public finances, where it can be used as a way to remove major public infrastructure 
investments from governments’ balance sheets, and thereby reduce the pressure on public capital 
budgets and provide more infrastructure than would otherwise be possible. This is illustrated by the 
Irish case, while in Denmark the public finances prior to the financial crisis were fairly strong. The 
Ministry of Finance was therefore less concerned about a short term need to finance projects, and 
more concerned about the long term implications and potential lack of control over municipal 
infrastructure investments. 
These findings have significant implications because they suggest a gap between the assumptions 
commonly made in political debate and in the scholarly literature about governments’ objectives 
with PPPs, and the actual findings from case studies of concrete decisions about PPPs. While 
keeping in mind that the two country cases and four case studies from the schools sector obviously 
have limitations in terms of generalisability to other countries and PPP sectors (Yin, 2003: 10), they 
are also interesting from a more general PPP perspective because they illustrate that there is an 
inherent trade-off between short- and long-term interests and strategies in the PPP model. In the 
short term, if projects are indeed registered off balance sheet, it is correct that PPP can reduce 
public budget pressures and provide more infrastructure than would otherwise be achievable. From 
a rational actor perspective, this would make the PPP model very attractive for policy-makers and 
administrators (Niskanen, 1975). In the long-term, however, PPPs can be seen as challenging 
governance schemes because there is always a bill for governments - and thus indirectly taxpayers – 
to pay ten, twenty or even thirty years into the future.  The findings of this dissertation thus suggest 
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that national PPP developments are likely to be determined by the state of public finances, and 
whether leading government actors take a long or short term perspective. 
These findings are important because the argument that placing investments off balance sheet can 
reduce the pressure on public budgets thus can be said to be right in the short term, but indeed false 
in the long term: what has in reality been provided is the substitution of expenses here and now with 
a long-term loan with duration of 25-35 years. The dissertation thus contributes with robust 
empirical results across two country cases and multiple levels of analysis that support the 
observation made by Hodge and Greve (2007: 549), “We are certainly now drowning in promises 
by governments around the world that PPPs will provide public sector services more cheaply and 
quickly, with reduced pressure on government budgets. (...) A mechanism through which 
governments may turn a large, once-off capital expenditure into a series of smaller, annualized 
expenditures has simply been provided.” From the perspective of future generations of voters and 
tax payers, this raises fundamental accountability and legitimacy issues, which the scholarly 
research on PPPs has so far only started to address (see Mörth, 2007). Clearly, more research which 
focuses both on the short- and long-term interests, strategies and consequences of PPPs is warranted 
to uncover these broader legitimacy and accountability issues further. 
The dissertation also makes a contribution to the field of PPP governance research, which has 
hitherto been characterised by case studies or single country studies, whereas comparative 
approaches are seldom taken (although see Greve & Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 
2007; Ysa, 2007). As a result of this, very little is known about how, why and to what consequences 
national governments have adopted differing policy and regulation frameworks. Although studying 
two country cases obviously cannot provide the basis for generalisation of the statistical kind (Yin, 
2003: 10), this study offers empirically rich descriptions of two PPP cases which can be utilised for 
the development of preliminary analytical categories of national PPP governance approaches, which 
can be tested and developed in further research. Thus, based on the findings, I will suggest the 
following taxonomy (see Table 10).  
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Table 10. Preliminary taxonomy of national PPP approaches  
Anglo-Saxon PPP 
approach 
Continental European PPP 
approach 
Scandinavian PPP 
approach  
Country examples UK, Australia, Canada, 
Ireland 
Netherlands, Germany, 
France
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland 
PPP objectives of 
governments 
Remedy budget constraints, 
some degree of 
marketisation ideology and 
NPM- reforms (for example 
emphasis on value-for-
money) 
Remedy budget constraints 
and launch of new public 
governance based on 
horizontal cooperation 
Unclear objectives, a mix of 
NPM principles (value-for-
money) and new public 
governance elements 
(innovation, mutual added 
value)  
Governance approach Widespread policy and 
regulation measures 
Intermediate to high policy 
and regulation measures but 
fewer money earmarked for 
projects 
Limited or unsupportive 
policy and regulation 
measures 
Projects and sectors Large deal flow, high 
diversity in PPP sectors 
Medium deal flow, primarily 
‘hard’ infrastructure (roads, 
railways, etc.) 
Low deal flow, few sectors 
covered 
Although preliminary, this categorisation contains three national PPP governance approaches: (i) an 
Anglo-Saxon PPP approach, which is characterised by a comprehensive policy and regulation 
framework and an extensive deal flow across many procurement sectors. The UK is the 
predominant example, but countries such as Australia, Canada and, more recently, Ireland would 
belong to this group; (ii) a continental European PPP approach, which is characterised by 
intermediate to high policy and regulation measures but with considerably less money earmarked 
for PPP projects and consequently a medium deal flow, with a focus on ‘hard’ infrastructure 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). Examples are the Netherlands, Germany, and France; (iii) a 
Scandinavian PPP approach, which is characterised by unclear objectives, limited and/or 
unsupportive policy and regulation measures, and a low flow of PPP deals in the market. Indeed, 
this is a rather rudimentary categorisation, which nonetheless makes a first important step towards 
developing a taxonomy of national PPP governance approaches, which further PPP research could 
build on and develop through additional comparative case studies. 
1.7.3Theoreticaldiscussionsandimplications
The study also raises a number of discussion points related to the application of the theoretical 
frameworks in the five papers and how the empirical findings relate back to the theories that I have 
used. These discussions are also found in each of the papers, and I will here focus on three cross-
cutting themes corresponding to the three theory-frameworks, which I have used in the dissertation: 
the Actor-Centered Institutionalism (ACI); the Multiple Streams Model; and multi-level governance 
theory.  
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First, in terms of my use of the ACI framework, from which I have drawn a number of the central 
theoretical concepts and assumptions in Paper 2-4, the empirical analyses have highlighted both 
some strengths and weaknesses in the application of this framework. Starting out with the strengths, 
Scharpf’s assumption about constellations of strategic actors that engage in decision-making games 
is supported by the analysis of the policy-making processes in both Denmark and Ireland. The 
assumption about interdependence between the policy-players is evident at the national level and 
also illustrated in the interplay between the national level and the local level, where the partly failed 
attempts to form concrete PPP projects of local governments and private business turns out to be 
largely due to unresolved regulations at the national level (see also Paper 3). The assertion about the 
varying coordination potential of the institutional settings also exercise explanatory power, as the 
empirical analysis illustrates that the interest conflicts among the key policy-players overmatches 
the institutional capacity of conflict solving, with the result that the development of Danish PPP 
policies and regulations have been largely uncoordinated (see also Paper 2). Furthermore, in the 
analysis of Ireland, where I combine the ACI framework with the multi-level governance 
perspective, this leads to an assumption about interdependencies both in the horizontal (public-
private) and in the vertical (multi-level) dimension of decision-making for PPPs. The empirical 
analysis illustrates a close interdependency between decisions at the EU-level, the national level and 
the project level in Ireland, which supports this theoretical assumption (see also Paper 4). The use of 
Scharpf’s ACI framework combined with the multi-level governance persepctive has thus turned 
out to provide a suitable theoretical framework for producing strategic and institutional explanations 
for the different development of policy, regulation and application of PPPs in Denmark and Ireland.  
However, the empirical analysis has also revealed at least two limitations regarding my use of the 
ACI framework in the papers. The first relates to the agenda setting and the question about why the 
PPP idea arose on the political agendas at the particular point in time in the two countries. The 
limitation to Scharpf in this respect is that he assumes that actors have certain preferences and 
strategies, whereas the theory framework is more silent when it comes to providing a theoretically 
based account of how specific interests and strategies are formed in the first place (I would argue 
that this is a general weakness of rational choice institutionalism). The consequence of this first 
limitation is that the papers where I use the ACI framework (Paper 2-4) provide little information 
about why PPPs arose to the policy-agendas in the two countries at the particular point in time. I 
have tried to accommodate this limitation by using Kingdon in Paper 5, which provides a more 
explicit focus on agenda-setting than Scharpf (see below).  
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Other theoretical approaches could also have provided supplementing insights concerning agenda-
setting and mechanisms of institutional change. Sociological institutionalism would have provided a 
focus on institutional isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), which could have been used to 
further investigate the inspiration from PPP/PFI in the UK, which the Danish Ministry of Finance 
briefly mentioned in 1999, and which Kay and Reeves (2004) mentions as a source of inspiration 
for the Irish government (although they do not explore this issue further). Moreover, historical 
institutionalism, with a focus on path dependencies and critical junctures (Pierson, 2004), could 
have shed more light on the link between contemporary and historic developments of institutions 
related to public and private provision of services and infrastructure (see also Greve & Hodge, 
2007). The reluctant Danish PPP approach would then be explained as a result of path-dependencies 
and historic traditions for public provision of welfare services and infrastructure, whereas the 
introduction of Irish PPP approach would be seen as a critical juncture produced by a combination 
of external factors (falling shares of EU funds) and internal events (major infrastructure gap), which 
created an institutional change.  
The other limitation in relation to my use of ACI concerns the relationship between agency and 
structure (institutions) in the framework. Scharpf defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’, but 
sees the process dynamics between actors and institutions as a two-way relationship in the sense 
that ‘games about the rules’ are continuously being played as well (see also Stoker, 1998). In the 
empirical examples provided by Scharpf, though, it seems that institutions are seen as relatively 
stable, structuring devices for policy-games, rather than the other way around (see in particular the 
examples provided in Scharpf, 1997). In my empirical case studies, where the policy-making and 
regulation for PPPs are ‘regimes in the making’, the explanatory logic in the ACI framework tends 
to get somewhat blurry at the edges. The analyses of the Danish case illustrated that the PPP-sceptic 
Ministry of Finance used the unevenly distributed access to decisive decision-arenas within the 
Danish government to form an institutional structure for PPPs with a relatively weak PPP 
Competence Unit, while it placed itself as the head of the table in the inter-departmental group on 
PPPs. By this token, the ministry could effectively veto most PPP initiatives taken by other policy-
players in the arena. The empirical lessons illustrate that it is not always clear when the institutional 
settings sets the rules of the game, or when it is in fact the dominant policy players which develop 
the institutional playing-rules in accordance with their own preferences, so that they are sure to win 
the games. This might suggest that the relationship between agency and structure is more dynamic 
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(and more ambiguous) within ‘regimes in the making’ than in policy games characterised by more 
stable and well-defined institutional structures. This potential nuance within Scharpf’s framework 
should be further explored in additional empirical research to test the robustness of these findings. 
Second, in regard to the use of Kingdon’s multiple streams model in the dissertation, which I have 
used to extend the insights gained by use of the ACI framework, this theoretical model, with its 
emphasis on three distinct process streams, provided supplementary explanatory power especially in 
terms of explaining how and why policy-entrepreneurs in Ireland were successful in coupling the 
streams to open a policy-window in which a number of decisions to support PPPs were taken. 
Kingdon was also helpful in terms of explaining why the policy-window stayed closed in Denmark, 
even though PPPs were officially promoted, and also why the policy-window only became partly 
open in 2004 despite the lofty PPP rhetoric exercised by some policy-entrepreneurs. In comparison 
with the ACI framework, I found the most added explanatory muscle in the model’s politics stream, 
which provided a more explicit focus on broader politico-economic context variables than the ACI 
framework, and to some extent also in the problem stream, where the combination of Ireland’s huge 
infrastructure deficit and declining EU funds was broadly identified as a problem, which was not 
the case in Denmark were the infrastructure was relatively well-developed and strong public 
finances made private finance largely redundant (see also Paper 5). The empirical analyses thus 
illustrated that Kingdon’s model, which was originally developed for the USA, is suitable for 
analysis of the process of policy-making in a European context as well (for a similar argument see 
also Zahariades, 2003; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007). 
The focus on three separate process streams and the temporality paints a less rational and more 
ambiguous picture of policy-making and regulation of PPPs than previous research, which has 
mainly focused on strategic decision-making (cf. Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Koppenjan, 2005) or broader trends within the (mainly UK) politics of PPPs (Spackman, 2002; 
Flinders, 2005). However, in terms of uncovering the specific motives and strategies of the policy-
entrepreneurs, Kingdon’s model wielded considerably less explanatory power than the ACI 
framework (for a similar criticism, see also Sabatier, 1999; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007). 
Although the multiple streams approach clearly sees policy-entrepreneurs as bounded rational 
actors, it remains somewhat unclear how Kingdon more concretely envisages the interactions and 
constellations between the various policy-entrepreneurs and policy veto-players. Hence, whereas 
Kingdon’s model seems fit as a macro-level approach to explaining the temporal emergence and 
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development of PPPs on the political agendas in Denmark and Ireland, meso-level theoretical 
frameworks such as Scharpf (1994, 1997), or Ostrom (1999), would seem more suitable for 
examining the specific strategies and interactions among the policy-entrepreneurs and policy veto-
players. A way of addressing this challenge in future PPP research, which has also been my 
approach in this study, would be to follow the strategy of ‘filling out’, whereby different theoretical 
frameworks are used as supplementing analytical strategies (Allison, 1971; Antonsen, Greve & 
Jørgensen, 2000). 
Third, in relation to my use of the multi-level governance approach in the study, this is largely a 
novelty in PPP research, as previous governance PPP studies have either focused at the project 
level, the national level, and to a minor extent the EU-level. The multi-level governance perspective 
has revealed important aspects and relationships between vertical levels of decision-making for 
PPPs, which supplement the findings from the comparative analyses. In the analysis of the Irish 
case, where I applied the most explicit multi-level governance perspective, decision-arenas turned 
out to be closely interconnected across the different vertical levels. The multi-level governance 
approach here provided insights that could not have been achieved using mainstream governance 
PPP approaches, which have mainly focused on interdependencies in the horisontal (public-private) 
dimension. The broader lessons from the multi-level analyses are thus that in order to fully grasp 
the causes and consequences of public administration reforms in different national institutional 
contexts, we need to supplement the comparative analytical perspective with a multi-level analysis 
as well. EU policy studies have developed and applied the multi-level governance perspective for 
quite some time now (cf. Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Jessop, 2005), 
but this approach is still rare within comparative public administration and management studies. 
This point of criticism is to some extent accommodated in Osborne’s (2010) edited volume ‘The 
New Public Governance’, where some of the chapters make more explicit use of the multi-level 
governance approach than what has been seen in previous studies concerning comparative public 
management reform. The findings from this dissertation suggest that we should continue this 
development and increasingly start talk and write about public sector reforms using the comparative 
and multi-level analytical approaches in conjunction. 
1.7.4Epilogue:PPPsandthefinancialcrisis
To conclude the synopsis and before I move on to present the five papers, I will consider PPPs in 
the light of the recent financial crisis. The crisis is interesting from a PPP perspective for several 
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reasons. First, the large budget deficits which many countries are now experiencing will make it 
even more tempting for policy-makers at all levels of government to utilise the PPP model as a 
means of undertaking investments in physical infrastructure and services which would otherwise 
not be achievable because of the crisis. Second, reports are now pointing to drastically reduced 
liquidity in the financial markets, which is increasing the cost of private money and thus making 
schemes signed during the crisis more expensive than previous generations of PPPs. This means 
that the basis for assessment of pros and cons of PPPs has changed. Third, the financial crisis has 
exposed governments to further and unforeseen risks such as when private PPP operators 
experience financial trouble, as illustrated by some of the first reports of government  bail-outs of 
PPP companies in the UK and elsewhere (European Partnership Excellence Center, 2009). This 
affects the basis for risk assessments of PPPs, and more broadly the viability of using this 
instrument. Clearly, the financial crisis has had very different consequences for Denmark and 
Ireland, both as a result of the major differences in the government deficits which the two countries 
are currently experiencing, and because of the difference in the number of actually implemented 
projects. Whereas in Ireland the government has launched a number of initiatives to facilitate 
further private investments in PPPs, the Danish government has taken no such direct measures. 
Nonetheless, PPPs are still being used in both countries, and in 2010 the Danish PPP market 
witnessed the signing of the largest PPP deal (a motorway project) to date, with a capital value of 
app. € 200 million signed.  
As the financial crisis will sooner or later disappear into the horizon, two scenarios for PPPs seem 
likely. The first option is that the crisis will lead to a healthy rethinking of the current PPP deals and 
spark more critical reflection when new schemes are being planned. This would perhaps make it 
likely that fewer projects would be carried out, but that they would be the right ones, where the 
primary rationale was not to postpone the spending burden to future generations of tax-payers but to 
provide a value-for-money project with appropriate sharing of risks and innovation potential. If this 
scenario is realised, the financial crisis would indeed have created a healthy shock for the PPP 
market. The second option, which seems to be the scenario in the Danish case, is that financial 
markets are improving while the strains on public budgets are gradually increasing both because of 
the crisis and because of demographic development, which poses a major challenge to the economy 
because there will be an ageing population and fewer people to pay the taxes with which to finance 
the large welfare state. Local municipalities in Denmark have recently voiced the concern that they 
will not be able to finance public services in the future, and in a recent political agreement with the 
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local municipalities, the Danish government stated the intention that various forms of public-private 
interaction should be further used in the local municipalities (Danish Government and Local 
Government Denmark, 2010). So, despite the original reluctance towards the PPP model, in the 
context of the serious strains on public budgets, the preference for PPPs and other forms of public-
private collaboration seems to be increasing in Denmark as well. 
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Appendix1:Exampleofpreinterviewletter
Research project: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in a 
comparative perspective 
Request for a research interview 
Dear Stephanie O'Donnell, 
I am currently carrying out a research project comparing public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in Ireland and Denmark. Whereas Ireland 
has build up a rather extensive PPP program, Denmark has been 
much more reluctant. The project examines why this is the case. 
The project combines a focus on national regulation and policies with 
in-depth case studies of concrete PPP projects in Ireland and 
Denmark. At national level I am planning a round of interviews with 
all central departments that are involved in the formulation of PPP 
policies and/or regulation. Topics for a research interview with the 
Central PPP Unit could include:  
 How is the Central PPP Unit working to facilitate the Irish PPP 
programme? 
 How are policy initiatives and regulation for PPPs coordinated 
between departments across government? 
 Have there been any regulatory obstacles to PPPs that the unit 
had to resolve?  
 What are considered pros and cons of PPPs from a Ministry of 
Finance perspective? 
 What is the rationale behind the establishment of the 
Interdepartmental Group and the Informal Advisory Group – 
to what means shall these two groups contribute? 
The broader aim of the project is to facilitate policy learning and 
exchange of best practice, and it is my hope that the project and the 
results will be of interest to you and your organisation.  
Practical arrangements  
The research interview will carried out face-to-face, and can be 
conducted at a time and place at your convenience. The planned 
length of the interview is app. 60 minutes. To benefit fully from the 
interview I would like to record it on an electronic sound recorder. 
This is standard research procedure. The recorded interview will not 
be shared with any third part, and I will nowhere make use of direct 
citations from the recording. I can send the interview guide a couple 
of days in advance of the interview.  
13. October, 2008 
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Project: ’Partnering – regulation and policymaking’ 
The ph.d-thesis is carried out as part of a larger research project 
’Partnering – regulation and policymaking’ that is financed by the 
Danish Social Science Research Council. Professor Carsten Greve, 
Copenhagen Business School, is the project manager and also 
supervisor of the ph.d.-thesis. Other related researchers are 
associate professor Niels Ejersbo, University of Southern Denmark, 
and associate professor Karsten Vrangbæk, University of 
Copenhagen.  
Suggestions for an interview meeting 
I hope that you will find the project of interest. In that case I suggest 
an appointment in the first week of November (3-7 November). If you 
will be so kind and contact me at a time of your convenience, we can 
make the further arrangements. Please find my contact details below. 
Best regards, 
Ole Helby Petersen 
MsC, political science, ph.d-candidate 
International Center for Business and Politics 
Copenhagen Business School 
E-mail: ohp.cbp@cbs.dk
Phone: +45 3815 3514 
Mobile: +45 5122 7573
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Appendix2:Exampleofinterviewguide
Research Project: Public-Private Partnerships in a Comparative Perspective  
Interview guide: The Central PPP Policy Unit 
Dublin, November 2008 
Before-interview briefing:
Thanks for your interest in this research project. Before outlining the interview questions, a short 
briefing: The project draws on two primary sources: primary documents such as guidelines, 
legislation, reports, notes etc.; and face-to-face expert interviews. I have by now trawled through the 
large number of documents. Many interesting questions have arisen during this reading, and the 
intention with this interview is to address questions that relate to your department’s activities in 
relation to regulating PPPs. By other words, I come well prepared but is on the other hand not (yet) 
an expert on the Irish PPP programme. Once again thanks for your interest in this project.        
The first few questions serve as an introduction to the Central PPP Unit’s work: 
 How is the Central PPP Unit working to facilitate the Irish PPP programme? 
 What are the main areas of work that the Unit undertakes? 
 What resources in terms of staff etc. does the Unit upholds?  
 Why is the Unit placed under the Department of Finance, and does the Unit refer to the 
department and the Minister for Finance?
 What are considered pros and cons of PPPs from a Ministry of Finance perspective? 
The second set of questions relate to the development of Ireland’s PPP programme: 
 What would you consider to be the main reasons for the introduction of PPPs in Ireland in 
the late 1990s? 
 What role did a) the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds play for Irish PPPs, and b) the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s financial criteria play for the introduction of PPPs? 
 It seems that the PPP programme was given relatively much attention in the late 1990s and 
was institutionalised rather quickly, but that implementation of the announced pilot projects 
took some time. Is that right and if so, why has this been the case? 
 A related question that has puzzled me: The 2001 report by PwC for the Ministry of Finance 
lists 134 PPP projects – but the Unit’s PPP project tracker from June 2008 only lists 73 PPP 
projects running and/or planned? (has the method been changed, have projects been 
cancelled, or something else?). 
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 What is the Unit’s relative salience to PPPs relative to other public-private arrangements? 
(contracting out, privatisation etc.) 
 This relates to the definitional issue and the range of models included in Ireland’s PPP 
programme?  
The third set of questions relate to the organization of the PPP program: 
 How are policy initiatives and regulation for PPPs coordinated across departments and 
agencies and what is the Central PPP Unit’s role in terms of coordination?  
 What is the rationale behind the establishment of the Inter-departmental Group and the 
Informal Advisory Group?  
 Is the Cabinet Group on PPPs still in existence, and which issues does the Central PPP Unit 
refer to this Group?  
 Which organisations, both public and private, would you say to be the main proponents of 
Ireland’s PPP programme PPPs?  
 Have any departments, agencies etc. been sceptic regarding Ireland’s use of PPPs? (In 
Denmark,  the Ministry of Finance has for example had concerns over the financial effects 
of local governments entering long-term contracts)
The final set of questions relate to regulation of PPPs: 
 Have there been any general regulatory obstacles to PPPs in Ireland that the Central PPP 
Unit has had to resolve? 
 When and how did they arise, and how were they solved? 
 The on/off balance sheet issue is a debated topic, what is the Unit’s approach to this issue? 
 Tax and value-added tax issues have been a major concern and hindrance for PPPs in 
Denmark. How has these issues been treated in Ireland? 
 The EU directive in public procurement in 2004 was added the competitive dialogue tender 
procedure. Is the competitive dialogue used for procurement of PPPs in Ireland, and did it 
have any effect that this new tender procedure was added? 
 Are there any other relevant EU regulation or policies for PPPs?  

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Appendix3:Methodologicalheuristicforcaseanalysis
Overview of prior events, contemporaneous events, events of the episode and related events in the Danish case.  
Overview of prior events, contemporaneous events, events of the episode and related events in the Irish case. 
PE1: Stable 
public finances, 
positive 
economic 
outlook 
PE2: Relatively 
well developed 
physical 
infrastructure 
PE3: Large 
potential PPP 
projects were 
publicly 
financed 
CE2: Changes in political elite with pro-marketisation program  
CE3: Local government scandal over sale and-lease-back  
CE1: Strong short- and long-term fiscal indicators 
E1 1999: Introduction of PPP but no earmarked money for projects 
E2 1999-2003: Some PPP discussions but no concrete action taken 
E3 2004: Government introduced ambivalent PPP Action Plan and 
pilot projects to be tested for PPP relevance  
E5 2004-2009: Little determinism in terms of solving regulations  
RE1: Modest PPP deal flow: 4 projects operational by end of 2009 
E4 2004: Competencies split between Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry Economic and Business Affairs
LE1: Later 
policy and 
regulation 
decisions
for PPPs 
LE2:
Formation 
of further 
PPP 
projects  
PE2: Rapid 
economic growth 
and surpluses on 
government 
budgets 
PE3: Falling 
shares of EU 
funds 
PE4: Major 
infrastructure 
investment gap as 
a result of under-
investments in 
1980s and early 
1990s 
CE1: Strong short- and long-term fiscal indicators
CE2: Public demands for physical infrastructure upgrade
CE3: Social Partnership Agreement, proactive PPP lobbying 
E1 1999: Introduction of PPP policy with eight pilot projects
E2 1999 Setup of formal and informal Groups and Central PPP 
E3 2001: NDP further supports PPP and sets out earmarked money
E6 2005: NDFA Act further centralises procurement authority
E5 2002: Public Private Partnership Arrangements Act lays out legal 
framework and centralises decisions about local government PPPs 
RE1: Significant deal flow: around 70 projects in various stages 
E4 2001: Framework for Public-Private Partnerships
PE1: EU funds 
major source of 
physical 
infrastructure 
development 
LE1: Later 
policy and 
regulation 
decisions for 
PPPs 
LE2: 
Formation 
of further 
PPP projects  
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Appendix4:OverviewofempiricalsourcescollectedfortheDanishcase
Expert interviews 
 Danish PPP Competence Unit, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Tax Authority, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Construction Association, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Ministry of Finance, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Chamber of Commerce, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Local Government Denmark, 10 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of Transport, 15 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior, 21 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Transport and Logistics Association, 22 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Confederation of Danish Industry, 28 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Local Municipality of Herning, 10 November 2008, Herning, Denmark. 
 MT Højgaard, 11 November 2008, Århus, Denmark.  
 DanEjendomme A/S, 12 November 2008, Århus, Denmark. 
 Local Municipality of Kalundborg, 13 November 2008, Kalundborg, Denmark. 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 17 November 2008, Kalundborg, Denmark.  
Policy papers 
 Danish Government (2001). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse [Growth, welfare - innovation].   
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2002). Vækst med vilje [Dedication to growth].   
 Danish Goverment, Danish People’s Party, Danish Social-Liberal Party and Christian People’s Party (2003). Trafikaftalen 
af 5. november 2003 [Trafic Agreement of November 5th 2003] 
 Danish Government (2003). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse II: Supplerende regeringsgrundlag [Growth, welfare – innovation 
II: Supplementary government platform].  
 Danish Government (2003) Investeringsplanen [Investment Plan] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Staten som bygherre [The government as building manager]. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Handlingsplan for en mere virksomhedsnær offentlig sektor 
[Action Plan for a business responsive public sector] 
 Danish Government (2004). Handlingsplan for Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber (OPP) [Action Plan for Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs)]. 
 Danish Government (2005). Nye mål – regeringsgrundlag VK-regeringen II [New Goals – Government Platform II] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2007). Bedre og billigere byggeri [Better and Cheaper Building 
Activity]. 
Legislation, government orders and other binding decisions  
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (1971). Lov om statens byggevirksomhed m.v. 
(Statsbyggeloven).[Law about government building activity]. Act. No. 228, 05/19/1971. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior (2000). Bekendtgørelse om kommunernes låntagning og meddelelse af garantier m.v. 
(lånebekendtgørelsen) [Government order on loan-taking in the local municipalities and announcement of garantees etc.].   
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2002). Cirkulære om udbud og udfordring af statslige drifts- og anlægsopgaver 
[Government circular on procurement and challenge of government service and construction works]. Government circular 
no. 159, 12/17/2002. 
 Danish Competition Authority (2004). Udbudsdirektivet [Public Procurement Directive]. Government order no. 937, 
09/16/2004. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Bekendtgørelse om anvendelse af offentlig-privat partnerskab 
(OPP), partnering og oplysninger svarende til nøgletal [Government order on public-private partnership (PPP), partnering 
and key indicators]. Government order no. 1394, 12/1/2004. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2005). Lov om ændring af lov om statens byggevirksomhed m.v. 
[Amendment to law about government building activity]. Act. No. 413, 06/01/2005.  
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2005). Bekendtgørelse af merafgiftsloven (momsloven) [Announcement of the Law on 
Value Added Tax] Government order no. 966, 10/14/2005. 
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2007). Bekendtgørelse af lov om skattemæssige afskrivninger [in English]. Government 
order no. 1191, 10/11/2007 
 Danish Tax Authority (2007). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregistrering [PPP-
project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. Binding tax answer 
SKM2007.234.SR.  
 Danish Tax Authority (2008). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregistrering [PPP-
project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. Binding tax answer. 
SKM2008.563.SR. 
Framework contracts and comparator tools 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). OPP relevans vurdering [PPP relevance assessment] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Basiskontrakt. [Public-private 
partnership. Basis contract] 
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 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Vejledning til basiskontrakt. [Public-
private partnerships: Guidance notes to a basis contract]  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Vejledning. Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber 
[Guidance Note: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Teknisk manual: Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-Private 
Partnerskaber [Technical Manual: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships]
Guidance notes 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Bistand til offentlig-privat-partnerskab på drift og vedligehold af 
bygninger og velfærdsservice [Assistance for public-private-partnership for operation and maintenance of buildings and 
welfare services]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Partnerskaber om kommunale driftsopgaver [Partnerships for local 
government operational tasks].     
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Vejledning om OPP til bekendtgørelse om OPP, partnering og 
nøgletal [Guidance note about PPP for in relation to government order about PPP, partnering and key indicators] 
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2006). Budgetvejledning 2006 [Budget Instruction 2006]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Vejledning til ansøgning om medfinansiering til offentlig-private 
samarbejdsprojekter 2007 [Guidance note on co-financing of public-private collaborative projects] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Fem modeller for offentlig-privat samspil. En guide til 
kommunerne [Five models of public-private collaboration: A guide to the local municipalities] 
 Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2009). Vejledning om kommunal og regional udbudsstrategi og 
opfølgningsredegørelse [Guidance note on the local and regional government procurement strategy and follow-up review].  
Reports and major analysis 
 Danish Ministry of Finance (1999). Budgetredegørelse 1999 [Budget Report 1999]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Offentligt-privat samspil om skolebygninger [Public-private 
collaboration for school buildings]. 
 KPMG for the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). OPP-Markedet i Danmark 2005-2010 [The Danish 
PPP Market 2005-2010]. 
 Birch&Kroghboe, Grant Thornton and Karin Skousbøll (2005). Indsamling og analyse af udenlandske erfaringer med 
OPP i byomdannelse. Rapport udarbejdet for Socialministeriet og Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen maj 2005 [Overview and 
analysis of international experiences with PPP within urban redevelopment]. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2008). Rapport om Offentlige-Private-Partnerskaber (OPP) og de 
kommunale låneregler samt visse øvrige spørgsmål i relation til lånebekendtgørelsen [Report on Public-Private 
Partnerships and local government lending regulations and related issues]. 
 Local Government Denmark (2008). Kortlægning af udfordringer vedrørende offentlig-privat partnerskab (OPP) [A 
mapping of challenges in relation to public-private partnership (PPP)].  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Selvom der er forskel…kan du lære noget af udenlandske OPS-
projekter [Despite the differences…something can be learned from international PPP-projects]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Plan + Projekt: Offentlig-private samarbejde og planlægning [Plan 
+ Project: Public-private collaboration and planning]. 
Press releases, speeches, etc. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2006). Pressemeddelelse: Fælles offentlig-private selskaber skal 
give fornyelse og innovation [Press release: Joint public-private companies should lead to renewal and innovation]. 
06/02/2006. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Danske kommuner vil gerne offentlig-privat samarbejde (OPS) 
[Danish local municipalities are ready for public-private collaboration] 
 Parliament Committee on Transport (2008). Question to the Transport Minister [Question to the Transport Minister]. Nr. 
554. 
 Danish Government and Local Government Denmark (2008). Aftale om kommunernes økonomi for 2010 [Agreement 
about the local government sector’s economy for 2010]. 
Sources in relation to the schools sector cases 
 PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2008). OPP-forundersøgelse. Ny Høng Skole. April 2008. 
 Rambøl (2005). Trehøje Kommune, Vildbjerg Skole. Beskrivende dokument, Dialogfasen. January 2005.  
 Branchearbejdsmiljørådet Undervisning & Forskning (2009). OPP på Vildbjerg Skole, retrieved 10 June, 2009, from 
http://www.godtskolebyggeri.dk/Byggeriets_faser/Udbudsformer/OPP.aspx
 MT Højgaard (2006). Vildbjerg Skole klar på rekordtid, retrieved 11 April, 2008,from 
http://www.mth.dk/pressemeddelelser/vildbjerg_klar_paa_rekordtid
 Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen (2009). Håndtering af skat og moms, retrieved 16 December 2009, from 
http://www.ebst.dk/haandtering-af-skat-og-moms
 DG Market (2005). Request For Proposals DK-Vildbjerg: construction work for school buildings, retrieved 11 December 
2007, from http://www.market.gov.rw/tenders/np-notice.do~843591       

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Expert interviews 
 Irish Department of Finance (Central PPP Policy Unit), 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Roads Authority, 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Ernst & Young, 6 November 2008, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
 Irish Department of Education and Science, 7 November 2008, Tullamore, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Development Finance Agency, 15 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Business Confederation, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Cork Institute of Technology, 18 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
Policy documents and government reports 
 Farrell Grant Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants in association with Chesterton Consulting (1998). A Report 
submitted to the Inter-Departmental Group in relation to Public Private Partnerships. July 1998 
 Interdepartmental Group on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (2000). Framework for PPP Awareness and Training: 
Background and Explanatory Note 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2001). Framework for Public Private Partnerships.  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2002). Public Private Partnership National Communications Strategy, 2002 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2003) Policy Framework for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Ireland. Evolution of PPP 
Policy in Ireland. 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2006). Public Private Partnership. Guidelines for the Provision of Infrastructure and Capital 
Investments through Public Private Partnerships: Procedures for the Assessment, Approval, Audit and Procurement of 
Projects 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2007). Guidelines to State authorities regarding the National Development Finance Agency 
 PPP Policy Unit (2008). PPP Projects Update 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 1. What is a Public Private Partnership? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 2. What are the potential benefits of Public Private Partnerships? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 3. The Development of Public Private Partnership in Ireland  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 4. The Framework for Public Private Partnership in Ireland 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 5. The Current Status of the PPP Programme in Ireland (Updated 
July 2008) 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 7. PPP and the National Development Plan 2002-2006 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 8. The National Development Finance Agency  
 Cross-Departmental Team on Infrastructure and PPPs (2002) Fourth Progress Report 
 Department of Education (2005). Section 15 - Guide to the Department's functions.  
 Department of Finance and Price Waterhouse Coopers (2001) Review of PPP structures. 
 Irish Central PPP Unit (2006), Assessment of Projects for Procurement as Public Private Partnership.  
 Irish Government (2001). The Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001 
 Irish Government (2003). Sustaining Progress. Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005.  
 Irish Government (2000). National Development Plan 2000-2006.  
 Irish Government (2007). National Development Plan 2007-2013. 
 Irish Government (2007) National Development Finance Agency. Annual Report 2007 
 Irish Ministry of Finance (2009). PPP Project Tracker.  
 National Development Plan (NDP) (2009). How much money has Ireland received from the Structural Funds since joining 
the E.U.? 
Business and labor union reports and documents  
 Central Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) (1998), 
Submission to the Irish Government about Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
 IBEC (1998). First Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/01 1998 
 IBEC (1999). Second Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/04 1999 
 IBEC (1999). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) A Further Submission by IBEC and CIF to Government. April 1999. 
 Submission to the Cabinet Comittee on Infrastructure/PPPs on the Guidance Notes (2000). “A Policy Framework for 
Public Private Partnerships” and other Issues. 
 IBEC Press Centre (2003). Survey finds progress on PPP programme poor. 02/10 2003 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2005). Guidelines for Unions on consultations with State Agencies and Public 
Authorities in the Republic of Ireland concerning Public Private Partnerships 
 IBEC (2006). Promoting private sector involvement. In: PFI/PPP 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 2007-2013 
 IBEC Transport (2008): Now is the time for Public-Private Partnerships. In: Public Affairs Ireland. October 2008 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 2007-2013. 
03/14 2006 
 Irish Business News (1999). Immediate action is crucial to improve infrastructure. 04/28 1999 
94 
 Irish Business News (1999). McCreevy urged to target private sector for infrastructural funding. 04/28 1999 
 Hochtief (2008). Public Private Partnership. Concessions business at Hochtief. Position paper  
Legislation 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Service Contracts. S.l. n. 378 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Supply Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 379 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Works Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 380 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (2002). Public Contract Notices (Standard Forms). S.l. n. 343 of 2002 
 Irish Government (2002). State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002 
 Irish Government (2002). National Development Finance Agency Act 2002 
 Irish Government (2007b). National Development Finance Agency Act 2007 
Press releases, transcripts of speeches and other material 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2001) Speech by Mr. Charlie MaCrevy, T.D., Minister for Finance, Government Press Centre at 
the launch of the Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 11/01 2001 
 Address by Mr. Martin Cullen, T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance at the Information Seminars on the 
Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 02/15 2002 
 Address by Mr. Tom Parlon T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance. Information Seminars on the 
Framework for Public Private Partnerships. 06/03 2003 
 Speech by Mr. Charlie McCreevy, T.D., Minister for Finance at the launch of the Public Private Partnership National 
Communications Strategy. 04/14 2003 
 Presentation by the Central PPP Unit, Ministery of Finance to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Transport. Assessment, 
Approval, Public Center Benchmark and Procurement of PPPs. 09/23 2003 
 The Examiner (2004). “Funding from the private partners” 
 Statement to the Seanad by Tom Parlon, T.D., Minister of State at the Department of Finance. 11/17 2004 
 The Examiner (2005). “PPPs may resolve infrastructural crux” 
 Address by Mr. Brian Cowen, T.D., Minister for Finance. Second Irish Public Private Partnerships Policy Forum, 04/05 
2006 
 Department of Education (2005). Schools in Midlands will be the first built in new PPP programme 11/22 2005.  
 Department of Education (2005). Projects under Public Private Partnerships, 09/29 2005 
 Department of Education (2008). Large-Scale Building projects programme, 02/01 2008  
Sources in relation to the schools sector cases 
 Buck, B. (2007). An Irish Town Planner’s Blog: 60 Euro music school hits right note. 07/18 2007. Retreived February 15, 
2010, from http://buckplanning.blogspot.com/2007/07/60m-music-school-hits-right-note.html
 BDP. National Marigime College, Cork . Retrieved November 9, 2009, from www.bdp.com/Projects/By-name/M-
O/National-Maritime-College-Cork/.
 Bovis (2002). Preferred Bidder Selected for Ireland’s New National Maritime College. 04/24 2002. Retrieved November 
9, 2009, from www.bovis.com/llweb/bll/main.nsf/toprint/news_20020424.   
 City Cork School of Music. Project Description. Retrieved September 8, 2009, from  
www.murrayolaoire.com/education/projects/csm/text.html. 
 Dáil Éireann – Volume 655 – 21 May 2008. Written Answers – Public Private Partnerships. Retrieved September 8, 2009, 
from historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0655/D.0655.200805210035.html. 
 Department of Education and Science (1999). Martin Announces Development of the Cork School of Music under the 
Government’s Public Private Partnership Initiative. Union Quay, Cork. 10/18 1999. Retrieved November 19, 2009, from 
www.education.ie/home/.
 Department of Education and Science (2005). 4 schools in Midlands will be first schools built in new PPP programme. 
11/22 2005. Press release retrieved September 30, 2009, from 
www.education.ie/servlet/blobservlet/pbu_announced_ppp_22_nov_2005.htm. 
 Department of Education and Science (2005). Education projects under Public Private Partnership – EUR 300 million for 
23 New Post Primary Schools and 4 New Primary Schools, EUR 255m for Third Level Projects. 09/29 2005. Retrieved 
September 30, 2009, from www.education.ie/servlet/blobservlet/pbu_announced_ppp_29_sept_05.htm . 
 Department of Education and Science (2008). Large-Scale Building Programme. Press release retrieved September 30, 
2009, from www.education.ie/servlev/blobservlet/pbu_announced_large_scale_building_programme.htm. 
 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2005). Formal Signing of Contract for the Cork School of Music PPP 
Project. Address by Mr. Micheál Martin, T.D. 09/12 2005. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from 
www.entemp.ie/press/2005/20050912.htm. 
 Department of Finance (2008). Project Update – June 2008. 
 Doyle, E. (missing date of publication). The Public Private Partnership model on which the National Maritime College of 
Ireland was conceived and delivered. 
 EIB Press Release (2003.) Ireland: new National Maritime College and schools get EIB support. 02/13 2003. Retrieved 
Oktober 20, 2009, from www.eib.org/projects/press/2003/.
 EIB. Irish Schools (PPP Project). Retrieved November 8, 2009, from www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/2001/20010133.htm 
 EIB. National Maritime College Project. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from 
www.eib.org/projects/pipeline/2001/20010362.htm. 
 Greville, E. (2005). The National Maritime College of Ireland. PEB Exchange, Programme on Educational Building, 
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2005/7, OECD Publishing. 
 Hochtief (2008). Public-Private Partnership (PPP): Concessions business at HOCHTIEF - Position Paper. October 2008. 
 Hochtief PPP Solutions. Cork School of Music. Cork, Ireland. 
 Inshore-ireland (2009). A ‘flagship’ of maritime colleges. Retrieved November 19, 2009, from inshore-ireland.com 
 Irish Government (2002). Fourth Progress Report: Cross-Departmental Team on Infrastructure and PPPs. 04/10 2002. 
 Leland, Mary (2005). Better Late Than Never for School. Irish Times, 09/12 2005. 
 McCann FitzGerald (2005). Cork School of Music achieves financial close. September 2005. Retrieved October 11, 2009, 
from www.mccannfitzgerald.ei/news_and_publications_5.asp?sID=1691.
 Murray, Niall (2005). Building Begins On School of Music. Irish Examiner, 09/06 2005. Retrieved November 10, 2009, 
from www.murrayolaoire.com/news_04/04_01_28/csm_0509b.html.  
 Publicservice.co.uk (2005) PPP evolution. 03/22 2005. Retrieved September 11, 2009, from 
www.publicservice.co.uk/print/features.asp?type=features&id=4190
 Signal 3.1 (2005). Academy of Excellence. 03/16 2005.
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Expert interviews 
 Internal Market and Services (DG Markt), 2 July 2008, Brussels, Belgium. 
 DG Energy and Transport (DG Tren), 1 July 2008, Brussels, Belgium. 
 Joint Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions (Jaspers), 3 July 2008, Brussels, Belgium. 
 DG Research, 3 July 2008, Brussels, Belgium.  
 European Investment Bank (EIB), 4 July 2008, Luxembourg. 
 Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), 4 July 2008, Luxembourg. 
Policy documents 
 European Council (2000). Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000. 
 European Commission (2001). White Paper. European transport policy for 2010: time to decide. European 
Commission, Brussels. 
 European Commission (2003) A European Initiative for Growth. European Commission, Brussels. 
 European Commission (2004). Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Contracts and Concessions. European Commission, Brussels. 
 European Investment Bank (2004). The EIB’s role in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). EIB, Luxembourg.  
 European Parliament (2006). European Parliament resolution on public-private partnerships and Community 
law on public procurement and concessions. European Parliament, Brussels.
Legislation and directives 
 European Council (1986). The Single European Act. Official Journal of the European Communities, L169.
 European Parliament and Council (2004). Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts. European Union: Brussels.
 European Commission (2007). Corresponding values of the thresholds of Directives 2004/17/EC and 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 2007/C 301/01. Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 301/1.
Rulings by the European Court of Justice 
 European Court of Justice (2001). Judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99, 
Impresa Lombardini. Ruling of the Court, no. 60/2001. 
Decisions by Eurostat 
 Eurostat (2004). New decision of Eurostat on deficit and debt: Treatment of public-private partnerships. Press 
release STAT/04/1818/2004. 
 Eurostat (2004). Long term contracts between government units and non-government partners (Public-
private-partnerships). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
 Eurostat (2009). New developments in Public-Private Partnerships. Public Finance Unit (C3), Luxembourg.
Reports and guidance material 
 DG Regio (2003). Guidelines for successful public-private partnerships. DG Regio, Brussels.
 DG Regio (2004). Resource book on PPP case studies. DG Regio, Brussels.
 European Investment Bank (2005). Evaluation of PPP projects financed by the EIB. EIB, Luxembourg.
 European Commission (2005). Report on the public consultation on the green paper on public-private 
partnerships and community law on public contracts and concessions. European Commission, Brussels.
97 



PART2:THEFIVEPAPERS


98 

PAPERI:Emergingmetagovernanceasaregulationframeworkforpublic
privatepartnerships:anexaminationoftheEuropeanUnion’sapproach



	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%


	




	


	
	



		



&'(

	
	
	
	

		


		
				
 	  	   	   !  !" #   
			

				

	 
	 	  $ 	 
	
	 	 

  	
			"%	 	 !	
  		
 	  
	  
		 	 	 
	  &
	  	
	
	 !'			
"
						
	 !
	
					()				
		

		
	"*	
 !						
	

	
 	  
 
 		   
  
	
		
			"+

	  	 ,   	 	  
   
	 

,	 		
  		
	

		"
		
&   )	) (* 
 	 +
 , (
,  		(
,  	-	 	 ./ 
,    
) 
		

 , 	 	
	 .) &
* !"""0 1	2 3 4	* !"" 0
5	,*!""60'	,37*!""601
2*!""608*!""90'
,
3:*!"";0

3<
*)

	/4
			
,

) 
* ,  	 	*       
)  	,

 	,,( ,  , 
	
 
) 
,	 % ,
	(.1	%*1	231
2*;;904	31	2*!""!04*!""60
4	*=>35%*!""6/7
,(4	,1	2*?	
(*	,*


@	
,		
	
,

%
	(A.!""!;B/=	

		
,
	*,		
)
%	),C		)

))
	

).)'31
2*!""!04	31	2*
!""!0'
,*!""D0

3:,*!""90*!""/

4 )
 
) 	 	 	 
  	
 
)   	   		, 	 
)
%
)+
E	
.+E/)

		)	(
)
-
	)	
,	.'
,3:*
!""6/ 4 ,( ( @, 	
 	 ,	 	
 ,


)	)*	(
,		


,(  ,	 .
  4	 3 1	2* !"""0 4F* !""G0 H*

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
!

!""9/ :
 	 ,

, ? 
,( 

,		
* 	 , 


	 
	 
  , 
, A .1
3=*
!""G 66/ 4	 	, )
  , 
 	
 ., /   

( 	 
)  
)  ( .=
I 3 

* !""D/ J	 

, 
 @ 
 
) 	 
 	
 K 
L .	*
!""D/*
%-,,	-
,
)
	.<)*!""/*
) @		
 
)  +EL 	
 
)  	 	( , , 
 )(
,,

,
*	
*,
-

4 
 
)  	 	 )
, .	/ 
 @	 +EL	 				
  		 %(     	% 	*  
	 , 	

0 .		/ 
 % 
% 
)  ,
 , ,	 	  +EL
	

)
-	)0.			/
			

)	
-
 )
% )
  )
	
 
)  
) 	
 , -	

,			
 J	  +E- 
	  	)	 		 	 
)
*  
 	 	 
 
	* 
 (	( , 		(* 

(	 	
 
) %
, 
 %(  	
 	   	%
	* 
		
 )
 
	,*  
	* , )	 
C 
) 
-

	)
		,	)

7
	)
%)
(	*		,

	

)+E
-
  
	,	    
) 	
 , 	,	 )


( 
)   
, 	  !9   .
  
 
) -


*!""6/7
+E
	
(	(	
,
	-*	:	
			
(.H*!""9/*	
	 	(   
 , )		
   +EL 
 	    
.+
 M
		
* !""D/ -
 	 
,( ,)	,  ? 
(
)
% , 	
* , * )
 
%A .1
3= !""G
6DB/			
.1
3=*!""G0

3:,*
!""9/* 
 , -
    
		  )
 
	N	
 
)  4 
	
 
) -
  		)	  	, 
) 
)
% 
) 
,		
* *  , 	,	 -  
	 	 -
		
,
	(,	

,		
)


		(	+EL

4	,	

-	)(()


)  	
 	  +E*  
 
) 
 

(* 	( 	 

C	

	%	*	

,*,
	
)
,.+
*!""D/O	
	
		,
	 * M
		
L ))
 
 

 %
) (
, 4 (	  
 ( 	
 	 		 	 -

)
%.	/
	
))		(,)

(.5/
)2

	 	 	 
,* 	(* 

* 
	  ( 		  	
+

%0.		/
),
-)			(
)
+
   
 	 
- 
 	  		)	 	


	7M
		

)
(,		

)
,
*			,			
.	
*
	
,
/
	,(
)	
,
)
%



	,)
	

)

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
 

4 	, 
)  	 
,  )

  
	(*
 ,-

   )
% )
   ,	, <C(* 	 
	 - 
	
 
)   
, ,  
, , )

" .
	 / 

	,@		

) 		 )	,	 
	0*  
  
,	,,)	(*	
	1*
	
	
	,,



	






	
	
4,			(
) 
  
		 

) 
	
,,			

)

	(	,(
,		

 	
 , 
 .) 3	* ;;B01

	* !"" 0 
,3
P	-5*!""D/J				
,
	
	,	)	,.J		
*;;G01

	*!"" 04*!""6/)	*

%  )
 
) 	(* 	 	, 
 
,-,-

 	
 ,
,	( 
) 	 	 
 	 	 
		
0 
,*

%)

)%-)
,

	

,,
, ( 	
0 	,*  
	 , 
) 	   
, 	

 
 
% 	 			
 
) 	
 	 , 	
%
,.1	%*1	231
2*;;901

	*!"" /

J	,				
)	(,%)
(
	,	

, M
L K4 $ 
)  5	L .; 9/ , ) ,
, ( 
	
 
 
 	 

	 .J		
* ;;G/*  
%

	 ( ,
,   		C 
)  	(-% ,	

( .= 3
%* !""G/ 7 	 -%
*  
% 	    
,	
	,	

,,	(
	N
(*,
	  , 	  
(-	 , 	- 
	 ( .<
%* ;;B0
<)* !""/ 7 	 % 
 ,  	 
 		(
	,,* 	  , 	   )
 

	
* 2
	,		
%	,*

(*	-		.1	234	*!"" /

4	
)	
	
*
*	

	,,	))*,


,	
),		
)	
.J	* !""6/ '
, , : .!"";/ % 
 )	 ,	)) K )		L*
 J	 .!""6/ 
  @	 
) 	
 K 
L 7

,			
,  	
K(	L
K(	L
	
	 .5	,* !""G/   	 ,	)) 	  	  
)
,  

 	    K L 	,  		-
%
 
, 
) 		N	
 , 
	 
   , 
 )	

	 .) P	,* ;;;0 '
,3:* !""6/* , 

 	% 
)  
			






			


				* 	%,)	 , .'31
2*!""!01	23
4	*!"" 01
2*!""6/

J		  			
 
*    ,		,, ( 	 	
 K
	 (
	L*  )
, 	 	
 	 
% , 
	( 
		* ,
K

	(	L	,(
-
	


 , 	 )
 	
 
		
 
) 	* 
*

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
D


	
*)	,
	

)
	

	))		(.'
,3
:* !""60 =

)	,* !""G/ 4 
	 
	
	) 
		(		)		+EL
,	)
		
@	)

)		*	
(
)	

,

4 
	
 
)  -
*  	)( ,	, 	  
	 	
*
		)	  	, 
)  +E   
	 	
 )
% )
 	
		( 	  !9 -
*  
, (  .!""  9/* 	
  (	 
) ?
 
) 
A4	 
	 
 	, 

	,
)	-		(	
	
*	
		

( 	 
@ 
% 
) 	, ,		
  .<)* ;;90 1	2 3
4	* !"" / K:L 
     (, 	   	 

	

)	,	

2*	

	(,	
*
,-
 +E-. 	 )
/'
* *

,
(+EL-

)Q

7
 	 ( 
) 	  *  +E   2 
  
 
)

( )
 , -	
 .
,3P	-5* !""D/'
*= ,
% .!""G/ 
 -
 	  	(  
 	  

	 ,*   
C* ?J %
 	 
  ,(	 
) -

* 
 
  	
	  
 , -
A
.		,GD/4		
	

(
)
%)
(	
)
-
7
,	(*	

),
	



@)

(	
)+EL
,-

)*	)(	

,
)+E
*,	,	+E
	(	.)<
34%*
!""!0 =
I 3 

* !""D0 H* !""D0 
* !""60 1 , +%,*
!""9/

5	*  	  ,  ,		
 . 	 M
	( 
,/ , 

2	,	 	,	 
) 
,-,-

	  ,

.<
34%*!""!0
*!""6/<
,*
),		
%,	))
, ( 
, 
 
 	
 ( )
	 
 
	

,	
*	*
	
	*,%	*
)		(
)
 
-  .H* !""D/ 7  ,		
 	  
)  , 

,

	
)	
,4M
	,
)
	
)
2
	*
	)
%
)
*,,,
		
	+E,
+
	)  

)
-*  
)  ,		
   
 ,
	-2	,	










	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
6

	

  
!	"#$%%&$'(()*&+,
#+"'
'-+  	"#
#.)+&'*/& P(	,	


<	-
	
.C	
	/

&
,
)


,		


#*+#.)+',
$+'%
M
		

+
M

)	
M
	
	

M
		

+
M

)	
M
	
	
M
		

M
	
$	
			
P
,	


	

'$#%% P
	

<	-
	 
		
	
#$"*&%(%'-
%*$+&'*%*
$'*+'
5

,
)

	,

*
+
M

)	
7,				*

	
	,
%	,-

	

			*-
*	,
	,%	
	(		

4	,*    & 
, 
) M

,		
 .&M/* 	  )
(
	
,,	
	

P	
<		!""".+
M
	*!"""/
4&M(	,,
)	
	+E
	(	*,
	  
 	 , 
 
	*  * (	
%*	 			
* ,  
		 	, 
)  
	 .=
I3


* !""D0
* !""601 ,+%,* !""9/4  	N 

,
)
	+E

	

	

4		
%)
		)

,
,

(
),		
.*
;;B/ -, @ 		  
,, )-
-) 	 = ,
P@
	%(
))	 	 +E* 	,	 O	
: .O:/ )

%,<	*O:)
4
,+(*O:)
!*
+
 =% .+=/* <		&))	
) +
<
		
.+
/*,
	7	
<

2	+
	
./
4		
,,
,	
	-,			,.1*
;;9/* ,  , 
 )		 ) (	 , , 
,	 4 
	 
)

,,

		/M
		

			,	
(
	, ,
 
 
 
   
,0 !/ 	,	)		
 
) %(

, 
 	
,
( 
 		 	 		  	 
M
		
 , 	  +
 	 4
 	 
* %( 
,
 	,	)	, 	
 
  		*  
	  ,	, 	 
		*,		C(
)
		*

,,(=N(.!"" /

4
   %
, 
, )
  @ 		*  
 
) ,%
 , 	  
	
 
)  , 
) 	( ,
	

,
,	
,*(
),
,
	
	(4	)		,
(	
)
,	4		,
,
	


),%*	

%)
C
			
=,P@
*	,,)

	


	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
G

 
	(,
*	*,
(
M
		
*	,+
M
	
 P		
,,		
))

 	(+
M

)	.+M/
 +
,		

	%),
		
 +	

,
(
)	,,

,,(
M
		
 ,  +
  =% . ,	@  )
 

,	

/

4 	( ,
 ,  		 ,	(,  	 ,			
 
) 
 7
M
		
   
 ,		 
	, ,	, 	)
	
 
  +EL
)
 	
 , 2
 
	( 				 )
 *  	 
  
	(

* 
		
 , 	)
 
, 	   	  
)
	
,
	(%	4	-,		)		,@		

)
	,	


)
,
),	)),
)	
)	

	
 %( 
 , 			
* 	 
) ,
 
 ,	( 	  )	 
	(
,
=
@ 		,,
(,			 
,

) 	,	)(			 	 , .	*;B90=N(*!"" /4	
,		,	)		

)

	
)-

   
) -		  
)  
	*  , 	  @
	


		


	
	
4			)			
(	,,(
,	

)
%

)+E,, 
) ,	(	
* 	
* , 
 ,			


		)

24	)	,	.
4!/

4 )	 	   
) ( )
 
) ,	 M
	( 	
 
	
)
	

)	'*,		

,

,
)
	
2	%@	((	
*	


,			
*
+EL 
 	 	 , 	,	  		( 	 ( 	, '
* 

,)	,			,	(,	+E)
%	
(
/ 
 +E
O		*	,	 
	
 ,			


2
	
	
,
%
(
)+E-	,
)
 ,0/, <		(,:
* M
		
,+

  
  ),  
) 	,	 ,		 
   
	 
 
, 	,	,( ,			

) 	%
 	
,	.
-,

))	/

4	,*
)
)
					,	)	,	+EL)
%
)
4 	, 

	

)4-+
4
$
%
.4+$-4/* )		 ,  ,	 
  
2* ,    
) 
+
	+@M.++M/





	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
9

	
 &#$+
'(()*&+,
#.)+&'*
'*%
'(()*&+,#.)+&'*00,&*.+'
%%)12#$++'+"##$&%&'*%'-
*+&'*0)1&$)+"'&+&#%+' 
0)1&$%#/&$#' '3%$'*+$++'
+"&0+,
'-+.'/#**$#&*&+&+&/#%+'0'('+#
-'(+&'*'-%&*+"#(#(1#%++#%
#.
%')$#
- 4
4	
<
,(
		

44(
.	/
,	( ,	( ,	(
#.)+&'* - 4
4(L
<	
%

		


7	D 
,D;
	


,		

!""D+MB
!""D+M9
<		(,
:


+@	
O)		
		
J	




		
.
-
,
	
	(



2/
P
,
@	
	
2

+
M
)
	
.++M/
.,	
7!""B/
'&$,.' - +C


)	
	
+C

)
	
	
	
,	
	
,
M

,		


))	

		,

	,
)
@	


,)		
O


)
-

,
	)



	

)<	
%


	


)	
	
	(

2
,@

,
	,
	

	,,
+E
	
)

M

	,	,
	
@
#%0'*%&1#
)*&+4%5
- O:
714
O:
714
+

O:+M5$
O:4+$ +=

+=O:4+$

%&*+"#%0)1&$0'$)#(#*+&#$+&/#

( 
 +E-

) 	 	

) 	
+
 
 % )
 	 
% , 	 
 4 <	
+
 %   		( 	    
  	)	

		

)
O		.+
	,M
	*!""D/4
,(				

	
	,	
	,
)	
	
,
	,  ,		
 
 , 	 
 
  	 

	 M
	 	
2
	(+
M

)	*	*	

)

	*,
O			

R	(	,
		
),	,	<
	


))

,
	 

	
			, 	
<,* 

 ,* 
 
	, 
  	% 
) ) 	 	 
 	
 , 
 	
  
 	 ,, (  
	 
		 ,  
			(   
,(

, ( 	 ( 

 
  	,, ( 
	,	
 
  

	 

.+
M

)	**M-!B6;;,M-!BG;;/

4)
*  	
* 	
 
 
 	 ,			
 	  
,	,


2 *
2,2
,)

	 	   * ,  
, 	  &))		 
 
)  +

M
	(.&+M/'
*
,		
)
@	(S66		
	*
	
(
2	


	2


		
 .+
 M
		
* !""9/ M
	,	  	N 
) K,,L 

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
B


2*

)

,		E1*)
@*
'4(
					
)T!"		
)

2
.'4(*!"" D /*,	,O	

		
	, 		 
) S!" 		
 , S   		
* 	( 4 	
 	,
	 	
			, 		 	   
2*
 
)  
@	( 
)  
 ,  
 
* 	
 	
	
 
 .J		
* ;;G/
 	
  
2 
, )
 	
	(@,
,		,
,
+E-	,	

!""D+
	,+
M
	

%	
,		


 ,  @		 
 ,		 4 		 , 	 M
		


))		,
 	
)
						

		)(,
,)
%)
,	+E4		,

%
))	,
,)

	,,	
		
.	 O: % ! ( !""B/ 
 )
 *  ,, 

O		 ,   @		 
 
, 	  )


)
*
-,K
		,	
L
,.+
	
,M
	*!""D/

4	
 
,	
),		
	
		,	

  	)		

)  
*	    	 		

 , C  
 	, )
 	 
% , 	 
 4 

,,



)
-,?	(
@

A .+
 	 , M
	 !""D* 	 !;/* ,  

	
		

 

2	(
,)		.R/*,

  
 
2	(  
 	)(   ,
 )		 %- 
)  
2 .+

	,M
	*!""DBU(	V/

4 
		 ,	
 
,  
 )		 
 
) 
,

-,
@
*
	,



	)		
 	 
, 
  

 )
 	 	
	
 	  
 .4F*
!""G/4*	,
)

	),	,,(	
*
		
,	

,	  	
	(-C	)	 	
)

	

,	
,	
+@		

,	
		,		 *,)	
	

, )
,
		
* (	

) 	 				  
	@,J	 	 	
(
	,,

	,)	,C
)	,,*,	
,  
		,	

, 	   	
	,, 


@,@	)
	,		%.*!""/

7)
	
	

,			,	))	
	(
	 
 	
 ( 
) 
, 	  +EL-
 )
% 4
+EL 
( )
% ,	(  ,	)) ( 
) , * 
	
,	))C	(.	/
	
	.M4-/0.		/


.MM-/0, .			/ 			 ./ .+
M
		
*!""D/J	
 
( 	,
		(
),	))
, .J	*
!""6/*  	 
	 	  ,	))  	
	( 	 
  M4- 
,

,
M4-,
,D	+E)
%

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
;

 M
- .M4-/* 	  ,)	,  	 	
	( 	  
)
%*  2 
 ,	,M
	( 	
  )
, 	 

 ,		 .+
 	 , M
	 !""D/ M4- 
,
 	 		- 	
		 	
  
4
	(	
(*C(*
	((
)
  	* 	,	 
 	) 
  
- 
 	
,
4	 
, 

, 
  	
 5 (  ,   O=5&*
O=5&*O=5*

 M
	
-.MM-/
 
(,)	,
-	
	(	

%
		
*,
((,	
,(
		
MM-
,

	
	*
 	 )( ), 
  	 
	
  	 
 ,	
)

)

	(()
	
 .
-, ,
 
/MM-*
* 2 
 
		
)<	%)
,	4(L7	D ,D;

 		
./*		
,	-	
	
)


		
*		,	
,	
O%*)
@*	(
)
,(

		

2
		-	
,
		

)

, 	 
	,, 
   	
 	* ,   )
 


,( +EL	
,		*	 	
,	
C	,		,.4 /


	
 

 '*+$+4	5 '*$#%%&'*45 *%+&+)+&'*45

$'*'(&$
' *#%"&0
)&*.
$'*+$+
0#&'

	(	.,,

,			

)	%/

	

<		-	
	


'$+&'*
'--&**$#

	(	

	

<		,
	
,	


' '-
0,(#*+%

	(

	



	
,	
	(
(,



<		,
	
,	


 *#%"&0
 "#*
$'*+$+
#60&#%

	(	

	(	

O

@	

#.)+&'*

	
	(
<2
	

,		

$
-	
	(
<2
	D ,D;
)
4	

$
,
7	D ,D;(	)

,,


$$')*+&*.

&
))	

,	
,			

)
	%

&))	

&			
,	
,	



	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
"

	"#'*7'--1*$#%"##+&%%)#&%3+*%-#*#.' *#%"&0'-0'2#$+%
J	 +E	,	+

% )

2

	

	
		
)
,*M
		
L



%( 	   
 	
 4 	 )	  	 	  

	
 5    O=5& , O=5 
, . <* !"""/ 
	, ),C	

 
	
)   , 	
) 	%
,,4	 	+

))		( ) 
  

)) 
	.+
*!""D/

4
	

)

))		+E	*,



% 
 +

(E	
 ,  
		 ))
 
 		 	

)	 
		 4+@	O)		 M		 C	  	
 
 %

,)				 
)
,
	
,.:O/*,

 	 , 	
   @	 
) G"  
) :O .'	@* !""6 6/
M
	 	  )	  		 	 
	
, (  M
		
 ,
+
*   	 
 
 	  		 
))	 
)  	


.	+
D(!""B/

 		( ,
, 	    ) * 	  !"" * 
M
		
  	
( 
, 
   
)  
2 	
	
,4 		
,,)
 

) 		,

 	 
  , 
  
	
  
  * 	
,	))		 	  +@	 O)		 M		* 	 (	(   

, 
	
2
 	L*( -
 	 	 
, )
 
  	,, 	 
))		 


 ,	  2
 )		 
	 	 , ,  
.	 +
 D ( !""B/ 4 +@	 O)		 M		* 	 	(
	,			)	
			+
*
,
	((,

<

)*	5(!""D*+
,,		


)	
	
 
 .+
* !""D/ 4 M
		
* 		 
  
 , 




2* , 
  
 
  
		  )	 		(
* ,	,,   	,, ,    (  	, 
))


(	)

,		


/ 4	
	
	%*,
/ 4 	     
 
) 	 			( 
 ,, 	%
.+
*!""D/

) 
  
,		
 *   
)   	 , 
))  	 
*,	)
	))
,)		
,
)

&  
(* 	) 

 
(

)  
,		
 	*  
,,	*,	,
	

4			(
	%,
	%	
,	

-
2 )
 
	
, 

 
	
,J	 
+
,		
*,	(
)!9	


,
	%	
,	,&	
(*
)		
)(+

(	,
-

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%


		 )
 	 -, 	 
)) 
  * 
)	,

		%)	,,
.)
,		

)	%	=	*!""6/

#$#*+#/#'0(#*+%+"#)*$"'-)'0#*+*#%"&06$##*$##*+#
45
<	 	
)
,	 
O		* 4(,
+
 
	 		*  +E 
 ( ,   
) 
)

				$,(	,(	
	 , 2 
 
		
 , 

	 ,2* 	 	,	  
	 	 	 	  %	  				 	, 	
 
	( 				*


	


2	+
=%.+=/*,

 *   	 
)  +
 	 +@
M .++M/4M
		
* ,  	 
)O:4+$ 	  	
,
!""9-!" *,
)SB		


4
$
%				.4+$-4/
,

264+=*
	

)
*
,

)  4+$-4 	 
 ,  
 	 
2  @	
.+=*!""D*!""6/

4+=,O:4+$(


	


		
+E*,
	-
)++M*	
))		(
,	<!""B4)
	

)	
	.(	(,
		( 
) 5	/    ),  
)  			
 
 )

 	
 .<%*!""!/		)	
*  	,	,
 ++M 	  	
 
)  +E  
 	   )		 

	,	,@
)	
<))
	,

,	 
 
 		
 
,*   
 
 
	 ( 	
*
	
*,
,			
4++M	
((	)

@ 
% , 	O:4+$  
  
- 	  
@	(
	  ( 		, 	
 @* 	 	* , 
  
 

	
	4
-	
)++M	(
*	
		,
			
	N	
(
,

,,	)

%+E

7

	(						
)
	7	
<


2 	 +
 	
 ./  	  				 (  += 	 
-

	
 	 O: +:& ,  +
 =% )
 
	
 ,
O
*	 , 
 
	, 
 
 ,			
 	  +EL
		

)
	
	)
2)
),	
)
<,M
	
5,.	 (!""B/42


2%()
*
)		
(

)
,


*

	

)	)
2	
*,

)
2
,



	
)++M*							,		

 +E 	 
 ,( ,		 
 )
  ,   
, 
)

	,		*
	,	*@
%*
,
	(	.=W3

*!""D/


	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
!

	




	

8
   , 
  +EL -
 
)   	 	
*
)	 
,	
) 	* 	% )

	

	 
		 )	,	 
 
 ,		

) 
( )
 )
 , 

, 
) 
 	  +E 5	*  +EL 
O		 C	
   
2 
  
, 		 
) 
@	( S66 		
 

,		

+E
%)

2=(
(
,	,)

)

%
+E* 	
)
 -
 )
% 
,	  	
-)
-% 
	* 	
		)	  	,  	 
( 
,	  

 
		
 ( 	
	
%-	.
,3P	-5*!""D/

'
*		N	
,,		

	
			(	%,

 4	31	2 .!"""/  ,  
 
) K		L .	
 
)

	(,
,	
/*,(	
)
	(-%	)



,	)) 4 	 
	
 
) 	 	, 
 

	   

				* 	%
 
 		
,*, )
	

))

	
  
 
) K		L  	 
 
	( ,  	
	,,.4	31	2*!"""/7+E	(			N,)
	%
)
)	

,)
* 
		,	

,
(
	
	C	,)	
		
)

,*	 	
	 	,	 

@

	,		,,	


<
,*  
	 , 

))   		  )

 )
 
+@	 O)		 M		  	
, 
 	,   
, 	 
 (
     
) ,			 	 ,)		 ( 	 2
 	
	
	L=(	
			
)
  
,
)	 

 +E* 	 	 (   



  
- 	 )		 
C 
)   
 	 
		)	P
	(*
				(	
)
 
 	  	 ,	 ,)		* 
   		 

	
(@,
,)			
+

	J		(
,   
 	 )
 
*  
 
) 	%-		
		(

,,		(
)	
	
-		(J))
)	*-

)
%
M
		
,+
	
	
		
	%),
	
)	,,	

4	,*		
)
%*
,
),XM4-*
MM-*,XJM4-2
)
		


)
O		*		)

)
,



+E-	,
%*MM-,,	
)
	
	(,(2
		
)<	%)
,	
4(L7	D ,D;5	(*
2
+E	
	


,
),,	))(		-
)
%*,
))
		%(


,)

O=5&* O=&* =&4* , =&&4 
, ,,  	 
 	 ,	*

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
 

	( ( 
  	  4 , 
, )
  
 
) 	
	 ,
 
 	 (  @	
  
( ,	)) 
( 	
		 
	, 
 	
  
,* , ) 
( 
% 	 , 	 
, 

)@
	)
)+EL	

)

5	(*   
) 				 
 
 ,	
 
) 	)
	
* 

	,	*,	
)	
			(	
)
)	
-
 )
% 			   % 
 )		 

	,		
)
*,(			
	N,	

)++M4				

)		
)
&
,
)M

,		
.&M/*,
C	

,
,
)
+E
)
,

%
*	(
)			
*,
,
)	.=
I3

*!""D0
*!""6/4)	,	

 
, ,(
)+E
( )

	 	 ,		

)
)

  	 * 	   ,   ,
   
( 	-

)
%
)		,	,	)

		(	
*	
,
,			


!	

 "  #  
 

%'$)#(#*+
&#$+&/#

	
-
%

+E.YS66
,/

M
	(
,
.
,-,-

/


$$')*+&*.*
'*7'--1*$#%"##+

	
--%

+E,


<
)
.	-
,-	/

	"##('#%'-
#.)+#

M
-



+EM4-
MM-
,

M
	(
,	

	
,
,	

	
	(
)

,

)'0#*
+*#%"&0
6$##*$##*+#

O	

)	)
	
*

	,	*,
,
)	

+E,	

)	
*	
*
,




&
,
)
M

,		
.	*
	*@

		/


=  (	 
 ,  		  

 +E -

)
%)
	+E	
,	,	
,*	(	)
	,  
) 		)	 	
 ,			 	  ) )
 ) 

		
 .
* !""6/   @	  	 
, 
) 
(

)
* +EL-
	

,	
	
	

(
	,,	))
,
)
.4D/3	
	 , 		   
 ,
	 
	 
) 	
* ,
 ))
 
 )		  

 +
  % , 

  )	
))
)				
, 
 	 	-

)
%



	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
D



J	 	

)+
<	%2
,	
)

	
		
 	  +E * 	   
	,   		
 
) %
C	  ))	 	) 

  ;;G 	  	,  SG""
		

,  ,, 	 !"" 
 	  4-+
 4
 $
%
.4+$-4/	,	96!""%
)
,*9B"""%	(*DB"
*  "	
*
  ))	  (*  	)
	
 (* 
.	
M

*!""69/4,)
		,	)
 )
	 %
,
)+E*	
	,
C	,,		
SB"-;"		

)		(		)
	
, 
	   
 +E .=% *
!""6/ O	 	 	,( 
	, *  +EL 				 
 


)
	
 
)  
2  (  , 4 	  ,	,  
+EL-
)
%
	,M
		
	
,		

		 
 
 
 
	 % 
)  	  4	 

	, 

 )
 
 )
 	
 
 
 ) 	
 
		
,	



	
,

=  (	 
 ,
, 
  
) +E 	
  ( 	)  	

	(	,	,
	,	
,		
,  

))   		 J	  
		 ,	
 
,*
	
,,	!""D*M
		
,

,


,

)),
%4
		
*%



))	*C	,	(
)
!9
,
	%	
,	
,J M
		
 
 )	, )
)
	
		
,)			
 
) *  
 ,		 ,  	  
 
, 
)
,  - M4-* MM-* ,  - 
 	 	
 	
		 ,
	
(.+
M
		
*!""D/

4 +E 	 * ,  M
		
 	 	*   	 	 


 	  
 ( 
	 
 

  +E-	, 

% )
  
2 . 	
--% 
	/ , 
 %  

,




,
)(	<		(,
:
		)

	)	
		.	
--%
	/4
    
 
* 	( 	, 	   

	 	
 
, 
	( % 	 
 	 
 %  
)    ( 
)


	
-,	

5
 
 		 .
 
	/   +EL -
 
)  	 , 

) 	 	 (	 	) ,
* 	 	 	 	@,
 4 (	 
 * ,	  M
		
L 		 	 
)
	-		*+E(
(,		

)
,
*	
	

	

	
 , 
 ,			
 4 M
		
 ,  +
 
=%L,		)
)
	

)	)
,
2	*,
()


 
2  O: 4+$ 
 )		( 
  += 
 	 
 

J	
)+
	+@	M.++M/*
M
		
,+=, 			
)
)
	@*

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
6

)
	
,
)
,,	,	@
		*(

	

	,,		)5,				

	M
	(

,
),	
*
(
,(
	
 ) )
 
) 
	*   ,	 	* 

	,	*,
	(	

)    
 (* ,   ( *
 , 
  ,

 +EL
 		&
		
)
,


	( ,(  ,	)) 	 
) 		 +E  
	( ,
	
 		
	 ,			
4(*%
,
	
	

	
,,,
,7
(
,
,
)
	
 	
 
* , 
  +EL )
% )
  	
				 
) 
 		
 
		
    &+MO ,  5 =

(	,
,	(	
,.)
@
M

*5%3<N* !""B0&+MO*!""B/ 	
) 	)	 
	
)
,	*	(,
)		
-,	-


)	

)
	
(,
,(
*		
	,	,		


&'(*<*7	*715*O		
):


Z%),%

4 
 	 ) )
 
 , 	
 )
 '
 'F2,* M
:*1[%*$	+2
*:'
,*(
,P	*(&*
J	,<
*,<


		

)	


	

 <
 
* 	( 
 
) * ) 
    K
) 
L
	, 
) 
)  
 ,			 )
  )
 
  
)  
-	,	
 '* 	 
, 	 
 +E 
	( *    
 
	(
!  ,
  	O:  
 
	  ,	))
,)	,*	

		
	
2,
	4			)

,	(),
			*
,%
,	)
	

 &(
	
2	
		,	(
)	

%

D 4 M4- .
-/ , MM- .
	
-/  ( 		
*
.			
/	M
		
L
))				
)

	


	
6 O:4+$ 
, 			( 
 
-
, 	 	
	( 
2	  
 "

)
*	(	,
@	
)!"
)


2



	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
G


=N(* * :	* 5* M
IN*  M 3 M2,
* : !""   
 	
 
	(M 	  P	7		
7M
 5
%
,
,

	:	,	
		*D!"-D
=*<3%*7!""G4
	

)$
%J)

	$<
J

)	
	(*!GG -B 
=	*P*7%	
(*7*+,,**3',*M!""64
	

)	%	
5
	

2	E1	


)
2*
! !6- 6
=

)	,*  !""G 4 M	 =	 
) P
-4 	-	
	 )	
 
 P
 +@	 	 7,			
 	* GG 
D""-D
=
I* < 3 

* 1 !""D 4 & 
, 
) 
-
,		
 ,  

	+E

)+
	
	(!B6-!"B
=%* 7* =%* 4* '		*  3 '	* M  !""6 	-	
	 	   +E  
	 
) M , + +
 7


	(		,	)
	(
+=*"!B!-
M
*'; 94$
)5	+

	*D BG-D"6
M

*7* 5%*13<N*: !""B 	  ,	-	
	 7,,	 ) M , 	 5	 	%
	

(5
,	

+
=%!""D4+=L
		-		./
+=P@

+
=%!""6+	

)
2)	,(+=+=
P@

+
M

)	!"",
) M

)		
	,MM-
!B6;;,M-!BG;;*P
,			
)M
*
G"!""
+
 M
		
 !""D :  
 	-	 	 ,
M
	(P
	M
,M
	
M&.!""D/ !9)	
+
 M
		
 !""9 M

,	  
)  
, 
) O		
!""D9+M , !""DB+M
) +
	 , 
) M
	 !""9M
 ""+
E	
=
+
M
	!"""	,(M
	
P	
+
M
	*! ,!D
!"""
+
 	 , M
	 !""D O		 !""DB+M 
)  +

	,
)M
	
) !""D


,		

)
,)

 , 
) 	 
% 
* 	 ( 
 , 	 	

+
E	
=
+
!""D<474"DB*5(!""D+
P@

5	,*   !""6 4 
		 
) 	-	 	 =		 
 
)

		,	
	
*9!!6-! ;

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
9

5	,*  !""G 	  
		 	 		  N 	



)	<
*; !G-!99
'	,* : 3 7* O  !""6 	 	 	 
+
	 ,O			
 +@	 )
7	 , 		
 )

M
		4)
	
4
	

)
		<	*6!;-6;
'	@*<!""64
		<(
)+
E	
E1	
' 4( !""  5 	  	  4 <	
( &))	*
P
,

'
,*:!""D4	%(	
)	-		7	

)
	7,			
*G D 9-D;
'
,* : 3 :* M , !""6 4 M 
) 	-	 	
P	)
	
+@	M*E1+,,+
'
,*:3:* M !"";  4  
) 	 	  
 )	

+

	7))	*!;  - ;
	*O!""D<,)						./
	 ,
	 
	 	 )
  P 
@ 	
 
 
)
	<
*96DD-D "

*=!""6?	-:
,	-
AD;-9D*
	=35	,*,*	-:
E<&@)
,E		(


*  3 :,* <  .!""9/ :
 
) 	-	 	

  )
  7	 Q 	
 	 
) 7,			
<	*9 D6G;-6B!


* < 5 3 <
* J  5

	 ?-	 
	N	
 

	N	
 )	,- (	*A  J  <
*  + P	 3   &* ,*
:
 
2 		
 , 
		 M* M	,* E1 M	,
E		(

,*  3 P	-5* O , !""D 4 
		 
) 	
 		
 ,

()
)
7
):
E1E<7+,,+
1*J3+%,*!""9
	( 	 	+
 

,
) 
-

,		
,

(),	

)+
	
	(*D!!!9-!D9
1	%*J* 1	2 +' 3 1
2*  , ;;9	 M
@ $
% X
<	)
	<
E1<
1	2*+'34	*:!""  		
 ,<	=	 
	-	
	 77(	 
) O M 	
(3* !    9-
D6
1
*M3=*!""G+	
 			
 )
%
)
 	 	 	 
% 	 O% 	
 
 
) 
2
*!D96DB-66G
1

	*!"" :
	:
E1<
1
2*!""645
	

)	-		P
)
$	
4
)
2 	$,	7,			
*B  6-
69

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
B

1* < ;;9 	 X + 	
,%	
 	 , %		 )
%			
M
'	N5

P	,* <' ;;;M
	 
4J	  	-	 	7	
=	
<		*D  6-6
H* E , !""D <
) P 	 :
 , 	
 7 ,			(
7(	M*E1+,,+
H*E!""9	,		O	+))		(,
O
	7
		(4M
):	


)+
	
*!;6
G"XG9
&+MO !""B 	-	 	  	 
) 	% <	 ,  )


(&+MO		
&
* <  , !""" 	-	 	 4
( , 	 	
		
	P
,

,
*=:;;BM
	
		X4
(,
,E<7
* = : !"" ?-
 , 	 A   G-6 	 < 
&
*,*4$	:
X+		

(,
	
)	
E1
,
*=:3	* ;;B:
J	
:
Q	%		
7,			


)	7,			
,4
(*B!!! -!D 
*&'!""	

)	-		O		

(,* " 96-;!

*  !""6 4 & 
, 
) M

,		
 ,  M
	
 
) <
	
+
7'	
		\		3
*,*4&
,
)
M
-
,		
 	 7	
 4 +
 +
( , <
	 	
 <	
=+-P
	
M

 !""6O		   
	7 	 
)  	
,		(	
M


	*MM;B94M
	
,=%(E		(
)M	)
	
<* + < !""" 			
 , 	-	 	 $ 8
% <
=	,
<)*5;;9:7
(X7
-M,		
		
	(
E<7J	
<)* 5 !"" $
 4
,  4
( 
) 	- :
	 	 +
*
<,		
		<,	*!D-!G
<
*  3 4%* O  !""! 	,  : P , $ 7
 
 
:
	+
E	
+
P
*B-B
<%*  !""! 	-	 	 
 )
  =		 

+

	<(*!G !B - "
<
%*:;;B:

()	

		
	
<
	<	

**669-!B

	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
;

4	*:31	2*+'!"""	-			+
E	

&
*<*,*	-		4
(,				

	P
,

,
4	*:31	2*+'!""!	7:

	

:
<Q	7,			
	*G!!;9-!"6
4*4!""6	
,
):
XO			

		,%		*9!!G9-!BB
4	* &* =>* ' 3 5%* : !""6 
, 
) :
 7 $
 4
,
M
 M	)		
 +
 :
  .+E&:&/ $
 $-"6-"!
	,)

@-
%


,)-
-$-"6-"!,)
4F* M O !""G 	-	 	 )
  O	 	 	

P	*6 ;B-"B
 '* ' 3 1
2*  !""! =	,	 	-	 	 	
	* D6; -GG
J	*:!""6	-		,,	$
M
*J
%	
 
 G* 	
 M )
 =	 , 
		* M
 =	
<

* O% 	, )


	,%	," ;B9 DB]
]	]G
,)QC^
J		
*&+;;G4	
)
$8&@)
,E		(
8	*1!"" M<,(XO	,
,P
,
<
8* 4 !""9 :
 5
 	 E 	-	 	 	

	
*" 6-69






















	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
!"


9

$%
 %,<	.O:%/*!(!""B*=*=	
 O:+(,4
.O:4/*(!""B*=*=	
 
	 7	 
 <
 
2 	 +
 	
 ./*   ( !""B* =*
=	
 O:* (!""B*=*=	
 +
=%.+=/*D(!""B*P@

 <		&))	
)+
M
		.+
/*D(!""B*P@

 
 +
M
	 .!"""/	,(M
	
P	
+
M
	*! ,!D
!"""
 +
M
		
.!""/J	+


	()
!""	
,	,
+
M
		
*=
 +
M
		
.!"" /7+
			)
:
+
M
		
*=
 +
M
		
.!""D/:
	-		,M
	(P

	M
,M
	
+
M
		
*=
 +
  =% .!""D/ 4 +=L 
 	 	-	 	 ./ +=*
P@

 +
	 .!""G/+
	 
	

	-		 ,
M
	(
	
,
	
+
	*=
"
 +
M
	.;BG/4<	+
7&))		

)+

M
		*PG;
 +
	,M
	.!""D/O		!""DB+M
)+
	,

)M
	
) !""D


,		

)
,)
,
)	
%

*	(
,		
+
E	
=
 +
M
		
.!""9/M

,	
)
,
)O		!""D9+M
,!""DB+M
)+
	,
)M
	!""9M ""&))		


)+
M
		*M "
# 
 & ' 
 +
M

)	.!""/,
)M

)		
	,MM-!B6;;,
M-!BG;;*P
,			
)M
*
G"!""
( 
 +
.!""D/$,		

)+

,)		,,4
)	-	
	<474"DBB!""D
 +
.!""D/P


	,
-

.	-	-	/P@
&))	)
&))				

)+

M
		
 +
.!"";/$,
		-			5	E	.M /*
P@

# 
 O:	
.!"" /:	,	)
)	-		O:	
*=
 O:	
.!""D/


%
,	O:	
*=
 +
  =% .!""6/ +	
 
)  
2 )	, (  += +=*
P@

 +
M
		
 .!""6/
 
  	 
	

  
	-
	 	 , 
	(  
 	 
 , 
	
 +

M
		
*=






	
		
	
	

 !""#	
	$
%
!


	
 4	
		./	 
	 2

) 
	
 	 $
% .$/ 7 
% 	, 	  	
,
	,	,
,	
,,,	2

,
4

)	
			
		

	 
		* 	  	  )	, 
) 	  4
	*
		 , 	, 
% 	,	  ,	 
) 	,		, 	
 ,

* , 
	 ,	  	 C 	 )
 		


	,	

$ 4		

)	
	$
%	

	,)
)

	 	,* 
 ,  
)  , 	 	  )	, 
) 	
*,
				%	
	




	,,		
%			

$	,
G""		@(,	))
	,


)@,		
	,	)
(	

	
$	
(
-
)	
%,		)
J	 	
.,

,
)		)
)/
$	
<<$ <<$GG!- B9



120 
PAPERII:Hvorforsåfåoffentligprivatepartnerskaber(OPP)iDanmark?
Etministerieltspilomindflydelse,interesserogpositioner27

                                                          
27 Title in English: Why are there so few public-private partnerships (PPPs) in Denmark? A departmental game about 
influence, interests and positions. 
Mens offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP) udbredes
verden over har Danmark reageret med afventen og
tøven i forhold til at anvende OPP. Artiklen tager den
danske reguleringsramme for OPP under behandling
og belyser, hvorfor der ikke er sket mere på OPP-om-
rådet i Danmark. Med udgangspunkt i en spilteoretisk
inspireret analyseramme vises det, at de centrale mi-
nisterier med Finansministeriet og Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriet som toneangivende spillere indta-
ger modstridende positioner. Det gælder både politik-
udvikling og administrativ regeludvikling. Spillene
omkring reguleringsrammen er interessemæssigt
konfliktfyldte, og de institutionelle rammer er ikke
gearet til at løse disse fundamentale interessekonflik-
ter. Konsekvensen er en delvist ukoordineret statslig
politik for OPP. Artiklen belyser Finansministeriets
centrale rolle i de ministerielle koordineringsproces-
ser og giver et sjældent indblik i regeringens interne
politisk-økonomiske politikformulering.
Offentlig-private partnerskaber 
på dagsordenen
Offentlig-private partnerskaber – forkortet
OPP – er en af tidens store forvaltnings-
trends. Med rødder i det britiske Private Fi-
nance Initiative (PFI) har partnerskaber mel-
lem offentlige og private aktører fra de tidli-
ge 1990’ere og fremefter ført privat kapital til
en række store, offentlige anlægs- og infra-
strukturprojekter i Storbritannien. Som eks-
empler kan nævnes sygehuse, skoler, fæng-
sler og forsvarsområdet. Mange landes rege-
ringer – inklusive den danske – har op gen-
nem 1990’erne og specielt efter årtusinde-
skiftet kigget til og forsøgt at efterligne de
britiske erfaringer med OPP i et sådant om-
fang, at der kan drages paralleller til sen-fir-
sernes og halvfemsernes New Public Mana-
gement (NPM) bølge (Kettl, 2000).
Tanken om at forene offentlige og private ak-
tører i forskellige partnerskabslignende kon-
struktioner er ikke i sig selv ny (Wettenhall,
2005), men OPP i sin nuværende form er af
nyere dato. Der findes inden for partner-
skabslitteraturen mange forskellige forståel-
ser af, hvad et partnerskab indebærer (Weihe,
2005, opstiller fem forskellige forståelser).
Enkelte hævder imidlertid, at partnerskaber
hovedsageligt er et spil om ord og mening
(Greve og Hodge, 2005: Kap.1). Jeg vil i
denne artikel operere med en definition af
OPP som en samlet aftale mellem en offent-
lig og privat part om planlægning, opførelse,
drift og vedligeholdelse af et anlægsaktiv
over typisk 25-35 år med systematisk deling
af risici mellem parterne og med investering
af privat kapital i projektet. Denne forståelse
af OPP som et bygge- eller anlægspartner-
skab med efterfølgende drift og vedligehold
er identisk med den forståelse, som VK-rege-
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ringen opererer med i sin Handlingsplan for
offentlig-private partnerskaber fra 2004 (Re-
geringen, 2004: 12-14; se også Erhvervs- og
Byggestyrelsen, 2004: 3). Andre anvendelser
af partnerskabsbegrebet behandles derimod
ikke i denne artikel.
I Danmark, som denne artikel omhandler, har
reaktionen på OPP-bølgen været lige dele
nysgerrighed og afventen. Finansministeriet
introducerede i 1999 OPP-konceptet i en
dansk kontekst (Finansministeriet, 1999:
kap. 6). Herefter blev offentlig-privat samspil
kort nævnt i en lille håndfuld af regeringens
publikationer i 2002 og 2003 (Økonomi- og
Erhvervsministeriet, 2002, 2003), men det er
ingen overdrivelse at sige, at der skete meget
lidt med OPP i disse år. I januar 2004 ud-
sendte VK-regeringen Handlingsplan for Of-
fentlig-Private Partnerskaber (OPP) (Rege-
ringen, 2004), som var det første og til dato
eneste egentlige policypapir på området.
Handlingsplanen havde som eksplicit formål
at sætte dagsordenen for OPP i Danmark
samt at udpege konkrete pilotprojekter, hvor
OPP-formen skulle prøves af. Ved udgangen
af 2008, godt ni år efter introduktionen af
OPP i en dansk kontekst og små fem år efter
handlingsplanen, kan der kun tælles tre
igangsatte danske OPP-projekter: En skole i
Herning Kommune, en ny tinglysningsret i
Hobro og opførelse af nye magasiner til Det
Danske Rigsarkiv.2 I 2008 er der indgået af-
tale om opførelse af en skole på Langeland,
og et motorvejsprojekt i Sønderjylland samt
et par domstolsbygninger er under planlæg-
ning. Det er dog ingen overdrivelse at tale om
et dansk efterslæb i forhold til mange af de
lande, vi normalt sammenligner os med (Gre-
ve og Hodge, 2007).
Denne artikel tager den danske regulerings-
ramme omkring OPP under behandling i et
forsøg på at undersøge, hvorfor der ikke er
sket mere på OPP-området i Danmark. Ud-
gangspunktet er nylige resultater, som viser,
at den danske reguleringsramme udgør en
delvis hindring for igangsættelsen af OPP
projekter i Danmark, fordi centrale regelsæt
er delvist modstridende, og reguleringsind-
satsen er ukoordineret (Petersen, 2007b).
Spørgsmålet, som denne artikel skal besvare,
er, hvorfor reguleringsrammen for OPP
mangler denne styring og koordinering? Den
teoretiske ramme låner fra den tyske spilteo-
retiker Fritz Scharpfs aktør-centrerede insti-
tutionalisme (Scharpf, 1997), som består af
tre centrale begreber; a) intentionelt rationel-
le aktører, b) aktørkonstellationer og c) insti-
tutionelt understøttet beslutningskoordine-
ring. Der anlægges et regulation inside go-
vernment perspektiv (Hood m.fl., 1999),
hvilket betyder, at analysen fokuserer på pro-
cesser internt i staten. Det giver mulighed for
at zoome ind på de processer, forhandlinger
og beslutninger, som udspiller sig mellem de
centrale, statslige reguleringsaktører, hvor re-
guleringsstudier traditionelt har fokuseret
mere på stat-marked relationen. Artiklen gi-
ver et sjældent indblik i de regeringsinterne
koordinationsmekanismer og bekræfter Fi-
nansministeriets centrale rolle i de admini-
strative koordinationsspil mellem ministeri-
erne (se Jensen, 2003).
Artiklen er opbygget på følgende vis; I afsnit
2 opstilles den aktør-centrerede institutionel-
le analyseramme med spilteoretiske elemen-
ter. Herefter kortlægges i afsnit 3 de centrale
reguleringsaktører og disses ageren. I afsnit 4
og 5 analyserer jeg to centrale spil omkring
reguleringsrammen – henholdsvis omkring
policy-udvikling og administrativ regulering.
Afsnit 6 viser de institutionelle rammers
manglende evne til at overkomme interesse-
konflikter i de to spil omkring OPP, hvilket
leder til en forståelse af reguleringsrammens
lave koordineringsgrad. Sluttelig giver jeg i
afsnit 7 en perspektivering på artiklens resul-
tater og konkluder i afsnit 8.
Aktør-centreret institutionalisme
To begreber er centrale i den aktør-centrere-
de institutionelle analyseramme: Intentionelt
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rationelle aktører og institutioner. Aktører
antages at være intentionelt rationelle, hvil-
ket betyder, at de forfølger egennyttehensyn3
men gør dette underlagt visse kognitive be-
grænsninger i form af begrænset adgang til
information og begrænset evne til at analyse-
re alle løsningsudfald (Horn, 1995: 7). Der er
med andre ord tale om en begrænset rationel
men formålspræget handlingslogik. Normer
kan spille en rolle, men aktørernes domine-
rende præferencer antages at være egennytte-
hensyn. Et helt centralt begreb i teorien er be-
grebet den sammensatte aktør (Scharpf,
1997: kap. 3). Ministerier, styrelser og andre
organisationer består alle sammen af en lang
række individer, som via deres formelle
ansættelse og mere uformelle socialisering
udgør en sammensat aktør. Denne teoretiske
manøvre foretages, fordi de fænomener, sam-
fundsvidenskaben ønsker at undersøge, ofte
er organisationer af individer og disses hand-
linger, hvorfor der metodisk er behov for at
bevæge analysen fra individuelt til organisa-
torisk niveau (Rutherford, 1994: 36-37). De
ministerier og styrelser, som skal behandles i
denne artikel, er alle sammensatte aktører, og
egennyttehensyn skal derfor betragtes fra or-
ganisationernes perspektiv.
Nu er karakteristika ved aktørerne hver for
sig ikke tilstrækkeligt til at analysere spil om-
kring reguleringsrammen. Fritz Scharpf ope-
rerer med begrebet aktør-konstellationer som
udtryk for de relationer og spil, som aktører-
ne omkring reguleringsrammen spiller med i
(Scharpf, 1997: kap. 4). Aktør-konstellatio-
nerne kan afdækkes ved at stille to centrale
spørgsmål: For det første, hvilke interesser
og strategier forfølger aktørerne i deres in-
tentionelt rationelle ageren? Dette er aktører-
nes handlingsorienteringer. For det andet,
hvilken mængde tid, indflydelse mv. aktive-
rer og investerer aktørerne i spillet? Dette er
de investerede handlingsressourcer i spillene.
Handlingsorienteringer og handlingsressour-
cer kan siges at udtrykke henholdsvis den ret-
ning og den kraft, som hver enkelt aktør ind-
går i spillene med.
Det centrale i institutionel teori består i kra-
vet om altid at se aktørers ageren i en institu-
tionel kontekst. Aktører handler med andre
ord ikke i et vakuum, men altid inden for et
sæt af institutionelle spilleregler. De instituti-
onelle spilleregler kan både bestå af formelle
regler og mere uformelle sociale normer,
hvor teorien lægger vægt på de formelle in-
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Spilformer omkring
reguleringsrammen
Institutionel ramme (organisationsformer)
Ingen 
organisering
Netværksbaseret
organisering
Forpligtende 
sammenslutning
En egentlig OPP-
organisation
Ukoordinerede spil X X X X
Frivilligt forhandlede
spil
– X X X
Flertalsafgørelse i
spillene
– – X X
Hierarkisk styring af
spillene
– – – X
Kilde: Tilpasset fra Scharpf (1997: 47).
Tabel 1. Spilformer og institutionel organisering omkring reguleringsrammen
stitutioner men anerkender eksistensen af en
bredere forståelse (Scharpf, 1997: 38). Den
aktør-centrerede institutionelle analysemodel
opstår i koblingen mellem de to begreber ak-
tør-konstellationer og institutioner, jævnfør
tabel 1. Vertikalt er opstillet fire spilformer,
som aktørkonstellationerne udspilles inden
for, og horisontalt er opstillet fire grader af
institutionel organisering omkring regule-
ringsrammen.4
En bevægelse fra top mod bund i figuren in-
debærer en bevægelse fra ukoordinerede spil
over frivilligt forhandlede spil til mere for-
pligtende spilformer med flertalsafgjorte og
hierarkisk styrede spil. For den institutionel-
le ramme betyder en bevægelse fra venstre
mod højre et skift fra ingen styring og orga-
nisering i de institutionelle rammer over en
netværksbaseret organisering til en forplig-
tende sammenslutning og længst til højre en
egentlig organisation. Som det er illustreret
med et x i tabel 1 understøtter organisations-
formerne i den institutionelle ramme hver
især en række spilformer, men gør det langt
fra i samme grad. Er der ingen institutionel
organisering, kan hovedsageligt ukoordineret
handling udspille sig omkring regulerings-
rammen. Mere forpligtende spiltyper under-
støttes derimod ikke, og aktørerne vil ikke
kunne bindes til koordineret handlen i tilfæl-
de af interessekonflikter. Tilsvarende under-
støtter den netværksbaserede organisations-
form både ukoordinerede spil og frivilligt
forhandlede spil, men ikke flertalsafgørelser
og hierarkisk styring af spillene. I tilfælde af
mindre grader af interessekonflikt kan den
netværksbaserede organisation understøtte
aftaler mellem aktørerne, men stærke interes-
sekonflikter vil ikke kunne løses, da organi-
seringen bygger på frivillighed. Den forplig-
tende sammenslutning og en egentlig OPP-
organisation adskiller sig fra de to oven-
nævnte organisationsformer ved, at aktører-
nes egeninteresser kan overkommes via for-
pligtende beslutningsformer med sanktions-
muligheder. I den forpligtende sammenslut-
ning overkommes egeninteresser ved flertals-
afgørelser af bindende karakter, men pro-
blemløsningskapaciteten er begrænset af, at
flertal skal etableres og ikke mindst af, om
disse flertal er stabile. Løsning på spil med
omfattende interessekonflikter mellem de re-
gulerende aktører, og hvor stabile flertal ikke
kan etableres, kan på den vis kun koordineres
i en decideret OPP-organisation med hierar-
kisk styring af spillene. Set fra et statsligt
perspektiv er en stærk institutionelle ramme
på den vis af afgørende betydning for, om
ministerier og styrelser med forskelligt syn
på reguleringen af OPP kan koordinere en
fælles reguleringsrammen. Er den institutio-
nelle beslutningsramme derimod svagere end
interessekonflikterne, vil reguleringsrammen
fremstå ukoordineret og præget af de enkelte
aktørers initiativer.
Otte centrale reguleringsaktører
Analysen bygger på syv interview i staten
som primær kilde og en systematisk indsam-
ling af statslige dokumenter, lovgivning, vej-
ledninger mv. om OPP som sekundær kilde.5
Interviewene er gennemført efter en kryds-
refererende metodik, hvor de interviewede
blev bedt om at forholde sig både til egen
handlingsorientering og investering af hand-
lingsressourcer samt til de øvrige reguleren-
de aktører ditto. Otte aktører blev nævnt i al-
le interviews og må betegnes som de centra-
le reguleringsaktører, jævnfør tabel 3. Den
krydsrefererende metodik giver et billede af
reguleringsrammens centrale aktører gennem
56 individuelle målepunkter (7 interviews
gange 8 aktører). En fordobling af antallet af
målepunkter fremkom ved at tage højde for,
at der blandt de interviewede indgår både de-
partementer og styrelser, hvor departemen-
terne på forhånd måtte forventes at være mest
involveret i overordnet policy-udvikling om-
kring reguleringsrammen og styrelserne me-
re i administration, regeludvikling, tilsyn mv.
Hver enkelt aktørs orienteringer blev derfor
opdelt i henholdsvis policy-udvikling og ad-
ministration, og denne analytiske opdeling,
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som viste sig at genfindes i materialet, for-
doblede antallet af målepunkter til 112. Re-
sultaterne er samlet i tabel 2 nedenfor, hvor
målingerne for hver enkelt aktør for overskue-
lighedens skyld er aggregeret. Pladsen tillader
ikke en fyldestgørende gennemgang af hver
enkelt aktør, men kodningen af interviewene
viste to centrale variable, hvor de otte aktører
placerer sig forskelligt: Variabel 1; funktion i
forhold til regulering af OPP, og variabel 2;
standpunkt i forhold til udbredelse af OPP i
Danmark.
På den første variabel, funktion i forhold til
regulering af OPP, inddeler aktørerne sig i tre
grupper alt efter hvilken måde, de er involve-
ret i regulering af OPP. Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriets departement, Erhvervs-
og Byggestyrelsen og Finansministeriets de-
partement har alle arbejdet med regulering af
OPP på et tværministerielt niveau. Denne
gruppe kan betegnes OPP-aktører, som ind-
går i tværministeriel regulering. Velfærds-
ministeriet, Skatteministeriet og Slots- og
Ejendomsstyrelsen er mere indirekte blevet
involveret i regulering af OPP ved, at OPP-
regulering formuleret i den bredt regulerende
og dagsordensættende gruppe har berørt vita-
le områder af hvert af de tre aktørers myn-
dighedsområder, som henholdsvis er kom-
muneøkonomien, skattelovgivningen og ad-
ministration af statens bygninger og ejen-
domme. Jeg kalder denne anden gruppe for
regelforvaltende OPP-aktører. Endeligt er
Transportministeriet og Kulturministeriet ho-
vedsageligt involveret i OPP-regulering ved,
at OPP-dagsordenen formuleret i gruppe ét
har påvirket henholdsvis trafikområdet og
kulturområdet i form af OPP-pilotprojekter
udpeget i regeringens Handlingsplan for OPP
(Regeringen, 2004: 18-30). Denne tredje
gruppe betegnes aktører involveret i OPP
gennem pilotprojekter.
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Otte centrale statslige
reguleringsaktører6
Policy-
udvikling
Administration, 
regeludvikling, 
tilsyn mv.
Variabel 1:
Funktion ift. regule-
ring af OPP
Variabel 2:
Standpunkt ift. udbredel-
se af OPP i Danmark
Økonomi- og 
Erhvervsministeriets
departement
Høj Lav Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering
Positiv og bidrager til 
udbredelse
Erhvervs- og 
Byggestyrelsen
Høj Høj Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering
Positiv og bidrager til 
udbredelse
Finansministeriets 
departement
Høj Lav Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering
Tilbageholdende
Slots- og 
Ejendomsstyrelsen
Lav Høj Regel-administration Positiv og bidrager til 
udbredelse
Velfærds-
ministeriet
Lav Lav Regel-administration Neutral
Skatteministeriet Middel Middel Regel-administration Tilbageholdende
Transportministeriet Middel Middel Pilot-projekter Positiv og bidrager til 
udbredelse
Kulturministeriet Lav Middel Pilot-projekter Tilbageholdende
Tabel 2. Kortlægning af otte centrale statslige OPP-reguleringsaktører
På den anden variabel, aktørernes stand-
punkt i forhold til udbredelse af OPP i Dan-
mark, bliver disse første grupperinger delt
yderligere op. Blandt de centralt regulerende
OPP-aktører er Finansministeriet overvejen-
de skeptisk og tilbageholdende over for brug
af OPP i Danmark, mens Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriet og Erhvervs- og Byggesty-
relsen har forsøgt at fremme OPP gennem
udvikling af reguleringsrammen. Inden for
gruppen af regelforvaltere er Velfærdsmini-
steriet neutrale, mens Skatteministeriet gen-
nem arbejdet med skatte- og momsregulerin-
gen har optrådt tilbageholdende og sinket ud-
bredelsen af OPP – i hvert fald på det admi-
nistrative niveau, hvor ministeriet er mest ak-
tiv. Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen har skiftet
orientering fra at være tilbageholdende til i
dag meget aktivt at udvikle statens første
OPP-projekt, Rigsarkivet, og må samlet set
betegnes som positiv. Den positivt udbreden-
de tilgang, som umiddelbart kan forekomme
overraskende i forhold til det tilbageholdende
standpunkt i departementet (Finansministeri-
et), støttes imidlertid af Finansministeriet,
der selv har udpeget styrelsen som projektan-
svarlig på Rigsarkivet. Endeligt observeres
der mellem Kulturministeriet og Transport-
ministeriet en betydelig forskel i tilgangen til
OPP, hvor førstnævnte har været skeptisk
omkring fordelene ved at bruge ministeriets
største byggeprojekt i mange år som pilot-
projekt for OPP, mens Transportministeriet
ser OPP i forlængelse af velkendte projekt-
former, som bruges ved større infrastruktur-
projekter. Kobles de to variable sammen fås
et to-dimensionalt billede af aktørpositioner-
ne omkring reguleringsrammen:
Aktør-konstellationerne viser sig at være
komplekse ved, at kun departement og sty-
relse i Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet
(hvilket ikke er så overraskende) har samme
kombination af handlingsorienteringer på de
to variable. De øvrige aktører har således
højest interesser til fælles på den ene af de to
variable, og der er ingen umiddelbare kon-
stellationer på tværs af ministerområder. Det
første billede af reguleringsrammen indikerer
på den vis en relativt kompleks konfiguration
af interesser og positioner. Billedet er imid-
lertid endnu kun halvt, da tabel 3 udtrykker
aktørernes handlingsorienteringer på to vari-
able men ikke aktørernes investering af hand-
lingsressourcer. Divergerende interesser kan
være mere eller mindre konfliktfyldte afhæn-
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Variabel 2: Standpunkt ift. udbredelse af OPP i Danmark
Positiv og bidrager til
udbredelse
Neutral Tilbageholdende
Va
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l 1
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 O
PP
Pilot-projekter Transportministeriet Kulturministeriet
Regel-administration Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen Velfærdsministeriet Skatteministeriet
Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering
Økonomi- og 
Erhvervsministeriet
Erhvervs- og
Byggestyrelsen      
Finansministeriet
Tabel 3. Reguleringsrammens centrale aktører i to dimensioner
gig af, hvor stærkt aktørerne forfølger deres
individuelle interesser. Det fulde billede af
spillene omkring reguleringsrammen fås ved
at koble det andet karakteristika ved aktører-
ne, investering af handlingsressourcer, på
modellen. Opdelingen mellem policy-udvik-
ling og administrativ regulering, jævnfør ta-
bel 3 ovenfor, danner to centrale spil: Første
spil står om policy-udvikling og andet spil
om administrativ regulering af OPP.
Spil 1:
Policy-udvikling af reguleringsrammen
Omkring policy-udvikling findes den centra-
le konstellation i relationen mellem Økono-
mi- og Erhvervsministeriet/Erhvervs- og Byg-
gestyrelsen (forkortet henholdsvis ØEM og
EBST) på den ene side og Finansministeriet
(FM) på den anden, jævnfør figur 1. Dette er
markeret med fed pil. Begge parter har en
bred tværministeriel tilgang og interesse i re-
gulering af OPP og investerer begge relativt
store handlingsressourcer i at forfølge deres
standpunkt. Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeri-
et ser på sin side OPP i en bred optik af er-
hvervsudvikling og inddragelse af private ak-
tører i den offentlige opgaveløsning. Mens
det lige efter årtusindeskiftet i høj grad var
departementet, som var involveret i policy-
udvikling, er meget af dette arbejde siden hen
lagt over i Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen, der
som den eneste danske aktør har oprettet en
decideret enhed for offentlig-privat samar-
bejde. Finansministeriet, som traditionelt er
bannerfører på moderniseringspolitikken, har
i forhold til OPP hovedsageligt budgetvog-
terkasketten på. Ministeriet ser en række ud-
giftsstyringsmæssige problemer ved OPP-
formen, og finanserne viser, modsat situatio-
nen i England i begyndelsen af 1990’erne,
store overskud. Det offentlige kan derfor selv
finansiere de fleste investeringer, er argu-
mentet, hvorfor dyr privat lånekapital skal
opvejes af endnu større effektiviseringsge-
vinster, hvis OPP skal være samfundsøkono-
misk fordelagtigt (Finansministeriet, 2006:
41). 
66
Variabel 2: Standpunkt ift. udbredelse af OPP i Danmark
Positiv og bidrager til
udbredelse
Neutral Tilbageholdende
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PP Pilot-projekter
Regel-administration
Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering
Figur 1. Policy-udvikling af reguleringsrammen for OPP
TRM
ØEM
EBST
SKM
FM
Ressourcer investeret i policy-udvikling.
Relationen mellem Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriet og Finansministeriet er den
primære policy-akse, hvor de to ’tunge’ mini-
sterier er uenige om, hvordan og i hvilken
grad OPP skal udbredes i Danmark. Relatio-
nen må betegnes som interessemæssigt rela-
tivt konfliktfyldt, da de to ministerier for-
søger at sætte henholdsvis en udbredende og
en tilbageholdende tværstatslig dagsorden.
Denne primære policy-akse suppleres af to
sekundære akser i forhold til henholdsvis
Skatteministeriet (SKM) (fed stiplet pil i fi-
gur 1) og Transportministeriet (TRM) (tynd
stiplet pil). Kigges først på Skatteministeriet
viser det sig, at ministeriet først i foråret 2005
blev involveret i OPP, da en problematik om-
kring OPP-projekters skatte- og moms-
mæssige status begyndte at optage skatte-
myndighederne. Aksen er derfor nyere end
den primære akse, og kan også forventes at
træde i baggrunden igen, når eller såfremt,
skatte- og momsproblematikken løses. Der er
hidtil ikke fundet en løsning trods vedhol-
dende opmærksomhed i en særligt nedsat
tværministeriel arbejdsgruppe. Udviklingen
af OPP i Danmark afventer på den vis en
løsning, hvor tolkningen fra de øvrige aktører
er, at de danske skattemyndigheder tolker
reglerne strikt og udgør en alvorlig hindring
af yderligere udbredelse af OPP. Skattemini-
steriet må derfor siges at indgå i en meget
konfliktfyldt aktørkonstellation med de øvri-
ge OPP-aktører inklusive Finansministeriet,
der trods en generelt tilbageholdende tilgang
til OPP ikke vil lade skattesagen spænde ben
for afprøvning af OPP-handlingsplanens pi-
lotprojekter, herunder Slots- og Ejendoms-
styrelsens projekt Rigsarkiv.
Transportministeriet har været med til at ud-
vikle trafikdelen af den danske OPP-dagsor-
den og indtager på den vis en policy-udvik-
lende rolle. Når ministeriet ikke placeres me-
re centralt i de policy-mæssige aktørkonstel-
lationer, skyldes det, at de øvrige aktører pe-
ger på, at ministeriets tilgang mere har været
knyttet op om fremme af konkrete pilot-tra-
fikprojekter end udviklingen af en bredere re-
guleringsramme. Der udtrykkes dog en ten-
dens til, at ministeriet langsomt bevæger sig
ind i en mere central rolle med udvikling af
en egen OPP-model for trafikområdet. Rela-
tionen mellem Transportministeriet og Øko-
nomi- og Erhvervsministeriet har et minimalt
orienteringsmæssigt konfliktindhold, da beg-
ge aktører forsøger at fremme brugen af OPP,
dog med vidt forskellige tilgange. Relationen
til Finansministeriet er orienteringsmæssigt
mere konfliktfyldt, jævnfør at Finansministe-
riet forsøger at modgå afledte udgiftsmæssi-
ge effekter ved OPP, mens Transportministe-
riet hovedsageligt investerer handlingsres-
sourcer i at fremme store og udgiftstunge tra-
fikprojekter på den statslige prioriterings-
mæssige dagsorden.7 Det helt centrale poli-
cy-spil står dog mellem Finansministeriet og
Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet med Skat-
teministeriet i en konfliktfyldt birolle.
Spil 2:
Den administrative regulering af OPP
Omkring den administrative OPP-regulering
er Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen den helt cen-
trale aktør, men også Slots- og Ejendomssty-
relsen, Transportministeriet og Skattemini-
steriet indgår aktivt. Kulturministeriet er ho-
vedsageligt aktiv i forhold til arkivfaglige
funktioner relateret til projekt Rigsarkiv men
præger ikke det samlede reguleringsbillede
meget. Den primære administrative regule-
ringsakse, markeret med den fede pil i figur
2, består af Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen
(EBST), Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen (SES)
og Transportministeriet (TRM). En supple-
rende og ikke uvæsentlig akse findes mellem
disse tre aktører på den ene side og Skattemi-
nisteriet (SKM) på den anden side (markeret
med stiplet pil).
Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen har de største
ressourcer investeret i den brede regulerings-
dagsorden, og styrelsen agerer som dansk
OPP-kompetenceenhed. Slots- og Ejendoms-
styrelsen har tillige store ressourcer investe-
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ret i at udvikle og udbyde Rigsarkivet som
OPP-projekt, men ressourcerne er i høj grad
bundet op på dette ene projekt. Transportmi-
nisteriet har en særlig rolle ved, at OPP-pro-
jekter på trafikområdet ikke er helt ens med
OPP-projekter på det øvrige byggeområde.
Ministeriet og dets styrelser har derfor en
central rolle i OPP-vurdering af de store tra-
fikprojekter i Handlingsplan for OPP samt
udvikling af en særskilt vejledning hertil.
Hovedkonstellation Erhvervs- og Byggesty-
relsen, Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen og
Transportministeriet viser, at den administra-
tive OPP-regulering er kendetegnet ved tre
spor: 1) et centralt og tværministerielt spor,
2) et konkret afprøvende byggespor samt 3)
et pilotprojektspor på trafikområdet. Specielt
omkring Rigsarkivet som OPP-projekt går
der erfaringsopsamling på tværs af sporene,
idet Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen bruger Er-
hvervs- og Byggestyrelsen som sparrings-
partner, men samtidig også sender systema-
tisk erfaringsopsamling fra det konkrete pro-
jekt den modsatte vej. Der er blandt de tre
centrale aktører forskel i hvilke funktioner,
man varetager i forhold til OPP (variabel 1),
men den centrale administrative akse er ikke
som policy-aksen præget af modstridende in-
teresser i udbredelsen af OPP i Danmark (va-
riabel 2). Om end med forskellige funktioner
og foci arbejder de tre aktører alle på at ud-
vikle reguleringsrammen for OPP, og den ad-
ministrative hovedakse må betegnes som
konsensuspræget.
Som tilfældet er det for policy-udvikling, så
er der i de administrative konstellationer en
supplerende og konfliktfyldt akse i forhold til
Skatteministeriet. Udover at sætte store dele
af den statslige OPP-politik på usikker grund
har skatte- og momsproblemet helt konkret
betydning for både projekt Rigsarkiv og for
Transportministeriets planlægning af OPP-
projekter på trafikområdet. Eksempelvis er
udbuddet af et motorvejsprojekt ved E45 i
Sønderjylland udskudt som følge af skattesa-
gen. I forhold til Erhvervs- og Byggestyrel-
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Variabel 2: Standpunkt ift. udbredelse af OPP i Danmark
Positiv og bidrager til
udbredelse
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Indgår i tvær-
ministeriel regulering EBST
Figur 2. Administrativ regulering af OPP i Danmark
SKM
Ressourcer investeret i administrativ OPP-regulering.
sen er styrelsens OPP-basiskontrakt samt de
øvrige OPP-vejledninger blevet udfordret i
og med skatteproblematikken ikke har været
medtænkt. Konstellationen mellem Skattemi-
nisteriet og de tre centrale administrative ak-
tører må på den vis betegnes som oriente-
ringsmæssigt konfliktfyldt ved at udfordre
grundlæggende dele af reguleringsrammen,
som disse aktører har investeret væsentlige
ressourcer i at opbygge.
Ved at kigge på henholdsvis policy-udvikling
og administrative funktioner omkring regule-
ringsrammen er to centrale spil opstillet. Po-
licy-spillet er væsentligt mere konfliktfyldt
end det administrative spil, men skatte- og
momsproblematikken spiller væsentligt ind
begge steder. I det følgende skifter analysen
fokus fra aktørniveauet til en analyse og di-
skussion af de institutionelle rammer. Jeg un-
dersøger hvilken grad af konfliktløsningska-
pacitet, der understøttes i de statslige, institu-
tionelle rammer omkring beslutninger om
brugen af OPP i Danmark.
De institutionelle rammers (manglende) 
koordineringskapacitet
Beslutninger om reguleringen af OPP tages i
to centrale fora: 1) på embedsmandsniveau
findes en tværministeriel OPP-styregruppe
samt en nedsat arbejdsgruppe til løsning af
den tidligere omtalte skatte- og momsproble-
matik, og 2) på regeringsniveau er regerin-
gens Økonomiudvalg og Koordinationsud-
valg stederne, hvor der træffes beslutninger
om regeringens økonomiske politik. Disse to
beslutningsfora kan betegnes som henholds-
vis et tvunget formaliseret netværk og en for-
pligtende sammenslutning med hierarkiske
elementer (uddybes nedenfor), og af tabel 4
fremgår det hvilke typer af spil, de to fora
hver især understøtter.
Beslutningsfora på embedsmandsniveau
Den tværministerielle OPP-styregruppe blev
nedsat i 2003 og består i dag af fem aktører:
Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet, Finansmi-
nisteriet, Transportministeriet, Velfærdsmini-
steriet og Skatteministeriet. Styregruppen
mødes jævnligt, har en fast medlemskreds og
er nedsat med det specifikke formål at drøfte
OPP-spørgsmål og tage beslutninger i sådan-
ne sager. OPP-styregruppen kan af tre grunde
kaldes et tvungent formaliseret netværk:
1. For det første er deltagelse delvist tvun-
gen ved, at aktørerne i praksis ikke kan
undslå sig deltagelse. Alle aktørerne ser
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Spilformer omkring 
reguleringsrammen
Institutionel koordineringskapacitet
Tvungent formaliseret netværk Forpligtende sammenslutning med hie-
rarkiske elementer
Ukoordinerede spil OPP-styregruppe
Arbejdsgruppe omkring skattesagen
Ø-udvalg og K-udvalg
Frivilligt forhandlede
spil
OPP-styregruppe
Arbejdsgruppe omkring skattesagen
Ø-udvalg og K-udvalg
Flertalsafgørelse 
i spillene
– Ø-udvalg og K-udvalg
Hierarkisk styring 
af spillene
– (Ø-udvalg og K-udvalg)
Tabel 4. Spilformer og institutionel koordineringskapacitet
ud til at dele en opfattelse og accept af, at
den tværministerielle koordinering om-
kring OPP-politikken sker i OPP-styre-
gruppen. Der er altså i vid udstrækning
tale om, at aktørerne gensidigt anerkender
et behov for koordinering af den statslige
OPP-politik. Alternativet, at der slet ingen
koordinering sker på tværs af ministerier-
ne, ser ikke ud til at være en reel mulig-
hed.
2. For det andet er netværkets formalise-
ringsgrad relativt høj med en fast formand
(Finansministeriet), løbende møder og en
fast defineret medlemskreds, hvor ak-
tørerne hver især repræsenterer relativt
veldefinerede ministerielle interesser.
3. For det tredje kan OPP-styregruppen ikke
træffe egentlige flertalsbeslutninger, der
kan overtrumfe enkeltaktørers handlings-
orienteringer. Der er derfor, uanset de for-
maliserede og tvungne elementer, tale om
en netværksform, som understøtter frivil-
lige aftaler, men ikke mere forpligtende
spilformer.
Som en afart af netværksformen kan OPP-
styregruppen, jævnfør tabel 4, understøtte to
typer af spil; ukoordinerede spil og frivilligt
koordinerede spil. OPP-styregruppen under-
støtter derimod ikke flertalsafgørelser og hie-
rarkisk styring af spillene. Spørgsmålet er,
hvad dette betyder for løsning af interesse-
konflikter omkring udformningen af regule-
ringsrammen. Policy-udviklingens domine-
rende uenighed står mellem Finansministeri-
et og Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet,
mens Skatteministeriet både i forhold til po-
licy-udvikling og den administrative del dan-
ner en sekundær og relativt problemfyldt re-
lation. I begge tilfælde kan beslutningskoor-
dinering omkring reguleringsrammen ikke
forventes at blive understøttet af frivillige af-
taler i OPP-styregruppen. Hertil er oriente-
ringerne grundlæggende for konfliktfyldte,
og koordinerede beslutninger kræver derfor
elementer af tvang enten ved flertalsafgørel-
ser eller hierarkisk styring. OPP-styregrup-
pen understøtter på den vis hverken koordi-
neret handling på policy-delen, hvor Finans-
ministeriet og Økonomi- og Erhvervsmini-
steriet hovedsageligt agerer, eller omkring
skatte- og momsproblemstillingen, som både
spiller ind på policy-udviklingen og det ad-
ministrative niveau. Resultatet er, at Økono-
mi- og Erhvervsministeriet på sin side posi-
tivt har søgt OPP udbredt via statsbyggelov-
givningen, mens Finansministeriet på bevil-
lingsområdet modsat behandler OPP efter en
skærpet reguleringsprocedure, som tilmed gi-
ver usikkerhed i forhold udbudsprocesserne
for OPP-projekter (Petersen, 2007b: 43). Re-
guleringsrammens delvist modstridende re-
gelsæt kan på den vis forklares ved, at stærke
orienteringsmæssige konflikter blandt de
centrale policy-formulerende aktører klart
overmatcher OPP-styregruppens koordine-
ringskapacitet.
Omkring skatte- og momsproblematikken
ses det, at Skatteministeriet sammenlignet
med eksempelvis situationen i Storbritannien
anlægger en relativt snæver tolkning af reg-
lerne, hvilket har sat store dele af den statsli-
ge OPP-dagorden i venteposition både poli-
cy-mæssigt og administrativt. OPP-styre-
gruppen og den særligt nedsatte arbejdsgrup-
pe til løsning af skatteproblematikken har ik-
ke kunnet nå frem til en løsning. Det faktum,
at OPP placerer sig midt i et regelsæt opbyg-
get mod selskabssvindel, må betegnes som
en noget speciel veto-faktor, som gør ak-
tørernes positionering yderst kompleks, da
ingen er interesseret i at trumfe OPP af-
gørende igennem uden sikkerhed i lovgivnin-
gen og dermed åbne det skattemæssige hul
igen. En manglende løsning af skatte- og
momsproblematikken kan derfor ikke på
samme måde som den lave grad af policy-ko-
ordinering ses som udtryk for lav koordinati-
onskapacitet i OPP-styregruppen. Derimod
må det forhold, at problematikken blev opda-
get meget langt henne i arbejdet med OPP
tolkes som et tegn på manglende styring og
overblik omkring udformningen af regule-
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ringsrammen. Det er derfor ikke i så høj grad
skatte- og momssagen i sig selv, men deri-
mod måden, hvorpå sagen er opstået og
håndteret, som peger på OPP-styregruppens
manglende kapacitet til at understøtte en
løsning. Samlet peger det i retning af, at den
ukoordinerede og delvist modstridende regu-
leringsramme omkring OPP må forstås som
et produkt af, at OPP-styregruppen kun un-
derstøtter mere uforpligtende spilformer. I en
situation med væsentlige orienteringsmæssi-
ge konflikter mellem flere af reguleringsram-
mens centrale aktører ville en mere koordine-
ret reguleringsramme kræve enten flertalsaf-
gørelse eller ligefrem hierarkisk styring af
spillene omkring både policy-udformning og
skatte- og momsproblematikken. Kort sagt
overmatcher uenighederne i de centrale spil
omkring reguleringsrammen de institutionel-
le beslutningssystemers koordinationskapa-
citet.
Det i denne artikel sidste, men afgørende
spørgsmål, er, hvorfor der i denne situation
ikke sker en større grad af politiks styring af
reguleringsrammen, hvilket regeringens
Økonomiudvalg og Koordinationsudvalg po-
tentielt kunne katalysere.
Regeringens Økonomiudvalg 
og Koordinationsudvalg 
Økonomiudvalget har til formål at koordine-
re regeringens økonomiske politik. Faste
medlemmer er Finansministeren (formand),
Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeren, Kulturmi-
nisteren og Skatteministeren samt Statsmini-
steriets departementschef, som repræsenterer
Statsministeren i udvalget. Sammensætnin-
gen af udvalget kan ændres løbende og af-
spejler en intern balance mellem regerings-
partierne (se Jensen, 2003, for en analyse af
Økonomiudvalgets udvikling op gennem
1990’erne)8. Øvrige ministre kan deltage,
hvis deres ministerium har sager på dagsor-
denen. Der afholdes ugentlige møder, som
forudgående forberedes og koordineres i Sty-
regruppen – et embedsmandsudvalg beståen-
de af departementscheferne for ministrene i
Økonomiudvalget samt en departementsråd
fra Statsministeriet.9 Lotte Jensen har i sin
bog om Finansministeriet vist, hvordan den-
ne akse Styregruppe-Økonomiudvalg udgør
regeringens centrale politisk-økonomiske ko-
ordinationsakse (Jensen, 2003).
Sager af mere principiel karakter kan imid-
lertid både blive behandlet i Økonomiudval-
get og på højere niveau i regeringens Koordi-
nationsudvalg, hvor Statsministeren sidder
for bordenden.10 Organiseringen omkring
Økonomiudvalget er derfor tæt sammenkæ-
det med Koordinationsudvalget og sager kan
tilmed »vandre« fra udvalg til udvalg og for-
søges strategisk placeret i det ene udvalg
frem for det andet (Jensen, 2003: 208-209).
Disse regeringsinterne koordinationsproce-
durer bygget op om Ø- og K-udvalg kan af
tre grunde betegnes som en forpligtende
sammenslutning med hierarkiske elementer:
1. For det første kan der træffes beslutninger
selv i lyset af uenighed mellem ministre-
ne, hvilket netop skete i forbindelse med
beslutningen om at udbyde Rigsarkivet
som OPP-projekt. Enkeltaktører kan på
den vis overtrumfes af gruppen og for-
pligtes til at følge regeringens økono-
misk-politiske linie.
2. For det andet er statsministeren via sin ret
til at udpege og afsætte de øvrige ministre
formelt såvel som uformelt placeret i top-
pen af koordinationshierarkiet. Under
statsministeren vil de øvrige ministre i
mere uformel forstand placere sig
forskelligt i hierarkiet med vice-statsmi-
nisteren og finansministeren på nogle af
de efterfølgende pladser afhængig af sa-
gens karakter og indhold.
3. For det tredje er der ikke tegn på, at nogen
enkeltaktør hierarkisk kan styre koordina-
tionsprocesserne. Selv statsministeren er
– for at blive siddende – afhængig af op-
bakning fra resten af gruppen og fra bag-
landet, og på trods af hierarkiske elemen-
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ter er der derfor grundlæggende tale om
en afart af den forpligtende sammenslut-
ning og ikke om en egentlig hierarkisk
indrettet organisation.
Som en forpligtende sammenslutning kan
Økonomiudvalget og Koordinationsudvalget
understøtte flertalsbeslutninger, jævnfør ta-
bel 4 ovenfor. Aktørerne vil kunne indgå ko-
alitioner, som specielt vil stå stærkt i tilfælde,
hvor flere højt placerede ministre står sam-
men, men den grundlæggende beslutnings-
form er forpligtende flertalsbeslutninger.
Spørgsmålet melder sig nu, hvorfor OPP-po-
litikken ikke koordineres i disse regeringsin-
terne fora, når disse netop understøtter for-
pligtende beslutninger, hvilket OPP-styre-
gruppen viste sig ikke at gøre. Datamaterialet
anvendt i denne artikel er, som tidligere be-
skrevet, baseret på interviews på embeds-
mandsniveau. En forklaring på, hvorfor OPP
i Danmark på politisk niveau hidtil har mødt
beskeden opmærksomhed, kan derfor kun
blive et første bud, som jeg giver i neden-
stående perspektivering af artiklen. Den vok-
sende mængde af forskning på området må
efterprøve disse ansatser til forklaringer, og
her vil både inddragelse af det politiske ni-
veau i dataindsamlingen samt brug af inter-
nationale sammenligninger være oplagte me-
toder at gå videre med.
Hvorfor så beskeden politisk 
opmærksomhed omkring OPP? 
En første forklaring på den hidtil beskedne
politiske opmærksomhed omkring udbredel-
sen af offentlig-private partnerskaber i Dan-
mark kan være reguleringens relativt tekni-
ske og komplicerede karakter, hvor den
egentlige reguleringsmæssige ekspertviden
besiddes af embedsværket. Det er med denne
logik ikke bare en fordel men tilmed en nød-
vendighed, at selve regeludviklingen sker i
fora som OPP-styregruppen og den skatte-
og momsmæssige arbejdsgruppe. Nært be-
slægtet med denne tanke er det forhold, at der
meget hurtigt ville ske et overload i de cen-
trale koordinationssystemer, hvis den mere
tekniske politikudvikling skulle ske der. Kun
principielle sager som Rigsarkivet eller OPP-
handlingsplanen hæves fra inter-ministerielt
til regeringskoordinerende niveau. På trods af
høj understøttelse af konfliktløsningskapaci-
tet i de regeringsmæssige koordinationspro-
cesser viser der sig altså at være en række
grunde til, at disse koordinationsmekanismer
kun sjældent tages i brug af systemet. Hertil
kan indvendes, at der fra politisk side kunne
stilles krav om, at OPP-styregruppen og ar-
bejdsgruppen omkring skatte- og momssagen
uden involvering af de politiske systemer fik
koordineret reguleringsrammen og løst ue-
nighederne. En sådan argumentation støttes
af begrebet »the shadow of hierarchy«
(Scharpf, 1997), som udtrykker, at hierarkiet
potentielt kan gøre sin indflydelse gældende,
hvis sager ikke løses. Hierarkiets skygge kan
føre til løsning af sager på lavere niveauer
fordi alternativet i form af hierarkisk inter-
vention er kendt og ofte uønsket af de spil-
lende aktører, idet intervention fratager dem
beslutningsretten. Hierarkiets skygge i form
af regeringens Økonomi- og Koordinations-
udvalg ser imidlertid ud til at være svag, og
trods det at OPP præsenteres i officielle pub-
likationer og udmøntes i enkelte pilotprojek-
ter, har regeringen sat beskeden kraft bag op-
bygningen af en koordineret reguleringspoli-
tik for brugen af OPP i Danmark.
Et andet bud på regeringens hidtil tilbagehol-
dende tilgang til OPP er, at selve OPP-mo-
dellen på én og samme tid bærer potentielle
fordele og ulemper med sig. Økonomi- og
Erhvervsministeriets samt Erhvervs- og Byg-
gestyrelsen tilgang kan tolkes som et forsøg
på at åbne den offentlige sektor for yderlige-
re privat inddragelse i forlængelse af vel-
kendte begreber som udlicitering og selskabs-
dannelser. Finansministeriets tilgang kan der-
imod tolkes som udtryk for en bekymring
over, hvordan offentlige opgaver på private
hænder underkastes klassiske hensyn såsom
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kontrol, ansvar og økonomistyring. Der ser
altså ud til at være en vis usikkerhed om bå-
de fordele og ulemper ved brug af OPP, hvil-
ket ikke mindst den 25 til 35-årige aftaleho-
risont bidrager til.11
En tredje forklaring på den afventende til-
gang kan være den meget omtalte Farum-sag,
hvor en del af sagen omhandlede kommu-
nens frigørelse af store mængder frie midler
ved at bortsælge bygninger til private parter
for derefter at leje dem tilbage (den såkaldte
sale and lease-back model, Petersen 2007a:
14). En forklaring, som også kommer til ud-
tryk enkelte steder i de gennemførte inter-
views, er, at hele Farum-sagen har spillet ne-
gativt ind på offentlige aktørers lyst til at eks-
perimentere med OPP. Savas (2000) refererer
ligefrem til sale and lease-back som en afart
af OPP-modellen, men som jeg har argumen-
teret andetsteds (Petersen, 2007a: 14), er der
også væsentlige forskelle, som Savas overser.
Vigtigst af disse er det, at den private part ved
sale and lease-back slet ikke er involveret i
projekterings- og opførelsesfasen, hvor
blandt andre Bent Flyvbjerg har vist, at store
risici er placeret omkring forsinkelser og
budgetoverskridelser (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Far-
um-sagen kan dog ikke afvises som delårsag
til en tøvende tilgang specielt i lyset af hele
kommunalreformprojektet, som har trukket
store ressourcer i mange kommuner landet
over, hvilket må forventes at have nedsat ly-
sten og overskuddet til at forsøge sig med
OPP. Igen må yderligere undersøgelser af
området til, førend den egentlige effekt af
disse faktorer kan måles.
Et fjerde bud på en forklaring går ud over
Danmarks grænser, hvor organisationer som
EU og OECD ser ud til at have været relativt
tavse. Sammenhængen mellem regulering af
OPP på nationalt og europæisk niveau er et
hidtil uopdyrket område, men noget tyder på,
at OPP har været genstand for en grad af po-
licy- og reguleringsmæssigt vakuum såvel
nationalt som internationalt. Som peget på
ovenfor må yderligere undersøgelser af om-
rådet til, og den voksende litteratur om of-
fentlig-private partnerskaber er i den forstand
både lovende og velkommen.
Interessekonflikterne overmatcher den
institutionelle kapacitet for beslutnings-
koordinering
I denne artikel har jeg anvendt en spilteore-
tisk inspireret analyseramme til at analysere
reguleringen af OPP i Danmark med fokus på
aktører og institutioner. Analysen har vist, at
den danske reguleringsramme for OPP ud-
formes i to spil: Et spil omkring policy-ud-
vikling og dagsordensættelse af OPP og et
andet spil, hvor regler og vejledninger udvik-
les og administreres. Mens det administrative
spil er forholdsvist problemfrit, er policy-
spillet mere konfliktfyldt med Finansministe-
riet og Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet i di-
vergerende positioner. Uenigheden mellem
disse to centrale policy-formulerende mini-
sterier er baseret på uenighed om og hvor
hurtigt OPP skal udbredes i Danmark. Øko-
nomi- og Erhvervsministeriet ser OPP i en
bred optik af erhvervsudvikling og arbejder
sammen med Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen
aktivt på at udbrede OPP, mens Finansmini-
steriet er mere skeptisk over for fordelene
ved at bruge OPP. Den finansministerielle ar-
gumentation er, at den private parts låneom-
kostninger ved OPP er højere, end hvis den
offentlige part selv finansierede projektet, og
derfor beror fordelagtigheden ved OPP på, at
der kan opnås effektiviseringsgevinster, som
er større end de forhøjede låneudgifter. Ue-
nighederne mellem de to »tunge« ministerier
må betegnes som substantielle. En skatte- og
momssag giver problemer for både policy-
udvikling og det administrative arbejde med
reguleringsrammen.
De institutionelle systemer omkring regule-
ringsrammen er potentielt stedet, hvor regu-
leringspolitikken kan koordineres og udfor-
mes. Analysen viser imidlertid, at beslut-
ningssystemerne kun understøtter ukoordine-
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rede spil og frivilligt indgåede aftaler. Den
institutionelle koordineringskapacitet er lav,
og aktørerne er ude af stand til at løse de
identificerede interessekonflikter. Kort sagt
overmatcher konfliktpotentialet i aktørkon-
stellationerne den institutionelle kapacitet for
beslutningskoordinering. Resultatet er, at re-
guleringsrammen for OPP fremstår ukoordi-
neret. Regeringens politisk-økonomiske ko-
ordinationsmekanismer, som potentielt kun-
ne generere en styring af reguleringsrammen,
er hidtil kun lejlighedsvist blevet taget i brug.
Denne artikel har fokuseret på den danske re-
guleringsramme, men forståelsen kunne have
været udvidet yderligere ved at inddrage in-
ternationale og komparative aspekter. OPP
er, som det blev præsenteret i artiklens ind-
ledning, langt fra et enestående dansk fæno-
men. Spørgsmålet er, hvordan regulering og
policy omkring OPP udspiller sig i andre lan-
de, og ikke mindst, hvordan nationale for-
skelle på et ellers verdensomspændende fæn-
omen forklares. Jeg har i perspektiveringen
peget på et behov for videre undersøgelser af
feltet.
Noter
1. Tak til den anonyme reviewer for mange brugba-
re kommentarer og forslag til forbedringer af den
første version af manuskriptet.
2. På Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsens hjemmeside
findes en oversigt over en række OPP-vurderede
projekter (www.ebst.dk/OPPForundersoegelse).
Af disse er kun de tre nævnte projekter igangsat.
3. Forfølgelse af egennyttehensyn kaldes også op-
portunisme, som betyder, at aktørerne agerer stra-
tegisk kalkulerende med henblik på så vidt muligt
at maksimere egne nyttefunktioner. Horn (1995:7).
4. De fire spilformer og institutionel organisering er
idealtypiske eksempler i Weberiansk forstand.
Der kan i praksis tænkes findes hybridformer
mellem de her nævnte.
5. Der er gennemført interview i Økonomi- og Er-
hvervsministeriet, Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen,
Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen, Indenrigs- og Sund-
hedsministeriet, Kulturministeriet, Transportmini-
steriet og Finansministeriet. Skatteministeriet blev
kontaktet flere gange, men ønskede ikke at delta-
ge i et interview, og ministeriets position er derfor
belyst via de syv interview i de øvrige departe-
menter og styrelser. Den nærmere årsag til afsla-
get på forespørgslen om interview er ikke oplyst
men kunne være udtryk for den relativt konflikt-
fyldte rolle, som Skatteministeriet indtager ift. re-
gulering og policy omkring OPP i Danmark, hvil-
ket bliver uddybet gennem artiklen. Interviewene
er udført blandt fuldmægtige, special-, eller chef-
konsulenter i de relevante kontorer eller afdelin-
ger i de nævnte departementer og styrelser.
6. Konkurrencestyrelsen og Justitsministeriet er kun
i mindre grad involveret i OPP og er derfor ikke
inddraget i artiklen. Konkurrencestyrelsen admi-
nistrerer de danske udbudsregler, som for OPP er
omsat fra EU’s udbudsdirektiv. Justitsministeriet
er involveret via OPP-vurdering af et fængsels-
byggeri i Østdanmark, som formentlig ikke gen-
nemføres som OPP. De planlagte domstolsbyg-
ninger udbydes af Slots- og Ejendomsstyrelsen,
selvom domstolsområdet hører under Justitsmini-
steriet. 
7. Der henvises til ATP-sagen, hvor Transport- og
Energiministeren positivt advokerede for, at ATP
kunne gå ind og overtage drift og vedligehold af
det danske skinnenet i en længere årrække. Sam-
menholdt med det store overskud på de statslige
finanser må vedligeholdelsesstandarden på skin-
nenettet i høj grad betragtes som en politisk be-
slutning frem for en konsekvens af manglende
mulighed for offentlig finansiering. Sagen kan
derfor tolkes som et trafikpolitisk forsøg på at
fremme et højere udgiftsniveau ved at advokere
for partnerskab med en privat leverandør. Det bør
i den forbindelse bemærkes, at der ikke er tale om
et OPP, men et driftspartnerskab. 
8. Sammensætningen af Økonomiudvalget ses på
http://www.stm.dk/Index/mainstart.asp?o=93ogn
=1ogh=4ogs=1 søgt d. 25. februar 2008.
9. Statsministeriet har på embedsmandsniveau en
anden opbygning end de øvrige ministerier. Un-
der departementschefen sidder tre såkaldte depar-
tementsråd, som hver især har ansvaret for en po-
litisk søjle. Det er departementsråd for søjle 2
»Økonomi og indenrigspolitiske forhold«, som
repræsenterer Statsministeriet i Styregruppen,
mens Statsministeriets departementschef sidder i
Økonomiudvalget sammen med ministrene fra de
øvrige ministerier, jf. ovenfor.
10. Koordinationsudvalgets sammensætning; 
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http://www.stm.dk/Index/mainstart.asp?o=93ogn
=1ogh=4ogs=1 søgt d. 25. februar 2008.
11. Selv hvis der kigges til Storbritannien, som jf.
indledningen til denne artikel igangsatte OPP-
projekter i de tidlige 1990’ere, er projekterne an-
no 2008 kun cirka halvvejs i aftaleperioden. Erfa-
rings- og evalueringshorisonten for denne type
OPP er altså meget lang.
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Denmark: a PPP sceptic
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are being
used by governments around the world. But
whereas more experienced PPP countries—
such as the UK, Australia, Portugal, Spain, and
more recently also Ireland and the
Netherlands—have witnessed a steady growth
in the number of signed projects, the
Scandinavian countries and some central and
eastern European countries have shown more
reluctance towards the PPP concept. In times
of globalization when public management
concepts are flowing across national borders,
these national differences in the adoption of
the PPP model are puzzling.
Whereas the PPP programmes and
activities of the more experienced PPP
countries are well documented (see Klijn and
Teisman, 2003; Reeves, 2003; Pollock et al.,
2007; Weihe, 2008), much less has been
produced on those countries that have reacted
with more scepticism towards PPPs. This article
extends the current stock of PPP studies by
presenting the Danish case. Denmark first
considered adoption of the PPP model in 1999,
but the programme has moved slowly. Today
only three PPP projects are operational and a
few others are under construction. Examining
Denmark’s PPP policies and regulations,
supplemented by two case studies from the
schools sector, this article details the hesitant
development of construction/infrastructure
PPPs in Denmark.
The origins and development of Denmark’s
PPP programme
Denmark has a long tradition of public delivery
of welfare services, and has traditionally been
hesitant about imposing user charges on
services and infrastructure. In fact, the two
major infrastructure projects in the 1990s—
the Great Belt Bridge and the Oresund
Bridge—were constructed as state-owned
companies. Even though user tolls are collected
on these bridges, they are not generally
considered to be PPPs because of the public
finance element. Further, the Copenhagen
Metro which became operational in 2002 was
also financed by public loans and land sales.
Unlike the serious constraints on public
spending and borrowing that the UK economy
was facing when the PFI programme was
launched in the early 1990s, the Danish
economy was booming and government
surpluses meant that major projects could be
financed out of the public purse. In the period
from 1997 to 2008, Denmark’s government
sector produced an average annual surplus of
2.2% measured against GDP, compared to a
Euro area average of -1.9% (Eurostat, 2009).
So the politico-economic case for introducing
PPPs in Denmark was from the outset not as
favourable to a large-scale adoption of the PPP
model as elsewhere.
The PPP concept was introduced in
Denmark by the Danish Ministry of Finance in
1999 (Ministry of Finance, 1999). However, as
it was published in the ministry’s annual budget
report (not a public bestseller), the introduction
went almost unnoticed. In late 2001 the
incoming prime minister, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, announced a more widespread
involvement of private partners in public
service delivery. In the subsequent years, a
handful of government reports mentioned
PPP as a means of optimizing large-scale
construction and infrastructure projects
(Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs,
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2002, 2003), but no concrete government action
was taken, nor was any money earmarked for
projects.
In January 2004, the Danish government
launched a PPP action plan with 10 initiatives
to support a more widespread use of PPP in
Denmark (Danish Government, 2004).
Important among these initiatives were seven
pilot PPP projects, the establishment of a Danish
PPP Competence Unit, and a universal PPP
testing requirement. The action plan also set
up pools of money to support local and regional
authorities in the testing of projects for PPP
relevance (see table 1).
However, many initiatives have either been
seriously delayed and/or had little practical
effect. Unlike many other countries, where
PPP competence units have been established
under the ministry of finance, the Danish PPP
Competence Unit was placed in an agency
under the Ministry of Economic and Business
Affairs, which has traditionally been the
Ministry of Finance’s little brother. The Danish
PPP unit is responsible only for facilitating
construction-type PPP projects (schools, office
buildings, sports arenas etc.). Infrastructure
PPPs have been given no dedicated institutional
support in Denmark, even though five of the
seven pilot PPP projects in the government’s
action plan were road projects.
So, although launched as an ambitious
initiative, the evidence clearly indicates that
the Danish government’s PPP action plan has
in fact produced little real action. This lack of
action owes much to the Danish government’s
serious problems in setting out a regulatory
framework supporting PPPs, which has made
the planning and procurement process costly
and risky for public and private partners.
Denmark’s regulatory difficulties with PPP
While some of the Danish PPP regulations are
parallel to those of the UK, Ireland, and
elsewhere, others are not. Even where the
European Union (EU) is the source, for
example with public procurement regulations,
the Danish regulatory authorities seem to have
adopted a less favourable interpretation for
PPP than elsewhere.
This article is based on face-to-face
interviews with officials in all government
departments and agencies regulating PPPs in
Denmark. Interviewees included officials in
the Ministry of Finance, the PPP Competence
Unit, the Tax Agency, the Ministry of the
Interior, and the Ministry of Transport. To
balance these public sector accounts, interviews
were also conducted with private sector
interviewees in the Confederation of Danish
Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, the
Construction Association and the Transport
and Logistics Association. Information was also
sourced from official documents, legislation
and other published government materials.
Table 1. Ten initiatives in the Danish government’s 2004 action plan for PPPs.
Initiative Action Status 2010
1 Seven national pilot PPP projects One project operational (the Danish National Archive)
Two projects planned as PPPs Two projects to proceed as traditional procurement contracts
One project cancelled
One project has been analysed but the report has not been
released
2 Universal testing requirement: all national Implemented in Danish national building legislation in 2009
construction projects to be tested for PPP relevance
3 Approximately £3.0 million to support PPP testing Few projects have been tested for PPP relevance
of infrastructure projects by local and regional
authorities
4 Approximately £0.8 million to support PPP testing of Analyses of PPP relevance for 17 projects have been partly
construction projects by local and regional authorities financed from this pool of money
5 Clear regulations on local municipalities’ budgeting and Regulations unchanged until a special government commission
finance of PPP projects resolved the issue in May 2008
6 Framework contract with three preferred PPP advisors The framework contract was delayed significantly but
eventually signed in 2006
7 General PPP guidance documents and legal Material provided by the Danish PPP unit (see initiative 10)
guidance material
8 Web-based portal hosting all official Danish PPP Implemented. Danish PPP guidance material can be found at
documents www.udbudsportalen.dk and www.ebst.dk
9 Analyses of Denmark’s potential use and scope Two reports produced. One showed a Danish PPP potential
of the PPP model of c. £3 billion in the period 2005–2010
10 Launch of a Danish PPP Competence Unit with Established. The PPP Competence Unit offers guidance to
responsibilities for construction PPPs local municipalities. Exclusive focus on construction sector
PPP projects, no expertise in infrastructure PPPs
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Universal PPP testing requirement
Unlike Ireland and the UK, the Danish
government has chosen to adopt a universal
PPP testing of public sector projects (the UK
had a testing requirement, but chose to abolish
it after only a few years). Testing only applies to
national government projects, not local or
regional projects and it is only mandatory for
construction projects—infrastructure projects
that are handled by the Ministry of Transport
are excluded. In addition, no procedures have
been established to monitor whether
departments and agencies actually carry out
the PPP testing.
Two government projects have been signed
subject to the testing requirements: the building
of new archives for the Danish National Archive,
and a National Registration Court. Both
projects became operational in 2009. The
universal PPP testing requirement has thus led
to the testing and procurement of a few Danish
PPP projects, but many sectors have been
exempted, and there is no significant deal-
flow.
PPP procurement: the competitive dialogue
procedure
PPP projects in Denmark and all other EU
member states are subject to a common set of
procurement regulations. The so-called
‘competitive dialogue procedure’ was launched
in 2004 as a new procurement principle that
should facilitate the procurement of contracts
that are ‘particularly complex’, and where the
contracting authorities: ‘are not objectively able
to define the technical means…and/or are not
objectively able to specify the legal and/or
financial make-up of a project’ (European
Parliament and Council, 2004, p. 18 [my
emphases]).
The competitive dialogue procedure was
meant to facilitate procurement based upon
open output specifications—one of the basic
principles of PPP. Instead of choosing a
preferred bidder early in the process, the
competitive dialogue procedure prescribes that
the public authority pre-qualifies a list of
consortia that proceed into the dialogue stage.
The procurement authority in this stage holds
a number of bi-lateral meetings with each of
the pre-qualified bidders. The output
specification is then gradually specified
throughout this process. The process terminates
with detailed bids from all remaining bidders,
after which the public procurement authority
awards the proposal it considers to be the most
attractive.
The public procurer must proceed with
parallel meetings throughout the whole tender,
and the private consortia on their side spend
considerable time and money developing
separate project proposals, while only one will
eventually be awarded the contract. These
regulations apply on an EU-wide basis, but
whereas countries such as the UK, Ireland and
the Netherlands launched their pilot PPP
programmes long before the competitive
dialogue procedure was added to the EU’s
procurement directive in 2004, Denmark’s pilot
PPP projects coincided with the amended
procurement procedures. Experiences with the
competitive dialogue procedure are still
building up in Denmark and elsewhere, but
the interpretation from the field is that this
procedure, despite its advantages in terms of
transparency and fairness, is both demanding
and expensive for public and private partners
alike.
Restrictions on local government PPPs
Regulation of PPPs in the Danish local
government sector must be viewed in the
context of a strong tradition of decentralized
local government. The Danish welfare system
is one of the most comprehensive and costly in
the world. Local government collects income
taxes, and delivers such services as primary
education, childcare, environmental planning
and local roads. Approximately 12% of local
government services are contracted out to
private companies, and since the liberal-
conservative administration came into office in
2001, the government has strongly encouraged
that this number be increased, but with
moderate success so far.
Local government use of PPPs in Denmark
is subject to a comprehensive set of regulations
that restrict their access to private lending and
leasing. These regulations were recently
amended after a massive scandal in the local
municipality of Farum—a suburb of
Copenhagen. Farum had entered into sale-
and-leaseback contracts by selling off public
water treatment plants and other facilities to
private businesses and then renting them back.
This meant that Farum had substantial amounts
of capital to spend on new projects and services,
but it left the local municipality in deep debt
(see also Greve, 2003). Local municipality access
to these leasing arrangements was soon after
amended, and regulations now require that
municipalities entering into PPP or sale-and-
leaseback arrangements reserve an amount
equal to the value of the contract in a closed
account. This is to make sure that the PPP
model is used to increase the value for money
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of major construction projects, and not as an
alternative way of financing projects that a local
municipality would otherwise not be able to
finance. Accordingly, the reserved amount can
only gradually be released over the course of
the contract period (Ministry of the Interior,
2008).
What the central regulators did not realize
at this stage was that these regulations would in
fact render PPPs less feasible for local
governments than traditional procurement
projects. Regulations required the full project
value to be reserved upfront when commencing
a PPP project, whereas the payments on a
traditional project would follow the building
process that typically covers two or three budget
years. Furthermore, local governments’
reserves would have to include value added tax
(VAT), which is 25% in Denmark. Local
government spending is generally exempted
from VAT, so the money would be released
later, but the upfront capital needs when
commencing a PPP project became very high.
The regulations that were initially established
to promote value-for-money considerations and
as a safeguard against risky over-investment in
the local government sector resulted in PPPs
becoming an impossibility for most local
municipalities. Government regulators became
aware of this regulatory side-effect in 2005, but
it took three years before an inter-departmental
group in 2008 published a report resolving the
issue by giving PPP and traditional procurement
projects equal regulatory treatment in local
government budgets (Ministry of the Interior,
2008). By then, the unresolved regulations had
led to delays and cancellations of projects.
Tax and VAT for PPP
The tax and VAT regulation for PPP projects
has been a highly complex issue in Denmark
and elsewhere, but whereas countries such as
the UK and Ireland developed a way of
handling these issues relatively early, the
evidence collected for this article demonstrates
that the issue is still highly problematic for
Danish PPP projects. Danish tax legislation
allows companies to depreciate their assets,
and this depreciation can be deducted before a
company pays corporation tax. Also, VAT can
be deducted from the company’s expenses
related to operating and maintaining an asset
for commercial purposes, for example a
building or infrastructure facility operated
under a PPP scheme. However, a PPP company
can only depreciate the building or
infrastructure and deduct VAT from its
expenses if it is considered to be the legal owner
of the asset. In 2004, the Statistical Office of the
European Communities (Eurostat, 2004)
decided that a private partner’s legal ownership
of a PPP asset should be subject to two
conditions:
•The private partner bears the construction
risk.
•The private partner bears at least one of
either availability or demand risk.
The Eurostat decision applies to PPP projects
on an EU-wide basis, and has been central to
on/off balance sheet discussions for European
PPPs. Eurostat launched this decision based on
concerns that some countries would place
projects off balance sheet in order to meet the
excessive deficit criteria established by the
European Monetary Union (Petersen, 2008, p.
14). However, the on/off balance sheet
discussion has never been an issue in Denmark,
presumably because the country meets these
criteria by a large margin. So the EU regulation
on the legal ownership of PPP projects has not
been as important in Denmark as it has
elsewhere, but Danish tax legislation
nonetheless resulted in a heated debate over
risk distribution, the legal ownership and the
tax and VAT treatment of PPP contracts.
To understand the issue fully, the Danish
tax scandals of the 1990s must be considered. A
number of big cases went to the courts after
some businesses used a loophole in Danish tax
legislation for large-scale tax avoidance. The
cases were not PPPs, but the resulting regulatory
amendments made it very difficult for private
consortia to be registered as the legal owner of
the asset in PPP deals. The interviews
demonstrate that various government
departments were in open combat over the
issue, with the Ministry of Economic and
Business Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit
pushing for a solution, and the Ministry of
Taxation and the Tax Agency being in principle
neutral towards PPPs, but at the same time
overtly concerned that the PPP model might
unintentionally reopen the loophole in Danish
tax law.
The tax and VAT issues are extremely
important for Danish PPP projects. Case-by-
case solutions were found for some of the first
PPP projects, but there has been no generic
solution, and the tax authorities insist that
decisions cannot be made prior to the existence
of a concrete contract. The implication is that
projects must proceed all through the planning
and competitive dialogue procedure before a
decision can be made regarding the legal
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ownership of the asset. The interviews
demonstrate that substantial public and private
resources have been dedicated to this issue,
which still constitutes a major source of concern
in the Danish PPP market.
Denmark’s regulatory difficulties in action:
two case studies
The two case studies that follow both concern
primary school projects of similar size and
scope. The schools sector was chosen for these
case studies because Denmark has the most
extensive PPP experiences within this sector.
Whereas the first primary school project
proceeded relatively quickly through the
planning and procurement process to become
the country’s first operational PPP project, the
other one never made it to the procurement
phase.
The two case studies are the first
internationally published analyses of Danish
PPP projects, and thus also the first to illustrate
in practice the kind of regulatory difficulties
that public and private partners face when
engaging in PPPs in Denmark. The cases are
examined with reference to key PPP regulation
issues: procurement, transfer of risk, legal
ownership and tax and VAT.
Vildbjerg primary school: a struggle for PPP
Denmark’s first PPP project was a primary
school in the small town of Vildbjerg in the
western part of the country. The project was a
design, build, finance, operate, and maintain
(DBFOM) contract for a school of 700 pupils,
including administration buildings and an
indoor sports facility. The local government
became interested in the PPP model in 2004
and contracted two consultancy firms, KPMG
and Ramboll, to analyse the PPP potential of
the project. In October 2004, the consultants
submitted their report estimating a cost saving
of roughly 10% for PPP compared to a
traditional procurement model (KPMG, 2004,
p. 6). The school was not listed as one of the
Danish government’s pilot PPP projects because
the primary school sector is administered by
the local municipalities, but the PPP
Competence Unit supported the local
government with money and expertise in the
planning process.
The local municipality used the competitive
dialogue procedure to procure the school
project, which was noted in the Official Journal
of the European Community (OJEC). Twelve
consortia gave their expressions of interest and
five were pre-qualified to proceed to the
dialogue phase. Three of the five bidders
proceeded through the dialogue procedure
and submitted a final bid, whereas two consortia
were eliminated in the final phase. The
competitive dialogue procedure finished in
August 2005, and the winning bidder was a
Danish/German PPP consortium called
Vildbjerg Skole A/S, consisting of the
construction company MT Hoejgaard, the
facility manager Dan-Ejendomme, and the
German bank DNB Nord. However, it took
another four months before the contract was
finally signed, because the project ran into
serious problems with national regulations.
According to the evidence gathered for this
case study, at the time of contract closure the
Danish government still did not have
regulations in place to handle PPP projects,
despite the fact that initiative five in the
government’s PPP action plan should lay out
clear regulations for the use of PPP in the local
government sector (see table 1).
Two regulatory problems threatened the
use of the PPP model for this project: the first
related to the treatment of PPPs in the local
government’s budget. With the primary school
being a DBFOM, the Ministry of the Interior,
which also has the responsibility for the local
government sector, suddenly realized that local
government regulations made it mandatory
for the local municipality to reserve an amount
similar to the construction sum in a closed
account. The regulatory difficulties now became
very relevant. If commencing the project as a
PPP, the local municipality was required to
deposit the full construction sum upfront, and
add an additional 25% VAT to this amount.
This was not possible within the existing
budgets, and the project became seriously
endangered. In an attempt to reach a deal with
government regulators, local government
senior officials and senior representatives from
the private consortium travelled to Copenhagen
to hold several meetings with officials in the
Ministry of the Interior. Both the local
government and the winning private
consortium accrued substantial expenses, and
the project became so endangered that a ‘plan
B’—a traditional procurement solution—was
agreed between the local government of
Herning and the winning consortium in case
the reservation issue could not be resolved.
The PPP solution was not settled until the
minister of the interior announced that the
government would give Vildbjerg school an
exemption from the regulations on deposits,
but it was at the same time strongly indicated
that this was a one-off decision. Nonetheless,
the contract that had been ready for closure for
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months was finally signed, and construction
was started immediately afterwards. The project
became operational in December 2006.
The second regulatory challenge to this
project was the Danish tax and VAT regulations.
As the Vildbjerg school project was Denmark’s
first PPP, the Tax Agency had no prior
experience of PPPs. The Tax Agency had not
been involved in the Danish government’s PPP
programme, and staff were astonished when
contacted by the local government and its
advisers. Furthermore, neither the PPP
Competence Unit nor the Ministry of the
Interior, both of which had been in close contact
with the local government during the process
of planning this project, had been aware of this
issue until the local government and the private
PPP consortium issued a request for a private
ownership registration.
However, when contacted by the local
municipality, the responsible government
departments and agencies did not find a
solution to the issue, but rather started an
internal fight among themselves over the
principal aspects of tax and VAT treatment of
PPP. The Tax Agency in particular was very
nervous that PPPs would potentially pose a
challenge to existing tax regulations, whereas
the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs
and the PPP Competence Unit pushed for a
quick solution that was supportive to PPPs.
A compromise was finally agreed that
resulted in a private consortium, Vildbjerg
Skole A/S, becoming the legal owner of the
school during the contract period. The Tax
Agency required that the asset could only be
transferred back to the public partner subject
to payment of a market price for the asset
when the contract ended, which should
increase the risks transferred to the private
partner. Furthermore, the agency made it
clear that future PPP projects would be
treated on a case-by-case basis, and that a
final contract would have to be submitted
before it could evaluate whether risks were
sufficiently transferred to make the private
consortium the legal owner of the asset. So
whereas Vildbjerg primary school is often
presented by Danish policy-makers and
regulators as a project which illustrates the
commencement of a successful Danish PPP
programme, the evidence gathered on this
case demonstrates how the project ran into
serious difficulties caused by an unresolved
set of regulations at the national level which
delayed and challenged the PPP solution to
the project and imposed extra costs on the
public and private partners.
Kalundborg primary school: PPP rejected
The local municipality of Kalundborg, located
approximately 100 km west of Copenhagen,
decided in 2007 to build a new primary school
because one of its 10 existing schools was in
poor condition and pupil numbers were
increasing. Here the local government also
hired a consultancy firm to carry out an ex ante
value-for-money analysis of project costs for
the PPP model compared to a traditional
procurement. The consultants from
PricewaterhouseCoopers, analysing three
alternative locations for the new school,
submitted a report in April 2008 which
concluded that a PPP would cost approximately
the same as the traditional solution, but that
the transfer of risks was likely to make a PPP a
better deal for the local municipality (PwC,
2008).
The interviews conducted on this case
demonstrate that the city council was in favour
of commencing the project as a PPP, but that
the unresolved regulations regarding local
government PPPs soon became a deadly hurdle
for this scheme. After the Vildbjerg school
project had in 2005 been given an exemption
from the PPP reservation regulations, national
regulators began considering an amendment
that would treat PPPs and traditional
procurement projects equally in local
government budgets. These regulatory
discussions were initiated in 2005, but three
years later when the Kalundborg primary school
project was being planned, regulations had still
not been amended. Once again, local senior
officials and the private advisors travelled to
Copenhagen to hold meetings with the Tax
Agency and the Ministry of the Interior, but
this time the message was different: the ministry
was not willing to issue the city council with the
same exception as the Vildbjerg project had
been given. The Ministry of the Interior, which
was at the time chairing an interdepartmental
group working on an amendment to the
regulations to resolve the issue, informed the
city council that this work was going on. But the
ministry could not issue any guarantees for the
primary school project before the
interdepartmental group had given its
recommendations.
Being briefed on the situation, the city
council of Kalundborg at a meeting in late
April 2008 decided to vote down what would
otherwise have become Denmark’s second
primary school PPP project. Uncertainty over
the current regulatory framework for PPP was
prevailing, and the city council was frustrated
that these issues had still not been resolved four
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years after the launch of the government’s PPP
action plan, and three years after Denmark’s
first PPP project had been given an exception
from the same regulations. The local
municipality accrued additional expenses and
received extensive criticism in the local media
in this process. Furthermore, the subsequent
tax and VAT treatment of the project was an
additional hurdle that would have to be resolved
in the final process of signing the project as a
PPP.
Though initially favouring the PPP solution,
the city council decided to reject the PPP model
and proceeded with a traditional procurement
project. Only a month later, in May 2008, the
interdepartmental group published a report
recommending an amendment to the
reservation regulation that would give equal
budget treatment to PPPs and traditional
projects in the local government sector (Ministry
of the Interior, 2008). By then, the city council
had already gone further with the planning of
the traditional procurement project, and
decided not to reverse their decision.
Concluding remarks
Along with many other governments, the
Danish government has considered the PPP
model as a means of improving the value for
money of major construction and infrastructure
projects. The Danish government launched a
PPP action plan in 2004, but the effects in terms
of real action have been much less pronounced
in Denmark than in many other countries.
The evidence collected for this article
demonstrates that Denmark’s regulation for
PPP has been partly incoherent and that
regulatory authorities have moved slowly and
demonstrated little determination towards
resolving central regulatory issues. The
universal PPP testing requirement and the
competitive dialogue procedure have had a
very limited effect on PPP activity in Denmark.
Further, whereas EU regulation concerning
the on/off balance sheet issue has been
significant in many other countries, in Denmark
this has not been important—presumably
because of the strong public finance situation.
Restrictions on local government spending
and the tax and VAT treatment of PPP projects
have posed serious impediments to a greater
uptake of PPPs. The reservation issue was
finally resolved in May 2008 after years of
negotiations between government
departments. However, tax and VAT regulation
still constitutes a serious source of concern for
public and private partners engaging in PPPs.
The tax authorities insist that the legal
ownership of the asset can only be decided on
after careful review of the transfer of risks
under a concrete PPP scheme, which in practice
means that a project must proceed all through
the planning and procurement phases before a
tax and VAT registration can be issued to the
private partner. No generic solution has been
found, and tax and VAT is still handled on a
project-by-project basis.
The two case studies from the schools sector
have illustrated in detail the challenges which
public and private partners face when engaging
in PPP activity in Denmark. Whereas the first
PPP project, the Vildbjerg primary school, was
saved by the minister of the interior, who
issued a one-time exemption from the
restrictions on local government PPPs, the
second PPP school project fell because the
minister this time would not issue an exemption
from the local government reservation
requirements. In both cases, the lack of a clear
and well-tested model for tax and VAT
treatment of PPP projects made the PPP solution
uncertain for both public and private partners.
Rather than resolving these fundamental
regulatory issues, central government
departments and agencies fought over the
principal aspects of policy and regulation, and
displayed little determinism towards tackling
central regulatory concerns displayed in the
PPP market. The Ministry of Finance and the
Tax Agency in particular have shown a
reluctance towards setting regulation
supporting a more extensive use of the PPP
model in Denmark, whereas the Ministry of
Economic and Business Affairs and the PPP
Competence Unit have strongly promoted PPP
but have had limited resources and no direct
competencies to enact new regulations that
could further promote uptake of PPPs.
Finally, when judged against the Danish
government’s proclaimed mission to increase
the value for money of major construction and
infrastructure projects, these regulatory
challenges and the persistently low number of
signed deals can be interpreted in at least two
ways:
•First, as a lack of political determination in
setting out policies and regulations
supporting the adoption of PPP. The fact
that the Danish government launched a
seemingly ambitious PPP action plan, but
subsequently did little to resolve the
regulatory challenges for PPP projects, can
be interpreted as a consequence of the
fundamental disagreements between central
regulatory departments and agencies.
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•Second, a more optimistic interpretation of
the Danish government’s approach would
emphasise the uncertainty about the extent
to which PPP can really deliver value for
money. The emphasis on ex ante testing of
projects underpins this commitment to PPP
as a value-for-money tool, and not as an
alternative way of financing projects that
would otherwise not be feasible. Analyses
published in Public Money & Management
and elsewhere have recently raised serious
doubts and concerns about the HM Treasury
and the National Audit Office’s value-for-
money evaluations of PPP projects (see, for
example, Hodge and Greve, 2007; Pollock et
al., 2007; Pollock and Price, 2008).
If these critical voices hold true, being PPP
sceptic might, after all, prove to be a rational
strategy. But even if the jury is still voting on
the long-term pros and cons of PPPs, Danish
regulatory authorities need to get the
regulations straight. Economic theory
informs us that risks are priced in a market,
and that these risks will eventually influence
product prices. The PPP market should be
no exception. Denmark’s regulatory
uncertainties and slow problem-solving thus
increase transaction costs in the market and
make it less likely that PPP projects will turn
out to deliver value for money in the long
run, which was the government’s primary
reason for introducing PPPs in the first place.
Getting clear regulations in place is therefore
not only fundamental to a greater uptake of
PPPs in Denmark, but also to the value-for-
money prospects of such projects. ■
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INTRODUCTION 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have recently gained widespread attention among governments 
and scholars across public administration and management (Osborne, 2000; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; 
Ghobadian et al., 2004; Koppenjan, 2005; Vrangbæk, 2008; Greve & Hodge, 2010). Promoted as a 
more collaborative approach than earlier waves of privatisation and contracting out, the PPP 
approach has been touted as a means of overcoming the principal-agent relationships characteristic 
of the first epoch of New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Linder, 1999; Hammerschmid & 
Angerer, 2005; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Many commentators see the partnership idea as a 
suitable – some would even argue necessary - governance scheme with which to organise activities 
in the mixed sphere between public and private (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Treib, Bähr & Falkner, 
2005; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). Moreover, in a broader public administration context, the global 
resurgence of the PPP notion has been interpreted as part of a more general trend from government 
to governance in which decision making authority is gradually being dispersed both horizontally 
and vertically (Rhodes, 1996; Tenbensel, 2005; Ysa, 2007).  
Advances in developing an understanding of complex decision-making in PPPs have been achieved 
by analysing partnerships as institutionalised governance schemes characterised by shared 
responsibilities, costs, risks and benefits over a long time period (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; 
Koppenjan, 2005; Greve & Hodge, 2010). This theoretical perspective sees partnership not just as a 
contractual relationship or a financial tool, but as a governance scheme suitable for the modern 
network society (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Ysa, 2007). Significant insights 
have also been gained by analysing decisions relating to PPPs as a series of games in complex 
policy networks with participation of various public and private actors (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; 
Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Petersen, 2009). Inter-organisational decision, according to this 
perspective, is not just an option, but a necessity for achieving coordinated policy outcomes in 
complex networks involving the participation of various strategic actors (Scharpf, 1994; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003; Klijn & Edelenbos, 2007). But previous research also demonstrates that coordinated 
decision-making is difficult to achieve, because each actor chooses their own strategies, which 
make policy outcomes for PPPs subject to a strategic and institutional complexity (Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). 
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This paper analyses PPPs as a form of multi-level governance in the area of asset-based public 
services and infrastructure, with a focus on the Irish PPP case (Reeves, 2003; Hurst & Reeves, 
2004). The study addresses a gap in previous literature regarding regulation and governance of 
infrastructure PPPs, which has mainly focused on the complexities in the horizontal (public-private) 
dimension of PPPs, whereas studies focusing on the interplay between various territorial levels in 
the regulation and application of PPPs have hitherto been largely absent (see also Petersen, 2010a). 
I suggest that the Irish PPP case is interesting from a multi-level governance perspective because of 
the involvement of actors and organisations at several levels of government, including various 
central government actors, local actors, sector departments and agencies, and organisations at the 
EU level (such as the European Commission and the European Investment Bank), in important 
decisions about policy and regulation of PPP and in concrete decisions about the formation of PPP 
projects (see below). 
At the time it was launched in 1999, the Irish government’s PPP programme was officially designed 
to ‘allow for dynamic interaction and cooperation between the public and private sectors, 
highlighting the complementarity of the public service ethos with innovation in the provision of 
public capital infrastructure and services’ (Irish Government, 2001:2). Ireland was at the time 
facing a major infrastructure deficit as a consequence of years of underinvestment in the physical 
infrastructure combined with the serious strains on public capital budgets following on from the 
EU’s Growth and Stability Pact (Kay & Reeves, 2004). As a result of this, the Irish government was 
in search of alternative ways of remedying Ireland’s infrastructure gap while attempting to steer 
clear of excessive deficits on government capital budgets (Farrell and Goodbody Consultants, 1998; 
Reeves, 2003).  
Faced with these challenges, the Irish government launched an ambitious PPP programme to attract 
private investment in public services and infrastructure: a comprehensive policy and regulation 
framework was launched, a Central PPP Policy Unit was established under the Ministry of Finance, 
eight major pilot PPP projects were announced, and a pool of money was earmarked for PPPs. In 
the aftermath, however, when projects were not realised at the expected speed and the European 
Commission launched a new decision about risk-sharing and on/off-balance sheet treatment of PPP 
projects, the Irish government launched a number of amendments which largely centralised PPP 
policy and regulation within the Ministry of Finance. Also, procurement functions and financial 
expertise were centralised in the National Finance Development Agency (NDFA), a new 
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procurement unit established via specific legislation in 2002 and 2007. While this manoeuvre 
enabled Irish policymakers to guide and steer PPP activity to an extent much greater than 
previously, the PPP initiative has, however, subsequently been heavily criticised for its lack of 
legitimacy and accountability to the wider public (Kay & Reeves, 2004; Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions, 2005).   
The specific research questions addressed in this paper are: Who are the key actors and what are the 
strategic games that create policies and regulations for PPPs in the Irish case? How can the 
development of Ireland’s PPP programme be accounted for through the concept of multi-level 
governance? How did the EU level and the national level interact to support or hinder the 
formation of concrete PPP projects? Multi-level governance can be characterised as a “system of 
continuous negotiations among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, 
national, regional and local” (Marks, 1993: 392; see also Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Multi-level 
governance is thus seen in line with the more general trend in public administration from 
government to governance (Rhodes, 1996), whereby central government’s monopoly on policy-
making and regulation is gradually being dispersed to actors below and above it (Stoker, 1998; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & Flinders, 2005). From a theoretical viewpoint, therefore, I 
suggest that we should expect that the complexity of decision-making in PPPs occurs not only in the 
horizontal dimension, as illustrated by previous research (e.g. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; 
Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), 
but also in the vertical dimension, where strategic actors at several levels of government engage in 
complex decision-making games about important policy outcomes for PPPs.  
The paper commences with a brief overview of PPPs and the drivers behind their recent emergence 
(Section 2), followed by a discussion on how decisions about PPPs can be analysed as a series of 
games in multi-level policy networks (Section 3). Then, the empirical case of Irish PPPs is 
examined, starting with an overview of recent developments in PPP policy and regulation at the EU 
level, then moving on to examine the development of Irish national PPP policy and regulation, and 
finally, two case studies of PPP projects from the Irish third level schools sector (Section 4). 
Subsequently, the broader lessons we can learn from this case study are discussed (Section 5), and a 
conclusion to the paper is provided (Section 6). 
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PPPS AND THEIR RESURGENCE IN MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
The term ‘partnership’ is a broad notion which covers a number of differing concepts and forms of 
interaction between public and private (and sometimes civil society) actors for various types of 
public services and infrastructure provision (McQuaid, 2000; Teisman & Klijn, 2002). A common 
definition of PPP is that it concerns ‘co-operation of some sort of durability between public and 
private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share risks, cost and 
resources which are connected with these products’ (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2002: 598; see also 
Klijn & Teisman, 2005). This definition is, however, rather broad and allows for a variety of 
different organisational arrangements with an element of risk sharing, collaboration and a common 
time-horizon. Other scholars have suggested that we might identify at least ten different types of 
partnerships (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004), whereas the European Commission focus on three primary 
forms of PPP: contract PPPs, concession PPPs and institutional PPPs (European Commission, 
2004). Different definitions and classifications are common within this field of research, and it is 
also common to see PPP as an umbrella concept for a broad range of cross-sector arrangements 
(Mörth, 2007). 
In order to clarify the various meanings and approaches in the literature, a number of commentators 
have talked about different “PPP families” or “PPP approaches” (Hodge and Greve 2007; Weihe 
2008). Further, a distinction can be made between “economic partnerships” and “social 
partnerships”, respectively (Hodge & Greve, 2005: Chapter 1). Economic partnerships involve 
projects in which a private sector entity contracts with the public sector to take on the responsibility 
to design, finance, build, operate and maintain for instance a road, a hospital or a school over a 
long-term period (typically 30-35 years). The essence of this form of PPP is the involvement of 
private finance and the sharing (a PPP) or transfer (a PFI) of risks, in a process in which the private 
sector is paid to take on the risks related to the various phases of the project (Bing et al, 2005). 
Furthermore, there are both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ types of economic PPPs: transport infrastructure has 
for instance been labelled ‘hard infrastructure PPP’, while hospitals and schools have been 
designated as ‘soft infrastructure PPP’ (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). Social partnerships, according to 
Hodge and Greve, involve softer and somewhat less formalised partnerships, as found in issue 
networks and policy communities (2005: Chapter 1). In many countries including Ireland, however, 
the PPP concept is most commonly associated with the economic – and arguably narrower – 
understanding of the term, which is also the focus of this paper.  
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It has been argued that PPPs are established with the ultimate aim of achieving some sort of 
collaborative advantage (Huxham & Vangen 2000). Realisation of collaborative advantage means 
that something is achieved which could not have been accomplished without collaboration (ibid.). 
Another argument is that by letting the partners do what they are best at, PPPs can potentially 
accomplish a product or outcome which could not have been achieved by any of the organisations 
acting single-handedly (Klijn and Teisman, 2005). Various benefits in PPPs include economic gains 
(sharing/transfer of risks, new investment capital, value-for-money), resources (information, 
competencies, expertise), legitimacy and conflict avoidance (McQuaid, 2000; see also Mörth, 
2007). Innovation is also an often mentioned rationale for forming PPPs (Klijn and Teisman 2005). 
It is argued that when private sector money is being put at risk, private sector organisations are 
expected to have a greater incentive to adopt new and innovative approaches to designing, building, 
operating and/or maintaining assets than classic public sector provision (European Commission, 
2004; OECD, 2008), although few if any academic studies have so far empirically illustrated that 
PPPs bring about more innovative solutions than traditionally procured projects.  
Yet other scholars have argued that the primary reason for governments embarking on PPP/PFI has 
been the prospect of boosting government budgets by keeping major capital investments off balance 
sheets (cf. Glaister, 1999; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Reeves, 2003; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). As 
noted by Spackman (2002), “In political and popular debate - in the UK as elsewhere - the fact that 
privately financed capital spending is off-budget is often the main reason advanced for private 
financing.” (2002: p. 288). Thus, by letting private partners finance and erect a public school, road 
or hospital, major infrastructure investments can be undertaken without affecting the EU’s General 
Government Deficit criteria, subject to a sufficient transfer of risks to the private partner (Eurostat, 
2004; Kay & Reeves, 2004; Petersen, 2010). Another argument for utilising private finance in PPPs 
is that it enables governments to shift resources to other policy areas while delivering more 
investments as a whole: “In addition to maximizing efficiencies and innovations of private 
enterprise, PPPs can provide much needed capital to finance government programs and projects, 
thereby freeing public funds for core economic and social programs.” (Canadian Council for Public-
Private Partnerships, 2010). However, recent academic literature has been overtly critical towards 
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this assertion because there is always a bill for the public sector to pay for the asset in the long term 
(Spackman, 2002; Hodge & Greve, 2005, 2007; Mörth, 2007)28.
All in all, there are thus a number of differing views and interpretations in the academic literature 
concerning the meanings and objectives of contemporary PPPs. While some scholars see PPPs in 
line with earlier waves of NPM and privatisation (Linder, 1999; Hammerschmid & Angerer, 2005), 
others see them as a new public governance scheme suitable for the modern network society (Van 
Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2005; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). In this paper, the 
question about objectives and strategies pursued by various actors engaged in PPP policy-making 
and regulation and in concrete decisions about the formation of PPPs is reserved for empirical 
analysis. How can the various strategies pursued by actors engaging in decisions about PPPs be 
analysed? How are decisions for PPPs taken in policy networks at multiple levels of government? 
In the following pages I discuss, from a theoretical perspective, how these questions can be 
addressed, and second, I present the empirical findings from the Irish case, from which this analysis 
can begin.  
DECISION-MAKING AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE  
In order to address the questions formulated in the above, the paper utilises the Actor-Centered 
Institutionalism to public policy research (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003), and the multi-level governance approach (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & 
Flinders, 2005). In so doing, the paper follows a strategy of ‘filling out’, which means that the two 
theoretical approaches are used as supplementing perspectives for the analysis of the empirical 
problem of multi-level decision-making for PPPs (Antonsen, Greve & Jørgensen, 2000; see also 
Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007).  
Actor-Centered Institutionalism and strategic decision-making 
Given the participation of various strategic actors in decision-making games concerning PPPs, I 
take Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf’s Actor-Centered Institutionalism as the theoretical point of 
                                                          
28 Although there is one exception, as noted by Hodge and Greve: “In the case in which a government enters into an 
infrastructure deal requiring users or citizens to pay directly, such as tolls on a new road, it is clear that there is little 
impact on public budgets. Such an arrangement does reduce pressure on public sector budgets, but only because 
government has essentially purchased the infrastructure through the private credit cards of future road users rather than 
using its own resources.”(Hodge & Greve, 2007: 549) 
153 
departure (Scharpf, 1994, 1997; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995). Actor-Centered Institutionalism 
represents an attempt to combine rational choice institutionalism with a more realistic bounded 
rationality model of the actor (Scharpf, 1997). The theory framework, or at least the game-theoretic 
version of it, views the process of policy-making as a series of games that takes place within one or 
several relatively well-defined decision-arenas (Scharpf, 1994). Each arena is characterised by 
limited substitutability, which makes the policy-players interdependent (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; 
Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). These games can be cooperative or non-cooperative, the difference being 
that the former involves binding agreements among the players, whereas the latter does not support 
such coordinated action outcomes (Scharpf, 1994).  
This theory framework has been applied within PPP literature in particular by Dutch public 
administration scholars, which see policy-making for PPPs as a process of a series of negotiations 
in embedded policy networks with participation of various public and private sector partners 
(Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005). Klijn and Teisman 
defines policy networks as “changing patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors 
which take shape around policy problems and/or clusters of resources and that are formed, 
maintained and changed by an ecology of games” (2003: 137). The participation of actors from 
various networks, each with a specific set of preferences and resources, is likely to make the 
strategic complexity of decision-making high (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Teisman, 2000).  
In these policy networks, actors engage strategically but are also dependent on the resources and 
expertise of other organizations. This creates a continuity of interactions between the organisations 
participating in the network with the consequence that no single actor or organisation can 
unilaterally decide the decision outcomes (Stoker, 1998: 22). Policy-making, however, do not take 
place in an institutional ‘vacuum’, as noted by Scharpf: 
The approach proceeds from the assumption that social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome 
of interactions among intentional actors – individual, collective, or corporate actors, that is – but that 
these interactions are structured, and the outcomes shaped, by the characteristics of the institutional 
settings within which they occur. (Scharpf, 1997: 17). 
Institutions are thus seen as the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’, structuring, shaping and 
constraining the institutional decision environment in which particular courses of action are chosen 
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by the policy-players. But the relationship between actors and institutions is fundamentally two-way 
in the sense that ‘games about the rules’ are continuously being played as well (Stoker, 1998: 22). 
By changing the institutional settings surrounding the decision games, the institutional capacity of 
policy-coordination can be changed according to the interests and preferences of dominant actors or 
policy players (Roberts & King, 1991). The institutional settings thus constitute the decision 
environment in which games are being played, but these games can also lead to changing patterns 
of institutional structures (Scharpf, 1997).  
Multi-level governance as vertically interconnected decision-arenas 
However, complexities in policy-making for PPPs do not stop at the national border, but extend to 
the EU-level as well as to the sub-national (regional, local) levels (Marks, Hooghe & Blank, 1996).  
According to the multi-level-governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2003), multilevel governing (Scharpf, 
2001), or multi-tiered centric governance (Jessop, 2005) perspectives, recent years have not only 
witnessed a dispersion of central government authority horizontally to various private and civil-
society actors, but also vertically to actors drawn from below and above central government (Bache 
& Flinders, 2005). The multi-level governance approach does not refuse decision-making at the 
national arena as important, but it asserts that policy-making is no longer monopolised by central 
governments (Stoker, 1998).  
A PPP, according to this perspective, is created in policy-games with participation of strategic 
actors at several levels of government. At the same time, these policy games are guided and 
structured by an institutional framework made up of formal and informal rules at various levels of 
government. This creates vertical interdependencies between actors and institutional decision 
structures. The possibility that games can be played in several networks (for example a building 
sector network and a transport sector network) and at multiple levels of governing makes decision-
making for PPPs subject to an institutional and a strategic complexity both in the horizontal 
dimension and in the vertical dimension. Policy-games thus take place in interconnected arenas with 
various dominant actors, which expectedly make it difficult to connect the various interactions (see 
also Klijn & Teisman, 2003). In concrete terms, this means that we need to pay attention both to the 
actors and the various strategies they pursue, and to the multiple institutional levels in which policy 
games about PPPs are being played.  
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Building on the Actor-Centered Institutionalism combined with the multi-level governance 
approach, this paper examines the functioning of multi-level governance in the development of Irish 
PPPs. The paper investigates and links strategic actors, decision-arenas and institutional settings at 
the EU-level, the national level, and the sub-national level, using two high-profile schools sector 
PPP projects as case studies (see below). By using the multi-level governance perspective on PPPs, 
I attempt to extend previous governance PPP analysis, which has mainly focused on 
interdependencies in the public-private dimension (cf. Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Teisman & 
Klijn, 2002; Koppenjan, 2005; Ysa, 2007). First, however, a brief presentation of the methods and 
empirical sources used in this paper follows. 
METHOD AND EMPIRICAL SOURCES 
The empirical data for this paper was collected during a doctoral research project on policy, 
regulation and multi-level governance of PPPs.29 Reflecting the multi-level governance approach, 
empirical data was collected at several levels of government: (i) at the EU-level where key PPP 
issues such as procurement and the on/off balance sheet issue are regulated; (ii) at the national 
policy level in Ireland where central policy players guide and steer Irish PPP activities; (iii) at the 
project level utilising two in-depth case studies, the Cork School of Music and the National 
Maritime College of Ireland (third level schools), which are two of Ireland’s high profile PPP 
projects in the schools sector. The schools sector was chosen as test bed because it constitutes one 
of the major PPP procurement sectors in Ireland as well as abroad, which could facilitate policy-
learning and national comparisons with PPP experience in other countries.  
The research was conducted according to the method of data triangulation (Peters, 1998), and was 
carried out as follows. Empirical material was collected through a combination of in-depth expert 
interviews and primary documents, such as official government reports, legislation, press releases, 
guidance material, archive documents and secondary literature. As PPP basically involve both 
public and private partners, it was considered fundamental to supplement public sector accounts 
with interpretations sourced through interviews and written sources published by private sector 
organisations as well. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted at the EU level with 
                                                          
29 The PhD-project focused on the development of policy and regulation for PPPs in a comparative and multi-level 
governance perspective. The country cases investigated within this PhD-project were Ireland and Denmark. The 
research in relation to the Danish PPP case and the EU’s regulation of PPPs have been reported elsewhere (see Petersen 
2010a, 2010b).  
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representatives of the European Commission in Brussels and with the European Investment Bank 
and Eurostat in Luxembourg. Moreover, interviews were carried out in Dublin and Tullamore with 
representatives of Irish government departments and agencies as well as with Irish labour and 
business confederations, with a senior PPP advisor in Belfast, and in Cork with the public project 
manager of the two PPP schools cases. The in-depth expert interviews were utilised to get access to 
process information and knowledge accumulated at the personal level, as recommended by 
Barzelay et al. (2003). For example: identifying critical events in the data set and establishing 
relationships between events; sequences of actions, and changes in actor positions; consolidating 
and cross-checking facts about specific events; and identifying and understanding intermediate 
outcomes of processes and negotiations which are often not included in the final documents that are 
officially available. All in all, 17 respondents were interviewed in 14 interview sessions in Ireland 
and in the EU. 
The round of interviewing was supplemented by a course of desk research, where material was 
collected at both the EU level, the national policy level and in relation to the two case studies. In 
order to organise the large body of data, a database was formed to register central information 
including type of source, date of publication, summary of content, etc. Using the method of data 
triangulation between the interviews, the primary documents and secondary sources (Flick, 1992; 
Peters, 1998), a number of ‘critical events’ in the data set were identified (Barzelay et al., 2003). 
These events were characterised by major decisions concerning policy and regulation and/or 
application or PPPs, and were then analysed using the technique of intra-event analysis, which was 
used to track and analyse the development of single events, and cross-event analysis in order to 
establish connections between events and generate theoretically informed explanations (Barzelay et 
al., 2003). The results of these two analytical methods were ordered using visual methods for data 
analysis such as time-ordered matrix and time-lines illustrations (Eisenhardt, 1989), as presented in 
the next section.  
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This paper is the first international study with a combined analytical focus on developments in PPPs 
at the project level, the national level, and the EU level. In this section, I examine the empirical 
material collected for the purposes of this paper using a multi-level approach: (i) a brief overview of 
PPP regulation at the EU level, which serves as a background for analysing the Irish PPP case; (ii) 
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an examination of the origins and development of the Irish government’s PPP policies and 
regulations, and finally; (iii) two case studies of PPP projects from the Irish school sector. I then 
move on to discuss and interpret the findings using the multi-level governance perspective. 
The EU level: PPPs as a double-edged sword  
Compared to the initiatives of national governments, the EU was a latecomer to the field of 
regulating PPPs, and this policy area is today still to a large extent dominated by national and local 
players. For the EU, regulation of these long-term infrastructure PPPs has been a double-edged 
sword which has raised some significant dilemmas and trade-offs between key institutions of the 
European integration project (Teisman & Klijn, 2000; Mörth, 2007). Hitherto, the EU has abstained 
from setting binding standards or requirements regarding the use of PPP in the member states 
(Petersen, 2010a). Accordingly, EU regulation first becomes relevant subsequent to the decision by 
national or local players to adopt the PPP model for specific projects. There are two primary ways 
in which EU regulation indirectly steers and controls the formation of PPPs in the member states.  
The first relates to the tender of PPP contracts, where the EU Procurement Directive requires that 
projects with a capital value above a threshold limit of €5.15 million are procured openly on an EU-
wide basis, thus allowing bids from all businesses after announcement in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEC) (European Parliament & Council, 2004). National protectionism for the 
procurement of major infrastructure projects is thereby combated, but the procedures also impose 
strict limitations as to the amount of dialogue and exchange of knowledge prior to the signing of a 
contract (Interview DG Markt, 2008). To remedy this limitation on the existing procurement 
directive and to permit dialogue and the use of open output specification in the formation phase of 
PPPs, the Parliament and Council decided in 2004 to launch the Competitive Dialogue Procedure, 
which is a procurement method for the tender of so-called “particularly complex contracts” 
(European Parliament and Council, 2004: Article 29). The Competitive Dialogue Procedure was 
pioneering in the sense that it allows a number of formal rounds of talks to be held between the 
public authority and the pre-qualified private business before a PPP contract is signed. To some 
extent, it thus supported the use of open output specifications, a basic principle of PPPs (Zitron, 
2006), and provided room for private innovation in the process (Tvarnø, 2006). 
The second area of EU regulation of PPPs relates to the distribution of risk and ownership of the 
asset in PPP deals. In technical terms, this is referred to as the on/off balance sheet issue, and 
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encompasses the registration of assets under a PPP ‘on’ or ‘off’ the public sector partner’s balance 
sheet. The issue is closely related to the Stability and Growth Pact criteria, which requires that 
governments keep annual deficits within 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and total 
government debt within 60 percent of GDP (Hix, 2005: 315). Because of the size of individual PPP 
projects and the rapidly growing PPP activity in some member states (such as the UK, Portugal, 
Spain, Ireland), the Commission has been concerned that governments might resort to PPP merely 
as a financial tool, whereby major investments could be placed off government balance sheets 
(Interview Eurostat, 2008). The problem, as seen by the Commission and Eurostat, was that national 
governments could thereby making budgets look better, despite the fact that the public authority 
was legally committed though the PPP contract to pay the private partner over the course of 25-35 
years. To address this problem, in 2004 the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat) decided that PPP arrangements can only be placed off government balance sheets subject 
to an appropriate sharing of risks: (i) the private partners must bear the construction risk in a PPP; 
(ii) and the private partner must bear at least one of either availability or demand risk (Eurostat, 
2004; for a general discussion of risks in PPP see Bing et al., 2005). Only if both conditions are met 
can the asset under a PPP be placed off government balance sheets.  
Thus, in contrast to the first area of regulation, which was intended to support the use of PPPs in the 
member states, this second area was launched by the Commission and Eurostat to ensure that the 
PPP route was not utilised merely as a means of circumventing appropriate budget procedures in the 
planning and carrying out of major public infrastructure investments (Eurostat, 2009). To see if this 
concern was justified, let us now turn to the origins and development of the Irish government’s PPP 
programme.  
The national level: A stepwise centralisation of policy and procurement functions 
Compared to many of its English-speaking counterparts (for example the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, USA), which embarked on major privatisation programmes from the late 1970s onwards, 
Ireland was slow to adopt measures of marketisation and privatisation, and as a result of this, only a 
handful of public enterprises had been made subject to privatisation considerations before 1999 
(Reeves, 2003: 163). However, from the late 1990s onwards Ireland embarked on a larger 
privatisation and PPP programme, to a large extent as a result of strains on public finances. While 
the double-digit growth rates had given Ireland one of the most positive economic outlooks among 
the EU countries (see Battel, 2003), another problem appeared on the horizon by the late 1990s: 
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years of systematic underinvestment in the country’s physical infrastructure had produced a 
significant infrastructure gap, which now threatened the competitiveness of the  small, open 
economy (Kay & Reeves, 2004). Making things even worse, the approaching eastern enlargement 
meant that Ireland faced a falling share of funds received from the EU’s Structural Funds, which 
had provided a major source of finance for the country’s infrastructure investment in earlier decades 
(Farrell Grants Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants, 1998). 
Thus, at the time it was formed in 1997, the new centre-right government composed of Fianna Fáil 
(catholic conservative party) and the Progressive Democrats (centre-liberal party) took over the 
responsibility for an economy facing a number of immediate challenges in terms of developing the 
physical infrastructure while limiting the General Government Debt in accordance with the EU’s 
Stability and Growth Pact criteria. Further leading the way for PPPs in Ireland was the Irish 
government’s receptiveness to the Blair government’s third-way programme, which persuaded them 
that PPP could provide a “quick capital investment at politically affordable prices” (Kay & Reeves, 
2004: 71). The Irish government was therefore receptive when, in January 1998, the Irish Business 
and Employers Confederation (IBEC) and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) made a joint 
submission arguing for the large-scale uptake of PPPs in Ireland (IBEC & CIF, 1998). The aim was 
to persuade the government of the merits of PPPs in terms of addressing the infrastructure gap while 
utilising private sector expertise (Interview IBEC, 2008). IBEC and CIF’s invitation was well-
received, and later the same year, the Irish government assigned a detailed study on PPPs. 
The submission, commonly known as the ‘Farrell Grants Sparks and Goodbody Report’, 
recommended adoption of PPP across a broad range of procurement sectors, including transport 
infrastructure (roads, railways, car parks) and construction infrastructure (schools, housing, third-
level education, sports facilities, etc.) (Farrell Grants Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants, 
1998). Subsequently, in June 1999, the Minister of Finance, Charlie McGreevy, announced a first 
wave of pilot PPP projects covering four road sector projects, two education sector projects, a 
public transportation scheme, and a wastewater treatment plant (Irish Government, 1999). Inspired 
by international experiences (particularly the UK), a Central PPP Policy Unit was established under 
the Finance Ministry to “facilitate the PPP process centrally, by developing the general policy 
framework (including, where necessary, the legal framework) within which PPPs operate and by 
160 
providing central guidance to Departments and other State Authorities in that context” (Irish 
Government, 2010)30. Further initiatives to facilitate PPPs in Ireland included the following:  
 The establishment of an Interdepartmental Group (IDG) on PPPs to coordinate initiatives 
amongst government departments  
 The establishment of an Informal Advisory Group (IAG) on PPPs to invoke dialogue with 
business federations and labour organisations  
 The formation of devoted PPP units in ten relevant government departments 
 A framework agreement between the Irish government and employers and labour 
organisations about general PPP policy principles: the so-called ‘Framework for PPP’ 
(Irish Government, 2001) 
 The establishment of a clear legal framework for PPP by the launch of dedicated 
legislation (Irish Government 2002a, 2002b, 2007)  
Despite being a latecomer to the field of PPP, the Irish government has in comparative terms shown 
a major dedication in terms of setting out the policies, regulations and institutional underpinnings of 
its partnership programme. Further supporting the uptake of PPPs in Ireland, the National 
Development Plan (NDP) 2000-2006 earmarked a minimum of €2.35 billion investments in PPP 
projects for the period (Irish Government, 1999). However, the subsequent years witnessed a 
development towards a more centralised approach in which the Ministry of Finance and the 
Treasury gradually took over more competencies from local authorities and other government 
departments and agencies (Interview Central PPP Unit, 2008; Interview National Development 
Finance Agency, 2008). Ireland’s first legal act on PPP was launched in 2002 when the government 
introduced the ‘State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002’ that laid 
down a legal framework for state authorities and local authorities entering into PPP deals. In 
addition to clarifying the legal possibilities for public partners entering into PPPs with private 
partners, the Act furthermore made the important regulation that local authorities could only enter 
into PPPs after approval from the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government 
(Irish Government 2002a). The leverage of local government PPPs was further diminished later the 
same year, when the Irish government established the National Development Finance Agency 
(NDFA) (Irish Government, 2002b). The NDFA, functioning from 1 January 2003, was to advise 
state authorities on the optimal financing of public investment projects, hereunder PPP projects, in 
                                                          
30 http://www.ppp.gov.ie/about-the-central-unit, retrieved 6 February, 2010. 
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order to achieve value-for-money for the public sector. Other state authorities mentioned in the 
‘National Development Finance Agency Act 2002’ were obliged to seek the advice of the NDFA 
when planning major public investment projects, but it was still voluntary for state authorities as to 
whether or not to follow the recommendations.  
This leverage was subsequently removed when the final measure on the centralisation of PPP 
procurement functions was taken with the launch of the ‘National Development Finance Agency 
(Amendment) Act 2007’ (Irish Government, 2007). In 2005 the Government had announced that 
the functions and scope of the NDFA would be altered, and this change was written down in the 
2007 amendment which now made it mandatory for other government departments and agencies to 
procure PPP schemes through the NDFA. For that purpose the NDFA set up a Centre of Expertise 
for PPPs which was given the authority of procuring and entering into PPP contracts on behalf of 
other state authorities. The NDFA therefore hands over the projects to the relevant authority after 
the PPP contract has been procured and signed and the project has become operational (e.g. 
construction is finished) (Irish Government 2007). With this act the NDFA thus changed its role 
from advisor to primary procurer of Irish PPP projects, although roads, railways and local 
government sector PPPs are still procured by the respective government authority: for the roads 
sector the National Roads Authority (NRA), for railways the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA), 
and for local government projects the Department for Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government. However, compared to many other countries in Europe, Ireland is a largely centralised 
state, which means that most local projects are in fact procured by the NDFA (for example also 
schools).  
To sum up, what this brief overview of Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation demonstrates is that 
although Ireland was a latecomer to the field of PPPs, the programme has developed rapidly. 
Institutional underpinnings were established at an early stage under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Finance, and later, with the establishment of the NDFA, also under the Treasury. Business 
federations played an active role in the developments at the national policy level, and the voices 
were heard with the set-up of the Information Advisory Group and the Framework for PPPs (Irish 
Government, 2001). Moreover, we have also seen that the development of Ireland’s PPP 
programme has been a gradual one towards more centralised policy, regulation and procurement 
functions, with clear limitations to the leverage of other government authorities and local 
governments entering into PPP deals. How, then, did concrete Irish PPP projects in the schools 
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sector evolve? How were they influenced by policy and regulation at national and EU level, and to 
what extent did they ‘feed-back’ into the multi-level governance framework? In order to start 
addressing these questions, the next section examines the course of two high profile Irish school 
sector PPP projects. 
PPP experience in the Irish schools sector 
The two case studies that follow both concern third level (further education) school projects of 
similar size and scope: Cork School of Music and the National Maritime College of Ireland. 
Although they were initiated at the same time and both involve a design, build, finance, operate, 
maintenance (DBFOM) contract, the two projects display markedly different experiences. Whereas 
the Cork School of Music project was seriously challenged by EU and national regulations, the 
National Maritime College of Ireland proceeded relatively smoothly through the planning and 
procurement phases to become Ireland’s first third level PPP school project.31
Case 1: Cork School of Music 
The first case study covers a 25 year design, build, finance, operate, and maintain (DBFOM) 
contract for a new music school in Cork. As one of the pilot PPP schemes announced in June 1999, 
the Cork School of Music was one of the Irish government’s flagship projects, but it was to be 
another eight years before it was finally inaugurated. The data collected for the purpose of this case 
study demonstrates that the delay was caused by a combination of several events, some of which 
were project specific, and some of which related to a combination of factors at national and EU 
level.  
Prior to the erection of the new Cork School of Music, the music schools in Cork had been scattered 
around seventeen different locations in the city, many of which comprised rented facilities which 
imposed considerable extra costs and posed a challenge to the effective management of the school 
(Interview Cork Institute of Technology, 2008). In order to remedy these problems, a working 
group issued a report on the “Future of the Cork School of Music” which was submitted to the 
Department of Education and Science (Department of Education and Science, 1999). While the 
report did not at first discuss PPP as a procurement route, the Irish government was at that particular 
time investigating schemes which could be suitable as pilot PPP projects. In this process, the Cork 
                                                          
31 And, indeed, Ireland’s second PPP project in the schools sector as a whole. The first was a bundle of five primary 
schools procured together. 
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School of Music proposal was linked into the PPP policy agenda at national level, and was 
designated as part of the Irish government’s PPP pilot project plan launched by the Irish Finance 
Minister in June 1999.  
During the early stages the project proceeded quickly, and in October 1999 the Irish Department of 
Education and Science announced its plans for the commencement of Cork School of Music as a 
PPP (Department of Education and Science, 1999). Subsequently, in June 2000, the Department of 
Education and Science proceeded with an EU-wide call for tenders for a design, build, finance, 
operate and maintain (DBFOM) contract. Procurement followed the existing procedures at the time, 
which meant that the Competitive Dialogue Procedure, which was first announced in 2004, was not 
used for this project. Three private bidders were short-listed, and while the department’s initial 
intent was to procure a smaller refurbishment/rebuild contract, all three preferred bidders proposed 
a demolition of the existing buildings and erection of a new music school (Interview Department of 
Education and Science, 2008).  
Following the advice from the consortia, the Department of Education and Science decided to 
construct a new school at a total value of €60 million, and in April 2001 Jarvis Projects Ltd. was 
chosen as the preferred bidder based on a combination of quality and price (Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 2005). It was at this stage, however, that the scheme ran into a 
number of challenges which endangered the project and caused serious delays. The first setback 
was caused by the fact that the on/off balance sheet issue was not resolved by the Irish government 
when the project was announced under the pilot PPP programme. While it was clear that the 
construction sum would be financed by the private consortium under the PPP model, the Irish 
government, after consultation with the European Commission and Eurostat, realised that the costs 
would have to be counted against general government spending (Interview Department of 
Education and Science, 2008; Interview Eurostat, 2008).  
To see why this issue, which at first sight would seem rather technical, became a major challenge 
for the commencement of the Cork School of Music, we have to consult developments both at the 
national and the EU level. At the EU level, regulations on general government spending are issued 
under the Stability and Growth Pact criteria, which as we have seen sets limitations to government 
budget deficits and general government debt. The EU Commission and Eurostat were at the time 
becoming increasingly aware of the on/off government balance sheet treatment of PPP projects in 
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the national accounts of member states, because PPPs could potentially provide a means of 
circumventing traditional budget procedures (Interview Eurostat, 2008). At the same time, at the 
national level, a mini recession in the Irish economy after the ‘dot-com bobble’ had made the Irish 
government increasingly concerned with asset-based government spending as such investments 
would contribute negatively against the calculation of General Government Deficit (Kay & Reeves, 
2004: 75; Interview Cork Institute of Technology, 2008).  
Consulted by the Irish government, the Commission advised that it would require a substantial 
transfer of risk to the private partner if it was to treat the project as off government balance sheet. It 
thus became clear that the Irish government either had to cancel the scheme, which was one of the 
eight original flagship projects, or count it against the government’s capital spending. The 
interviews conducted for the purpose of this paper illustrate that the budgetary issue now led to an 
internal battle within the Irish government between the Department of Education and Science and 
the Department of Finance. Whereas the Department of Education and Science was lobbying for 
government finance for the project, the Department of Finance was concerned with the 
consequences for the General Government Debt (Interview Department of Education and Science, 
2008). The Cork School of Music project was now seriously delayed as a consequence of the 
missing finance for the project. The stalemate led to widespread dissatisfaction, not least among the 
teachers at the music school, which in October 2003 took a one-day industrial action concerning the 
funding delays (Buck, 2007). The situation was finally resolved when a compromise involving a 
downscaling of the project by some €10 million was made between the Department of Education 
and Science and the Department of Finance, and in March 2004 the Minister for Education and 
Science announced that construction would commence in the summer of 2004.  
However, as soon as the government had resolved the financing issue, the second challenge to the 
project arose, when in July 2004 Jarvis Projects Ltd., the private operator which had been awarded 
the contract in April 2001, issued a warning to the stock market stating that it was in serious 
financial trouble. The PPP contract, which had been ready for closure, was therefore cancelled, and 
the Irish government now had to seek an alternative private partner (Interview Department of 
Education and Science, 2008). The problem was resolved when Hochtief PPP Solutions, a major 
German PPP operator, finally took over the bidding arm of Jarvis, and the question became whether 
Hochtief could enter directly into the PPP contract which had already been signed with Jarvis. Once 
again, EU authorities in Brussels were consulted, now regarding the procurement directive, but 
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there was no precedence on the matter (Interview Cork Institute of Technology, 2008). The 
Commission, after looking into the case, decided that the takeover could be approved if the 
specifications of the contract were not changed. In September 2005 the contract was signed with 
Hochtief, and construction work was embarked on soon after (Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, 2005). Construction work took the planned 18 months, and in July 2007, eight years 
after the announcement under the Irish government’s pilot PPP programme, the Cork School of 
Music was finally inaugurated. Figure 1 provides an overview of the critical events in the 
development of this PPP project. 
 Figure 1. The development of the Cork School of Music project  
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Case 2: The National Maritime College of Ireland 
Though not initially listed as one of the Irish government’s pilot PPP projects, the National 
Maritime College of Ireland was the second PPP scheme to become operational in the schools 
sector.32 The project, which involved capital value of €52 million (of which €29 million in 
construction costs), is a 25 year design, build, finance, operate, and maintain (DBFOM) contract for 
a school of 750 pupils, including a library, fitness facilities and specialised marine training facilities 
(Greville, 2005: 1). The data collected in this case study demonstrates that the project moved 
quickly through the planning phases, and although it was delayed by 10 months while the 
government awaited approval for loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB), the project 
became operational in 2004 - three years before the Cork Music School project. Let us see why it 
developed more smoothly than the first case. 
The National Maritime College of Ireland is a naval school and training facility, which jointly 
serves the non-military training of the Irish Naval Service (INS) and the Nautical Studies 
Department of the Cork Institute of Technology (CIT). The school had in 1975 become Ireland’s 
                                                          
32 The first was a bundle of five PPP primary schools – for a case analysis of these projects see Reeves (2003). 
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primary training site for seafarers, when the Department of Education and Science had decided to 
move all maritime training activities to Cork. However, by the late 1990s the available facilities no 
longer met the standards of modern maritime education (Greville, 2005). Responding to the 
situation, the Minister for the Marine and Natural Resources set up a ‘Task Force on Seafarer 
Training and Employment’, which in 1999 reported back in favour of a joint naval and commercial 
maritime college in Cork (Interview Department of Education and Science, 2008). An Inter-
Departmental Expert Working Group (IEWG) was then established to carry out a careful analysis of 
the costs of adopting the PPP model for this project. The report came out in favour of the PPP 
model, and in May 2000 the Irish government decided to commence the joint naval and mercantile 
marine education and training facilities as a PPP scheme located some 20 kilometers outside Cork 
in southern Ireland.  
Subsequently, the Department of Education and Science made an EU-wide call for bids, which in 
August 2001 resulted in a short-list of three consortia that received the Invitation to Negotiate 
Document (ITN) (Interview Cork Institute of Technology, 2008). Separate meetings were then held 
with the three bidders, wherein each of the consortia were allowed to present detailed project 
outlines, and in April 2002, Focus Education, a consortium consisting of Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(financier) and Bovis Lend Lease (building operator) was appointed as the preferred bidder (Bovis, 
2002). The move towards financial close, however, awaited approval of a loan from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), which the Irish government in October 2001 had consulted for EU-funded 
loans (EIB, 2003). As a consequence, while the project was already planned under the Irish 
government’s National Development Plan 2000-2006, the project was now delayed by almost a 
year.  
The reason for this delay, according to the data collected on this case, was that the Irish government 
now chose to await a response from Brussels concerning access to EU-loans, rather than finance the 
project using state funds, as the latter would count against general government debt, as we also saw 
in the first case study (Interview Cork Institute of Technology, 2008). Financial closure for this 
project was finally reached 10 months later, when in February 2003 the EIB announced that it 
would provide a €29 million loan to cover the construction costs (EIB, 2003). Subsequently, 20 
months later, in October 2004, the project became operational within time and budget. Figure 2 
provides an overview of this case study. 
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Figure 2. The development of the National Maritime College of Ireland project 
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DISCUSSIONS: STRATEGIC ACTORS AND VERTICALLY  
INTERCONNECTED DECISION-ARENAS  
The empirical presentation of the Irish PPP case leads to a number of discussion points, some of 
which have been raised in the PPP literature, and some of which extend our knowledge about the 
complexities in the vertical decision-dimension of PPPs (cf. Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 
2005). At the national policy level, we have seen that the introduction of PPPs in Ireland took place 
against a situation of a major infrastructure gap combined with falling shares of EU funds for 
infrastructure investments. The course of action taken by the Irish government, and especially the 
Ministry of Finance, thus turned out largely to be motivated by the prospects of removing major 
capital investments from government balance sheets, which is confirmed by other case studies of 
Irish PPPs (for example Reeves, 2003; Kay & Reeves, 2004). We thus see a direct conflict of 
interest here across two levels of government: whereas the EU’s on/off balance sheet regulations 
were enacted to prevent governments from signing long-term commercial contracts which are not 
registered in public budgets, the Irish government’s pursuance of PPPs has on the other hand largely 
been motivated by the possibilities of placing such schemes off balance sheets.  
There is here clearly a tension between short- and long-term strategies, as the placement of projects 
off balance sheet will make it possible to finance more investments here and now, whereas in the 
long term, there is always a bill to pay for subsequent governments and later generations of tax 
payers (Hodge & Greve, 2005: Chapter 1). Moreover, as the EU, through Eurostat, does in fact 
regulate the on/off balance sheet issue closely by monitoring the specific accounting practices for 
PPP projects of national governments, there is indeed a conflict of interest between actors at the EU 
level and key policy and regulation players at the Irish national level, such as the Ministry of 
Finance and the Treasury. The Irish case thus illustrates that decision-making in PPPs is indeed 
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multi-level and characterised by a complex ecology of games and actions arenas in which policy 
outcomes for PPPs are negotiated (Scharpf, 1997). For example, the Department of Finance’s 
primary concern seems to be a macro-economic one, with a focus on removing major infrastructure 
investments from government balance sheets, whereas the Department of Education and Science as 
a sector department was much more concerned with the construction of the specific school projects 
(Interview Department of Education and Science, 2008).  
However, the realisation of coordinated decision-making for PPPs turns out to be difficult, not least 
because actors come with various preferences and strategies, but also because policy games are 
being played simultaneously at multiple levels of government. In concrete terms, this paper has 
focused on three levels at which decisions about PPPs in Ireland were formed. First, the EU level, 
where public procurement regulation and the on/off balance sheet issue is regulated. Although the 
EU does not interfere directly with the decisions of governments within this policy area, the on/off 
balance sheet issue in particular turned out to be of major importance to the developments at 
national policy level and at the project level. There has indeed been a tension in the EU between on 
the one hand supporting the procurement of PPPs, and on the other ensuring that PPPs are not 
merely used as a financial tool with which to circumvent appropriate budget procedures in the 
member states. As a result of this, the institutions of the EU have so far mostly engaged in the 
regulation of PPPs at a rather abstract and general level, and merely indirectly subsequent to a 
decision of a national or local public authority to form a PPP project. 
Hooghe and Marks (2003: 239), discussing also the problem of achieving coordinated decision 
outcomes in multi-level institutional settings, argue that two options are available: first, to limit the 
number of autonomous actors, the actions of which must be coordinated (type I); second, to limit 
the amount of interorganisational interaction by transferring competencies to designated units 
entrusted with a clear responsibility (type II). The findings from this study seem to suggest that the 
Irish government has embraced both these coping mechanisms. With the PPP Act in 2002, the 
competencies of local authorities were effectively transferred to central government level (an 
example of type I). Further, with the two National Development Finance Agency Acts, respectively 
in 2002 and 2007, competencies to organise, finance and procure PPP projects were transferred 
from organisations at the same level (government departments and agencies) to a single agency (an 
example of type II) (except for the railways and roads sectors). Thus, step by step, the number of 
autonomous departments and agencies has first been reduced, and second, the amount of interaction 
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between various actors (with potential conflicts in strategies) has been reduced by gathering policy 
and regulation competencies within the Central PPP Unit and procurement competencies within the 
National Development Finance Agency.  
At the project level, the two case studies from the schools sector revealed that the EU level and the 
national level have in fact only partly played together to support the formation of PPPs within this 
sector. Again, the on/off balance sheet issue turned out to be of central importance to the Cork 
School of Music project, because the Irish government suddenly realised that the project would 
have to be counted against general government debt at the same time as Ireland was going through a 
mini recession which was putting a strain on public budgets. Obviously, the policy and regulation 
framework here was a hindrance to PPP, mainly because the on/off balance sheet regulations were 
not coordinated between the EU Commission and Eurostat on the one hand, and national 
governments (in Ireland and elsewhere) on the other. Accordingly, because of this lack of 
coordination across the EU level, the national level and the project level, the music school project 
that was otherwise at an advanced stage was seriously delayed and subsequently downscaled after 
intense negotiations between the Ministry of Science and Education and the Ministry of Finance. 
But why did the other PPP school case, the National Maritime College of Ireland, not run into the 
same problems with unresolved finance and the on/off-balance sheet issue?  
To see why this was the case, we need to include another actor at the EU level, namely the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), which issued a €29 million loan to cover the construction costs 
(EIB, 2003). As the project was planned after the music school, the Irish government had thus learnt 
its lesson, and submitted a lending application to the EIB before a contract was signed with a 
private partner. The Irish government therefore avoided the on/off balance sheet issue for the 
second project, although it was subsequently delayed for 10 months before a final loan approval 
was awarded by the EIB. This seems to indicate that multi-level governance of PPPs entails a 
potential for conflict among the key policy players at national, EU and project level, which the 
institutional capacity for conflict resolution only partly matches, thus creating some tension and 
unresolved regulatory issues in the multi-level dimension of PPP policy and regulation. This 
ongoing institutional reconfiguration is indeed what Stoker (1998) talked about as the ‘games about 
the rules’ (as opposed to the institutional ‘rules of the game’). The institutional settings, within 
which decisions about PPPs are taken, thus determine which games are being played and what 
payoffs the participants in the policy networks can expect from these games, and vice-versa: by 
170 
changing the institutional settings, strategic actors can fundamentally change the ‘rules of the 
game’, whereby new modes of interaction become possible (Scharpf, 1997; Stoker, 1998). The 
empirical findings brought to the fore in this paper thus illustrate a very dynamic picture of 
institutional change processes in relation to PPP policy-making and regulation across multiple 
levels of government. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The transition from government to governance has resulted in a dispersal of decision-making and a 
blurring of the boundaries between state and market; thereby creating a poly-centric and multi-level 
governing system (Stoker, 1998; Scharpf, 2001; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Jessop, 2005). However, 
previous PPP governance research has mainly focused on the complexity caused by horizontal 
(public-private) coordination issues, although broader public administration literature and EU 
policy studies illustrate that the new public governance is characterised by a diffusion of decision-
making authority both horizontally and vertically (Scharpf, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Bache & 
Flinders, 2005). To start to address the issues of multi-level governance in decisions about PPPs, 
this paper has dealt with the interplay of multiple levels of governing in the development of PPP 
policy and regulation and in decisions about concrete PPP projects, with a focus on the Irish PPP 
case.  
The paper has illustrated that the launch of PPPs in Ireland took place against a combination of 
background settings that were favourable to the large-scale use of the PPP model: a major 
infrastructure gap posed a serious challenge for the government, and the decreasing shares of funds 
received from the EU imposed further strains on public budgets. The motive of removing major 
public infrastructure investments from government balance sheets has been noted in previous case 
studies of PPP in Ireland and abroad (Reeves, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005), but the research presented 
in this paper adds a number of further dimensions relating to the complex interplay between the  
EU-level, the national level formation of concrete PPP projects. At the EU-level, the analysis 
displayed an inherent dilemma in the EU’s institutions between two conflicting concerns: on the 
one hand the establishment of an EU-wide PPP procurement market to attract private capital 
investments and thus develop the physical infrastructure in the member states, which is seen as 
fundamental to the effective functioning of the Single Market; and on the other, the Commission 
and Eurostat has been concerned that some member states would utilise the PPP model to sidestep 
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the EU’s budget procedures for responsible fiscal policies by removing major infrastructure 
investments from the public sector’s balance sheets. The latter seems to be a sober concern, as the 
analysis revealed that removing major infrastructure investments from the public sector’s balance 
sheet has indeed been a primary rationale for embarking on large-scale PPPs in Ireland.  
The two case studies illustrated that the formation of PPPs is subject both to a strategic and an 
institutional complexity, which make PPPs challenging governance schemes for all players 
participating in the game. These two cases illustrate that the implementation of PPP projects do in 
fact require the resolution of a number of multi-level regulatory aspects, such as tax, legal issues, 
financial aspects, procurement, etc., but in the face of serious strains on public budgets and a major 
infrastructure gap, the Irish government solved these issues along the way. Indeed, when the first 
PPP ran into problems and was seriously delayed, the research illustrates that this was mainly due to 
changed EU regulations concerning the on/off balance sheet issue, which meant that the Irish 
government would have to count this project against the General Government Deficit. While this 
issue was avoided for the second project, because the Irish government petitioned the European 
Investment Bank for loans for the construction of this scheme, the findings from the two school 
projects illustrate that policies and regulatory framework conditions have largely served the purpose 
of supporting PPP projects procured off balance sheet. The lessons from Irish PPPs illustrate that 
interdependencies drive the process of policy-making and regulation of PPPs. Moreover, we have 
seen that challenges to PPPs can arise both as a consequence of an insufficiently coordinated multi-
level governance structure, and as a result of project specific events, as illustrate in the Cork School 
of Music case study. The fact that decisions about PPPs are made in interconnected decision-arenas, 
each with different rules of the game and dominant actors, seem to require a stronger multi-level 
governance structure across vertically interconnected decision-arenas than availed by the present 
governance configuration. Furthermore, as significant public and private resources are continuously 
being redirected to the formation of PPPs worldwide, it seems timely that public administration and 
management research increasingly starts scrutinizing multi-level governance aspects of 
contemporary PPPs as well. 
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The term partnership is now a dominant slogan in the rhetoric of public sector reform, arguably 
capturing that status from privatization which held similar dominance through the 1980s and 1990s. 
(Wettenhall, 2003: 77). 
Public–private partnerships, especially in the area of infrastructure development, now represent a 
relatively new but increasingly ubiquitous organizational arrangement with international acceptance. 
(Johnston & Gudergan, 2007: 570). 
Its advocates tout it as the epitome of a new generation of management reforms, especially suited to the 
contemporary economic and political imperatives for efficiency and quality. (Linder, 1999: 35). 
Provision of new investment in infrastructure in Europe is increasingly being carried out under a range 
of PPP structures based on the principle of private sector risk taking participation in the provision of 
public infrastructure. (European Investment Bank, 2004: 3). 
INTRODUCTION 
Every now and then a new and fashionable public management reform concept captures the 
attention of public administration scholars and policy practitioners alike. When this coincides with a 
political milieu which is favourable to policy change, it occasionally sets the agenda for widespread 
public sector reforms (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Barzelay & Shvets, 2006). While the New Public 
Management (NPM) was certainly such a concept (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000), so is arguably also the 
notion of public-private partnership (PPP), which now enjoys widespread acclaim in modern public 
administration (Linder, 1999; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005; Ysa, 2007; Hodge & 
Greve, 2007). Based on the idea of collaboration and joint decision-making, the partnership idea has 
been seen as representative of a new generation of new public governance “overcoming the deficits 
of the earlier waves of privatisation and marketisation” (Hammerschmid & Angerer, 2005; see also 
Osborne, 2010). Hence, as argued by Teisman and Klijn (2002: 198), “Partnerships are seen as the 
best way, in the end, to govern the complex relations and interactions in a modern network society”. 
The concept of PPP has been defined in numerous ways, from loose (and somewhat vague) 
conceptualisations including almost any form of public-private interaction to the most narrow 
definitions  of PPPs as contract based relationships specifying in detail the responsibilities and 
obligations of the respective partners (Linder, 1999; Wettenhall, 2003; Weihe, 2005). Perhaps the 
biggest difference in the literature is found between scholars who view PPP as a “language game” 
(Linder, 1999; Hodge & Greve, 2005), and those who think of it as a co-operative institutional 
arrangement involving shared risks, costs, responsibilities, resources and benefits over a long time 
period (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Koppenjan, 2005). Within the 
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institutional perspective on PPP, a further distinction has been drawn between partnerships 
involving loose organisational relationships, as found in issue networks and policy communities, 
and PPPs characterised by tight financial and organisational relationships, as represented by various 
PPP/PFI (Private Finance Initiative) type arrangements (Flinders, 2005; Hodge & Greve, 2005). In 
the latter meaning, a public authority contracts with a private company – a so-called Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) – for various combinations of planning, procurement, construction, finance 
and operation of a major construction or infrastructure facility33. These long-term commercial PPP 
contracts for asset-based public services and infrastructure development are the exclusive focus of 
this paper (Bloomfield, 2006). 
The scholarly literature on PPPs has been rapidly developing over the past ten to fifteen years with 
significant inputs from numerous disciplines, including public administration (Koppenjan, 2005), 
public management (Ysa, 2007), construction management (Koch & Buser, 2006), legal studies 
(Tvarnø, 2006) and accounting (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002), just to mention a few. A large practice-
oriented literature has also emerged, with significant inputs from private consultancy firms (e.g. 
Allen Consulting Group, 2007; Babcock & Brown, 2008), national PPP units (Irish Central PPP 
Unit, 2001; Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2004; HM Treasury, 2006), institutions 
of the EU (European Commission, 2004; EIB, 2005), and international organisations (World Bank, 
2006; IMF, 2006; OECD, 2008). This literature, with a predominance of Anglo-Saxon contributions 
(Hammerschmidt & Angerer, 2005), has to a large extent rehearsed the idea of PPP as a globally 
spread reform trend in public administration (e.g Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Ghobadian et al., 2004; 
Kwak, Chih, Ibbs, 2009). Indeed, the opening quotations describing PPPs as “a very-fashionable 
concept” (Wettenhal, 2003: 77), which “enjoys remarkable acclaim” (Linder, 1999: 35), and “with 
international acceptance” (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007:570), might perhaps lead us to assume 
similarity and convergence in PPP initiatives across countries.  
More recently, however, scholars writing from a central-European and Scandinavian public 
administration tradition have increasingly noted that PPP reform initiatives have not been the same 
everywhere (cf. Greve & Hodge, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos & Hughes, 2007; Petersen, 2010). In some 
cases, governments have enacted comprehensive PPP policies and regulations and signed a 
substantial number of major schemes over the course of the last ten to fifteen years. This group, 
                                                          
33 This form of PPP embraces the alphabet soup of design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM), design-build-
operate (DBO), build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) and build-operate-transfer (BOT) models, which illustrate the 
variety of models that exist under the partnership umbrella. 
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with an Anglo-Saxon and South-European predominance, includes the UK, Australia, Canada, 
Portugal, Spain and, more recently, also Ireland (Irish Ministry of Finance, 2009). A second group 
has also developed relatively comprehensive policy and regulation frameworks to guide and steer 
PPP activity, but signed a smaller number of actual PPP projects. These countries include France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Poland (Babcock & Brown, 2008). Finally, some 
countries have reacted to the PPP concept with much scepticism and formed few or no concrete PPP 
projects. These include Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
some of the new European Union (EU) member states. Thus, in reality, if we look beyond the 
testimonies from a small handful of countries that often display in the literature, we might say that 
national governments’ reform initiatives for PPPs is in fact a highly divergent phenomenon across 
various national institutional settings. 
In this paper, I attempt to make a contribution to the understanding of these vast differences in 
national modes adopting the PPP reform trend, with a focus Danish and Irish PPP experiences. The 
paper’s explanandum is authoritative decisions about policy and regulation for PPP made by 
government departments and agencies entrusted with the formal authority to formulate and oversee 
the national regime for PPPs. The focus is on system-wide decisions, i.e. decisions that are relevant 
for the whole or for most of the regime, as opposed to regulations and processes found within a 
single department or agency (see also Barzelay & Shvets, 2006). In line with previous research (for 
example Hodge, 2004; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), decisions in the policy and regulation 
framework are seen as constitutive elements that tap into and set the general conditions for the 
realisation of concrete PPPs. The analysis thus focuses on the national policy level of PPPs, which 
means that the focus is not on the project level decisions for PPP as such, although the underlying 
assumption for the paper is that the policy/regulatory context will play a significant role in 
facilitation or in hindering the actual use of PPPs: the observation that many more PPP projects 
have been carried out in Ireland than in Denmark supports this assumption (see below).  
The importance of studying PPPs in a comparative way arises both from an interest in 
understanding their similarities and differences and from an interest in the fundamental question as 
to why governments resort to PPPs in the first place (Hodge & Greve, 2005). Public administration 
scholarship has recently taken seminal steps towards developing comparative approaches to the 
study of public policy and public management reform (Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; 
Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg, 2007). A significant contribution to this 
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endeavour has been made by Michael Barzelay and associates (e.g. Barzelay 2001; Barzelay et al 
2003; Gaetani 2003) under the prescription of ‘Institutional Processualism’, for the research 
programme’s focus on policy processes and institutions in the study of public policy-making 
(Barzelay & Gallego 2006). In this paper, I utilise this comparative research combined with 
Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework to study PPP policy and regulation in a comparative 
way.34 The paper addresses the following research questions: How did PPP policies and regulations 
develop, and how did they come to differ so significantly across countries which are similar in a 
number of other dimensions? These questions are examined in a comparative case study of the 
development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland over a ten year period from 1999 
to 2009. The empirical material utilised in the paper has been drawn from a number of sources, 
including in-depth expert interviews with key organisational representatives (both public and 
private), a large amount of written material stored in a database, and Eurostat archive data 
containing key economic figures for the two countries (see Appendixes 1-3). 
The comparative interest in Denmark and Ireland is sparked by their display of similarity on a 
number of dimensions, while the two cases differ on the outcome variable of PPP policies and 
regulations. Both countries are small open economies with a population of respectively 5.5 and 4.3 
million inhabitants, and both are members of the EU, which makes them subject to a common set of 
regulations in relation to public procurement and on/off-balance sheet accounting and risk 
principles of risk sharing in PPPs (Eurostat, 2004; see also Petersen, 2010). Moreover, both 
countries were late adopters of broader privatisation measures, and they both officially launched 
PPPs in 1999. However, whereas Ireland has embraced PPPs and developed a comprehensive 
policy and regulation framework to support the implementation of PPP schemes across a broad 
range of procurement sectors, Denmark has been a sceptic and has only reluctantly developed 
policy and regulation in this area (Petersen, 2009). As a result of this, Ireland now counts around 70 
major PPP schemes in various phases of planning and operation, thereby making the Irish PPP 
programme one of the most ambitious in the world when taking size into consideration (compare 
                                                          
34 It should be noted that Barzelay’s approach has been presented in several papers and has been developed over time. 
Thus, in 2003 (Barzelay et al., 2003), it was merely a methodological heuristic for ordering case evidence, whereas in 
2006 (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006), it was developed into an integrated analytical approach. In this paper, I primarily 
utilise Barzelay in the former way - as a methodological heuristic for ordering the case evidence - whereas Kingdon’s 
framework (1995) provides the theoretical inputs to the analysis. This also means that in this paper I do not make use of 
Baumgartner & Jones (1993) and Levitt and March (1988), which Barzelay and Gallego (2006) combine with Kingdon 
(1995). This choice has been made to limit the number of theoretical concepts in the subsequent case analysis, and in 
line with this I therefore do not claim to apply the full version of ‘Institutional Processualism’ in this paper, but rather 
an abridged version of this research programme.  
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with the UK’s 59 million inhabitants). In Denmark, on the contrary, PPP policy and regulation has 
developed slowly and there are just five PPP schemes in the country to show for it and a few are 
being planned (Petersen & Vrangbæk, 2010). By analysing Danish and Irish PPP cases 
comparatively, the paper reveals two highly contrasting national accounts of PPP government-wide 
PPP policies and regulations, which I suggest could form an inspiration point for future, 
comparative PPP research.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical framework, drawing on Kingdon’s 
(1995) multiple streams model to study public policy-making. Method and research design is then 
presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present case studies into how PPP policy and regulation in 
Denmark and Ireland, respectively, developed over the ten year period from 1999-2009. These 
insights are, in Section 6, analysed through the lens of the multiple streams model to explain the 
differences between Denmark and Ireland’s PPP policies and regulation. Finally, in Section 7, a 
conclusion to the paper is provided. 
ANALYSING PPP POLICY AND REGULATION: A MULTIPLE STREAMS  
MODEL OF PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING  
The need to look at the policy and regulation aspects of PPPs has been identified by several 
scholars, such as Klijn and Teisman (2003), Ysa (2007) and Greve and Hodge (2010). However, 
most studies have hitherto been preoccupied with the performance of PPPs (e.g. Pollitt, 2005; 
Pollock & Price, 2008), technical/legal aspects (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Bing et al., 2005; 
Tvarnø, 2006), and conceptual/historical discussions (Linder, 1999; Wettenhall, 2003; Weihe, 
2005), but have generally been less attentive to broader policy and regulation issues of PPPs 
(although see Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Flinders, 2005). Furthermore, studies dealing with policy 
and regulation issues of PPPs have typically operated with single country research designs (cf. 
Spackman, 2002; Reeves, 2003; Deakin, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Flinders, 2005; 
Koppenjan, 2005; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007), whereas comparative approaches are generally 
rare in this field of research (although for a few notable exceptions; see Greve & Hodge, 2007; 
McQuaid & Scherrer, 2010).  
We know from the comparative public administration literature on NPM and post-NPM that we 
should not expect a global convergence on a common and uniform reform idea or concept (cf. 
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Barzelay, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Christensen & Lægreid, 
2007). This literature sees public sector reforms as shaped by a complex mix of national policy 
features, environmental pressures and historical and institutional context (Pollitt, Thiel and 
Homburg, 2007). Other attempts at analysing and classifying public sector developments at national 
level include distinct welfare state approaches (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or differing models of 
capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001). In a more practice-oriented way, the OECD’s PUMA project 
and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators can also be seen as attempts to categorise and 
compare public sector developments at the national level. These macro-approaches, however, have 
been contested for presenting oversimplified and static pictures, while paying too little attention to 
the actors, interests and policy processes in which specific national trajectories of public policy-
making and regulation are formed and implemented (Deakin, 2002). 
In order to understand how and why PPP policy and regulation developed – and thus account for 
their similarities and differences in Denmark and Ireland – I will argue that we need to examine 
how PPPs were raised on the decision agendas of various policy actors and inspect how concrete 
decisions about PPP policy and regulation were taken in the two countries. Towards this endeavour, 
I draw on John Kingdon’s multiple streams model (1995), a political science model of public policy 
making, which is supplemented by Michael Barzelay’s event-centred approach to public 
management policy-change (Barzelay et al., 2003). Kingdon’s model was originally developed to 
understand the process of agenda-setting and seeking alternatives, and a number of scholars have 
subsequently argued that this model can also be utilised for analysis of the decision-making phase 
in policy-making (Zahariades, 1999; Barzelay & Gallego, 2006; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007). 
The model focuses on how the process is organised, and the implications of this for opening 
‘policy-windows’ at particular points in time. It also focuses on the role of bounded rational policy 
entrepreneurs, although it has been critisised for not always being clear about their roles within the 
respective process streams (Sabatier, 1999: 5; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007).  
Kingdon’s model, with its focus on the flow and timing of policy decisions, is useful for examining 
the complexities of public policy-making and regulation. Drawing on the garbage can model of 
organisational behavior (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972), it basically conceives policy making as 
characterised by ambiguity and bounded rationality (Zahariadis, 1999). By this token it offers a 
model of the policy process that is significantly more complex and less neat than the classic stages 
model of policy-making (Lasswell, 1956; DeLeon, 1999). The multiple streams model emphasises 
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the importance of three separate and distinct streams: a problem stream, a policy stream and a 
politics stream.  
The problem stream is where a given situation is identified and formulated as a problem or issue 
that calls for political attention. A crisis or unforeseen event may arise; indicators might change, 
thus calling for changes in policies; or feedback from existing programmes may indicate that action 
is needed (Kingdon, 1995:ch. 5). The perception of a situation as unwanted and within human 
capacity to control or change it is therefore a prerequisite for it to rise on the agenda. But rather than 
being a rational process, in which various issues are analysed and listed according to objective 
criteria, the problem stream is characterised by an ongoing battle between various issues which 
cause it to capture the attention of people around the policy-making process (Zahariadis, 1999). 
The policy stream is where ideas and alternatives float around, waiting to be turned into policy 
alternatives and proposals. Kingdon also refers to this second stream as the policy primeval soup 
(1995: 116), referring to the time before life when molecules floated around with an infinite number 
of possible combinations possible. Ideas are often developed and combined by experts and 
specialists in policy communities, whereas at other times ideas which are unrelated to these expert 
communities come to the fore. To be taken as serious alternatives, ideas must be technically 
feasible, but the logic is not necessarily rational in a narrow instrumental sense. Policy proposals are 
not necessarily built to resolve predefined problems; rather, the logic is quite the opposite. These 
proposals float around searching for problems in the problem stream to which they can be tied, and 
if such a coupling is successful, the chances that this issue will arise in prominence on the decision 
agenda are enhanced (Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007). 
The political stream comes third in the model, and although it operates separately from the other 
two streams, political events in this stream can reshuffle the environment in which problems and 
policies battle for attention. Examples of political events are swings of national moods, political 
turnover of governments or parliaments, and interest group pressure, all of which can cause certain 
issues and policies to rise or fall on the decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995). Bargaining over 
alternatives rather than persuasion characterises the political stream, and more attention is directed 
at obtaining winning coalitions than to assessment of the specific consequences of certain 
alternatives and policies. Thus, bounded rationality is also a precondition in this stream (Brunner, 
2008).  
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As previously mentioned, the three streams are separate and distinct with their own logics, 
dynamics and dominant actors. But occasionally, the three streams meet and a problem is linked 
with a feasible solution that is salient in the political environment (Zahariadis, 2003). When this 
coupling takes place, it increases the likelihood of an issue rising on the decision agenda and 
turning into a decision – a policy, that is. For example, supporters of a given PPP policy may use a 
political context that is prone to market-based solutions in the public sector, while claiming that 
they present a solution to an existing problem of financing essential infrastructure development. If 
such a coupling is successful, a policy window opens, which makes a decision feasible (Kingdon, 
1995; Travis & Zahariadis, 2002). However, policy-windows can be unforeseeable, and they can 
close again without any decisions being taken if policy-entrepreneurs are not successful in coupling 
the problem to a feasible solution that can be supported by the political environment. This makes 
the policy process inherently ambiguous and dependent upon the temporal coupling of the three 
process streams (Zahariadis, 1999).  
The notion of three separate streams that each work on their own terms provides a useful framework 
for conducting analysis of the development of PPP policy and regulation, because it stresses that in 
order to foster policy-change, policy-entrepreneurs must couple a problem with a policy-solution, 
but also invoke support for the idea within the broader political stream. It should be kept in mind, 
though, that Kingdon’s model was originally developed to explain major policy change within a 
North-American two-party system with changing majority rule of a single party, whereas policy-
making in Denmark and Ireland is characterised by shifting coalition governments, which may 
render policy-change more incremental here than in the US system. Several scholars have illustrated 
the usefulness of the multiple streams model for a European context (cf. Zahariadis & Allen, 1995; 
Zahariades, 2003; Bundgaard & Vrangbæk, 2007; Brunner, 2008), and for the analysis of more 
incremental policy-change as well (Travis & Zahariades, 2002). The general points about attention 
as a limited resource and the temporality/timing as key features of policy-change thus seem relevant 
in a European setting too, although in the present cases I would expect a more incremental policy-
change than the “irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and our society, pushing aside 
everything that might stand in its path”, which was originally envisaged by Kingdon (1995:1). In 
the below, I discuss how I use Barzelay’s event centered approach as a structuring device for 
keeping track of events and contextual factors that can influence the three process streams (Barzelay 
et al., 2003).  
188 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Creation of a proper data set on ten years of development of PPP policy and regulation in two 
countries required triangulation of data from a number of sources (Peters, 1998). First, primary 
documents were collected for all years in the period from 1999-2009. For the relatively simple two-
country comparative setup of this very paper, this exercise involved the collection and reading of 
around 140 documents including policy statements, guideline material, legislation, government 
reports, legal framework contracts, etc. (see appendix 2 and 3 for an overview of the sources). In 
order to organise the material, all documents were stored in a database according to type of 
document, responsible authority and date of publication. The primary documents were used to 
establish a detailed picture of the central policy initiatives and regulations enacted for PPPs in 
Denmark and Ireland, respectively, and furthermore provided for a first, and rather rough, 
interpretation of the processes whereby PPP policy and regulation developed in the two countries.  
Next, to establish a detailed account of the policy processes, sequences of events, negotiations, and 
conflicts, several rounds of expert interviews were held35. In Ireland, face-to-face interviews were 
carried out in Dublin with the Central PPP Unit under the Ministry of Finance, the National Roads 
Authority, the National Development Finance Agency, and the Department of Education and 
Science in Tullamore. To supplement these official accounts, further interviews were conducted 
with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Irish Business Confederation, in Dublin, and with 
the consultancy firm Ernst & Young, in Belfast. A parallel round of interviews was held in 
Copenhagen with the Danish government’s PPP Competence Unit, the Tax Agency, the Ministry 
for Transport, and the Ministry of Finance. Here also, supplementary sources were interviewed, 
including Local Government Denmark, the Confederation of Danish Industry, the Danish Chamber 
of Commerce, the Danish Construction Association, and the Danish Transport and Logistics 
Association. All interviews were held face-to-face, and were taped to allow further coding and 
interpretation. Finally, in addition to primary documents and expert interviews, statistical measures 
of government fiscal key aggregates were sampled in order to establish an understanding of the 
economic background settings for introducing PPP policies in the two countries. For this purpose, 
                                                          
35 Interviews varied from approximately 60 minutes to 90 minutes. 
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the Statistical Office of the European Community (Eurostat) was sourced for comparative statistics 
on government key fiscal indicators (see appendix 1)36.
In the subsequent process of data analysis, the interviews were used to fine-tune the initial 
interpretations established from the primary documents. In order to structure the case evidence in a 
systematic fashion, in this paper I draw on a specific conceptual framework and methodological 
guide for event-centred case study research developed by Michael Barzelay et al. (2003), which is 
presented in Figure 1. 
  Figure 1. Barzelay’s heuristic for ordering case material.  
Source: Barzelay et al. (2003:25). 
The primary object of analysis is denominated as the episode. The current paper contains two 
episodes, which are the development of policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland, respectively, 
in the period from 1999-2009. Each episode is constituted by a number of events, that is, specific 
decisions about policy and regulation for PPPs. Furthermore, to contextualize and explain the 
episode, the concepts of prior events and contemporaneous events are introduced. Prior events 
occur before the primary object of study, the episode, and provide the background settings for 
studying the episode. Politico-economic background settings are for example prior events that 
condition the episode. Contemporaneous events occur in the same time setting as the episode, and 
are events that are not part of the episode but influence the events constituting the episode. Change 
in the political elite is an example of a contemporaneous event. Jointly, prior and contemporaneous 
events are sources of explanans for the episode (Barzelay et al., 2003), and they are used to provide 
                                                          
36http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORT
AL, searched on 23 March 2009.  
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theory-based explanations of Denmark and Ireland’s developments of PPP policy and regulation. 
Further, related events occur in the same time frame as the episode, but are more affected by the 
episode than vice-versa. Concrete PPP projects, as signed by various national, regional or local 
public authorities, are examples of such related events. Finally, later events designate events that 
happen after the episode, which means that including the later events is merely relevant in the study 
of historic episodes, as noted by Barzelay et al.: “Later events are sometimes included in the study 
frame for purposes of exploring the contemporary relevance of historical episodes” (2003: 24 [italic 
in original]). Hence, in this paper, where my focus is on explaining differences and similarities in 
the development of PPP policy and regulation with a focus on the present episode, the consequence 
is that I pay less attention to the later and related events in Barzelay’s model (see also Figure 2 and 
3 below).
To sum up, in this paper I utilise Barzelay’s heuristic as a structuring device, which is useful for 
keeping track of contextual factors that can influence the policy development. This is combined 
with Kingdon’s framework for the analysis of agenda-setting, alternative seeking and policy-
making. The specific method of the paper is thus to analyse episodes (a series of policy decisions 
about PPPs within the time frame of the study) as a consequence of the successful temporal 
coupling by policy-entrepreneurs of the problem, policy and politics streams. In the following, I 
first outline the two case studies utilising Barzelay’s event-centred method. This provides a detailed 
overview of the episodes, contemporaneous and prior events in the two cases. Next, I apply 
Kingdon’s multiple streams model to examine the coupling of the streams and the role of policy-
entrepreneurs in the development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland in the 
period from 1999-2009.  
CASE 1: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DENMARK’S PPP POLICY AND REGULATION 
The episode
The concept of PPPs was launched in Denmark in 1999 by the social-democratic government 
headed by then Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Danish Ministry of Finance, 1999). In the 
subsequent five years, from 1999-2004, a few government reports mentioned PPP as a means with 
which to invest in large-scale physical infrastructure projects (Danish Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs, 2002, 2003), but no concrete policies or regulations were formulated, and no 
money was earmarked for projects. Then, in January 2004, the Danish government launched its 
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Action Plan for Public-Private Partnerships listing ten concrete initiatives to support PPPs in 
Denmark (Danish Government, 2004). Among these initiatives were a universal PPP testing 
requirement, the establishment of a PPP Competence Unit under the Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs and the launch of seven PPP pilot projects. The PPP Action Plan also included 
amendments to the state building legislation requiring that all construction projects above a 
threshold limit of app. €13 million be tested for PPP relevance. Furthermore, the local government 
sector was given financial support for the testing of PPP projects, and a special pool of money was 
set up to relieve local municipalities from a complicated set of budget restrictions on construction 
type projects (Danish Government, 2004).  
   
The government’s Action Plan for PPP thus encompassed a broad span and introduced a number of 
new initiatives, legislation and a dedicated PPP institution. But in reality the government was in fact 
ambivalent towards PPPs and, in a number of important aspects, overtly sceptical that PPP would in 
fact deliver value for money. Too see how this was the case, we need only to scratch slightly at the 
surface of the policy rhetoric of the government’s PPP Action Plan. The effect of the legislative 
amendment that introduced a universal testing requirement was in fact very limited because it only 
applied to construction type projects (buildings), whereas the infrastructure area was exempted 
(Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority, 2004). Furthermore, the testing requirement only 
applied to the central government sector, whereas the local municipalities and the regions, which in 
Denmark have the responsibility for central welfare areas including primary education, childcare, 
environmental planning and local roads, were exempted from this.   
   
Regulations were thus in reality much vaguer than the pro-PPP policy rhetoric of the Action Plan 
indicated, and the testing requirement was far from universal. Examining further the role and 
competencies of the Danish PPP Competence Unit, we see that contrary to countries such as the 
UK, Ireland, and Netherlands, where PPP units have been set up under the Department of Finance, 
the Danish equivalent was set up in the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Being 
traditionally the little brother to the Danish Ministry of Finance in most public sector reform issues, 
this institutional anchorage meant that the PPP Competence Unit was from the outset limited in its 
ability to coordinate government initiatives. Somewhat paradoxically, in the inter-departmental 
group on PPPs, which was created to coordinate policy initiatives across government departments, 
the Ministry of Finance leads the group. Furthermore, when scrutinising the seven PPP pilot 
projects, the fact is that only one project has been signed (the Danish National Archive), whereas 
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four pilot projects have been dismissed and two projects are at various stages of planning, but have 
not proceeded to the procurement phase. A close reading of the government’s Action Plan reveals 
that the seven pilot projects were only to be tested for PPP relevance, and that it was not decided 
how many – if any – of the projects would in fact be carried out under a PPP scheme (Danish 
Government, 2004). The success rate for the government’s PPP pilot projects has been very low – 
only one of seven projects has been signed – and with a total number of four projects signed and 
two under preparation, the total deal-flow must be characterised as very modest. 
   
What this short review of the episode demonstrates is that after the introduction of PPP in a Danish 
context in 1999, the Danish government did in fact take no concrete policy or regulatory decisions 
for the next five years. When, in 2004, the PPP Action Plan was introduced, it indicated the Danish 
government’s serious commitment to a pro-PPP policy programme, but scratching at the surface of 
this policy rhetoric demonstrates that initiatives were in fact less ambitious. Regulatory 
ambivalence prevailed and competencies were split between the Ministry of Economic and 
Business Affairs, which has acted as a pro-PPP player, and the Ministry of Finance, which is much 
more sceptical towards PPP. This split between the two major departments is reflected in the 
institutional set-up of the Danish regime for PPPs, where the Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs hosts the PPP Competence Unit while the Ministry of Finance presides over the inter-
departmental PPP group.  
Prior and contemporaneous events 
What were the background settings for the introduction of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark? 
To answer this question, prior and contemporaneous events must be carefully examined (Barzelay 
et. al., 2003). Recall from the methodological section that prior and contemporaneous events are 
sources of explanans of the episode. Starting with the contemporaneous events, one of the often 
presented merits of the PPP model is that private capital investment in PPP relieves government 
spending burdens37. But logically, this argument would be more valid in contexts where the state of 
the economy imposes serious limits on government spending, whereas strong public finances and 
budget surpluses on the other hand would make private investment less of an incentive to 
governments.  
                                                          
37 When the UK introduced its PFI program in 1992 the explicit purpose was to attract private capital investment. 
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Total government debt and annual government deficit/surplus provide two commonly used 
measures of a country’s economic condition, and are also two central criteria underlying the 
Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union38. These two fiscal indicators 
respectively provide a measure of long-term and short-term budget performance, and thus a 
measure of the Danish government’s capacity for publicly financing major physical investment 
projects in the period under examination. Drawing on data from the European Commission’s 
statistical office (Eurostat), it becomes very clear that the Danish government’s need to rely on 
private capital to finance major investments has been negligible. In the period from 1997 to 2009, 
Denmark’s government sector produced an average annual surplus of 1.8 percent measured against 
GDP, compared to an EU-15 average of -2.2 percent in the same period (Eurostat, 2010). Also, 
Denmark’s general government debt was brought down from 65.2 percent in 1997 to 26.2 percent 
in 2007 (it thereafter rose to 41.6 percent in 2009 as a result of the global economic crisis, which 
compares to an EU-15 average of 79.0 percent in 2009 - see appendix 1).  
So both short- and long term fiscal indicators suggest that the private finance element of PPP would 
never have been much of an issue in Denmark, an interpretation that is supported in all interviews 
conducted for the purposes of this paper. The Danish government in its Action Plan for PPP put it 
very clearly by stating that ‘PPP is not an end in itself (....) PPP shall only be employed to support 
effective and good projects, not as a means of financial speculation’ (Danish government, 2004:12). 
Some major infrastructure projects that could potentially have been commenced as PPPs, including 
the Great Belt Bridge, the Oresund Bridge, and the Copenhagen Metro, were all financed as state-
owned companies backed by state guarantees. So a number of the prior and contemporaneous 
events were not particularly favourable to a large-scale adoption of the PPP model in Denmark. 
Another important contemporaneous event that pointed towards more use of PPP in Denmark was 
the change in the political elite, when the social-democratic government was replaced in December 
2001 by a liberal-conservative government led by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. A 
keystone in this third-way inspired policy programme was reliance on market-based solutions as the 
means with which to increase the quality and value-for-money of public welfare services (Danish 
Government, 2001, 2003). This shift in the political elite established a majority in the Danish 
Parliament officially in favour of contracting out and privatisation, but it was the introduction of so-
                                                          
38 Though Denmark has so far decided not to join the Euro, it has committed itself to these fiscal stability criteria. 
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called free choice – a right to choose between public and private delivery of welfare services – that 
was most dominant in the policy programme (Danish Government, 2001, 2003).  
While a change in the political elite brought in a government generally in favour of market-based 
solutions and private involvement in public sector activities, another high profile contemporaneous 
event sent shockwaves through the political establishment. In the late 1990s and into the 2000s 
Denmark witnessed a massive local government scandal in the small municipality of Farum, a 
suburb of Copenhagen (see also Greve, 2003). The mayor, who had for years been praised as an 
entrepreneur and visionary in inventing market-based solutions, was brought before a court accused 
of fraud with public money and was later imprisoned. Farum had sold a number of public assets as 
so-called sale-and-lease-back arrangements, where private partners buy public assets and deliver the 
service for 20-30 years subject to an annual payment by the municipality. This practice released 
substantial amounts of money that the mayor of Farum would invest in new projects such as sports 
facilities, housing, etc.  
However, central government regulations require that money released via leasing arrangements is 
reserved and can only be released gradually. This is to prevent large fluctuations in total public 
sector spending from year to year due to such leasing arrangements. Though by no means directly 
related to PPPs, the gigantic public outcry created by the case led to a more general scepticism 
towards private finance models among government regulatory authorities. In the aftermath of the 
scandal, the regulation of local government procurement of PPP projects was amended in a way that 
made it overtly difficult for local municipalities to enter into PPP deals39. Although Danish business 
and industry confederations have occasionally voiced criticism of the government’s inaction within 
this policy area, for most of the time these organisations have not been taking a role as policy 
entrepreneurs in the same active way as has been seen in the Irish case (see below). Figure 2 
summarises the central events in the development of Denmark’s PPP policy and regulation. 
                                                          
39 For a more lengthy presentation of the details of this case see Petersen (2010a).  
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Figure 2. The development of Denmark’s policy and regulation for PPPs. 
Note: Prior Events (PE), Contemporaneous Events (CE), Events constituting the episode (E), Related Events (RE), 
Later Events (LE).40
CASE 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRELAND’S PPP POLICY AND REGULATION 
The episode 
The official launch of PPPs in Ireland can also be dated back to 1999, when the Irish Minister for 
Finance, Charlie McGreevy, announced eight pilot projects to be commenced as PPPs (Irish 
Government, 1999). These initiatives spanned across different sectors, including two school 
projects, one public transportation scheme, four road projects, and a waste treatment plant (Reeves, 
2003). Institutional support for the Irish government’s PPP programme was given via the 
establishment of the Central PPP Unit in the Ministry of Finance, and furthermore, of an Inter-
departmental Group on PPPs coordinating policies and regulations amongst government 
departments and agencies, and an Informal Advisory Group for informal talks with business 
confederations, trade unions, and non-profit organisations (Irish Government, 2001). The 
government’s institutional underpinning of the PPP programme was strongly centred around the 
Ministry of Finance’s Central PPP Unit which heads both the Inter-departmental Group and the 
                                                          
40 As previously mentioned, I focus in this paper on the development of PPP policy and regulation from 1999-2009, 
which means that later events are not my focus.  
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Informal Advisory Group on PPPs. Already in 1998, Irish industry was actively pushing for a 
national PPP strategy, and in January 1998 the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) 
and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) made a joint submission to the Irish Government 
proposing the use of PPPs in the country (IBEC & CIF, 1998). The aim of the joint submission 
from IBEC and CIT was to persuade the Irish Government of the merits of PPPs, and later the same 
year it was followed up by an additional submission to the government.  
The Irish government further endorsed PPPs in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2000-2006 
(Irish Government, 1999). The plan launched investments in PPP projects far beyond the level 
indicated in the initial list of PPP pilot projects. The NDP set a minimum €2.35 billion target for 
PPP activities under the €22.3 billion total investments plan (Irish Government, 1999). The Irish 
government’s commitment to the PPP model was thus from the outset backed by earmarked money 
for projects, and in 2001 the Irish Ministry of Finance could report that 134 PPP projects were at 
various stages of planning. This number was subsequently lowered when the Central PPP Unit 
decided only to include projects with an estimated capital value of more than €20 million in the 
accounting. As of April 2009, a total number of 69 PPP projects are reported to be at various stages 
of planning and procurement (Irish Ministry of Finance, 2009). 
The Irish government’s approach to PPPs has to a large extent been a gradual effort to centralise 
competencies in a few central government departments. In 2002 the Irish government introduced 
the ‘State Authorities (Public Private Partnership Arrangements) Act 2002’ that laid down a legal 
framework for state authorities and local authorities to enter into PPP deals (Irish Government, 
2002a). Besides clarifying the legal basis for public partners to enter into PPPs with private 
partners, the Act removed the ability of local government to act independently when entering into 
PPP deals (Irish Government, 2002a). A further centralisation of the Irish PPP programme took 
place with the establishment of the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) (Irish 
Government, 2002b). The NDFA, functioning from 1 January 2003, was to advise state authorities 
on the optimal financing of public investment projects, hereunder PPP projects, in order to achieve 
value-for-money for the public sector. State authorities mentioned in the ‘National Development 
Finance Agency Act 2002’ were hereafter obliged to seek the advice of the NDFA when planning 
major public investment projects, but it was still voluntary for state authorities to follow the 
recommendations.  
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This latitude was removed in 2005 when the NDFA was given the authority to procure and enter 
into PPP contracts on behalf of other state authorities. The NDFA subsequently hands over the 
projects to the relevant authority after the PPP contract has been procured and signed and the 
project has become operational (e.g. construction is finished) (Irish Government, 2007a). The 
NDFA thus changed its role from advisor to primary procurer of Irish PPP projects. Exempt from 
this Act are the roads and rail sectors as well as the local government sectors, where procurement is 
undertaken by the National Roads Authority (NRA), the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA), and 
the Department for Environment, Heritage and Local Government, respectively.  
What this short presentation demonstrates is that the Irish PPP programme has developed quite 
differently from the Danish case. Eight PPP pilot projects were announced from the outset, and 
earmarked money was dedicated to PPP in the National Development Plan 2000-2006. Institutional 
underpinnings of the PPP program were established at an early stage, and centred in the Central 
PPP Unit under the Ministry of Finance. Business federations and trade unions played an active 
role, and the voices were heard with the set-up of the Information Advisory Group. We have also 
seen that the development of Ireland’s PPP programme has been marked by a gradual move towards 
more centralised competencies and procurement functions, and with clear restrictions on the 
leverage of other authorities to enter into PPP deals.  
Prior and contemporaneous events 
Starting with the prior events, the introduction of PPP in Ireland took place against a rather complex 
politico-economic background. ‘Once the sick man of Europe’ (Reeves, 2003:163), Ireland entered 
the 1990s as one of EU’s least affluent economies. Though insignificant compared to the total size 
of national budgets, EU funds provide a significant source of capital investment for specific projects 
in less affluent regions of the EU. Throughout the 1990s Ireland relied heavily on EU Structural and 
Cohesion Funds as an additional source of financing the much needed investment in the country’s 
physical infrastructure, which had long suffered from systematic under-investment (Reeves, 2003).  
The Irish government estimates to have received a total of €17 billion from EU funds from 
accession to the EU in 1973 up until 2003 (National Development Plan, 2009), and in the ten years 
from 1989 to 1999 leading up to the episode,  €11 billion was transferred from EU funds, much of 
which was invested in physical infrastructure. However, a decade of economic fortunes throughout 
the 1990s, and a general redistribution of EU funds in the late 1990s as the EU faced the eastern 
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enlargement, significantly reduced Ireland’s share of EU funds from 2000 onwards. Accordingly, 
Ireland’s share of EU funds was reduced to approximately €4 billion under the NDP 2000-2006, 
and further to an estimated total of €3 billion under the current NDP 2007-2013 (Irish Government, 
2007b: 16). So by the late 1990s, the Irish government was looking for alternative ways of 
financing investments in a physical infrastructure that, despite recent investment, was still 
considered to be underdeveloped. 
One alternative would be to finance projects via the Irish government’s purse – the so-called 
Exchequer. Assessing the feasibility of this option by using the same short- and long-term fiscal 
indicators as in the Danish case, we see that the Irish economy also experienced better times than 
the EU-average during this period (although the economic crisis has changed this: see appendix 1). 
In the period from 1998 to 2007 (latest data before the crisis), Ireland’s state sector produced an 
average annual surplus of 1.7 percent measured against GDP (compared to an average of -2.2 
percent in the Euro area). Moreover, in the same period, Ireland’s general government debt was 
brought down from 64.3 percent in 1997 to 24.9 percent in 2007, and after that it rose to 64.0 
percent in 2009 (EU-15 at 79.0 percent in 2009) (Eurostat 2010)41. So, whereas the falling shares of 
EU-funds in combination with an urgent need to upgrade the country’s physical infrastructure 
prepared the ground for private finance investments through PPP projects, Ireland’s government 
budgets displayed larger surpluses than most other EU countries (except for the major setbacks 
during the crisis in 2008 and 2009).  
Nonetheless, the need for further investments in physical infrastructure and public buildings was 
recognised by the Irish government in the National Development Plan 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 
(Irish Government, 1999, 2007b). The high political salience towards the issue reflects a more 
general public dissatisfaction with congestion and the state of the infrastructure. But the 
introduction and development of Ireland’s PPP regime must also be seen against the backdrop of 
another contemporaneous event, namely the active pro-PPP lobbying from Irish business. To 
understand the impact of this contemporaneous event fully, we need to assess Ireland’s Social 
Partnership Agreements which date back to 1987 (Irish government, 2003). In these agreements, 
each in place for three years, the government, employers, trade unions, farming organisations and 
the non-profit sectors reaches a consensus on major political issues for Ireland such as macro-
                                                          
41 The effect of the financial crisis is not yet shown in the available data, but already in 2007 the Irish government 
headed towards a zero, and the Danish government expects deficits in 2009. 
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economic policies, wage settlement, public service quality, workplace relations, etc. (Irish 
Government, 2003). So when in 2001 the Irish government and partners from business and labour 
agreed on a Framework For Public Private Partnerships (Irish Government, 2001), it reaffirmed the 
Irish social partnership tradition and laid down some basic principles - rules of the game - guiding 
the further conduct of PPP policy and regulation in Ireland. Figure 3 summarises the main events in 
the development of Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation framework.  
Figure 3. The development of Ireland’s policy and regulation for PPPs 
Note: Prior Events (PE), Contemporaneous Events (CE), Events constituting the episode (E), Related Events (RE), and 
Later Events (LE). 
COUPLING THE STREAMS: POLICY WINDOWS, POLICY  
ENTREPRENEURS AND POLICY VETO-PLAYERS  
It became evident in the case study section that the episodes evolved quite differently in Denmark 
and Ireland. Drawing on the multiple streams model, the following pages link the episodes with 
prior and contemporaneous events to examine how and why Denmark and Ireland developed such 
different policies and regulations for PPPs. I distinguish in the following between the decisions that 
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CE3: Social Partnership Agreement, proactive PPP lobbying 
E1 1999: Introduction of PPP policy with eight pilot projects
E2 1999 Setup of formal and informal Groups and Central PPP 
E3 2001: NDP further supports PPP and sets out earmarked money
E6 2005: NDFA Act further centralises procurement authority
E5 2002: Public Private Partnership Arrangements Act lays out legal 
framework and centralises decisions about local government PPPs 
RE1: Significant deal flow: around 70 projects in various stages 
E4 2001: Framework for Public-Private Partnerships
PE1: EU funds 
major source of 
physical 
infrastructure 
development 
LE1: Later 
policy and 
regulation 
decisions for 
PPPs 
LE2: 
Formation 
of further 
PPP projects  
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led to the introduction of PPPs in Denmark and Ireland, and the subsequent decisions that led the 
two countries to further develop their PPP policies and regulation frameworks in different ways. 
Denmark 1999-2003: The policy window remains closed 
The Danish case displays a political stream and a problem stream that for a number of reasons were 
not very favourable to a large scale adoption of PPPs in the late 1990s. Neither prior nor 
contemporaneous events made the private finance element of PPP a particularly attractive argument 
due to the fact that the Danish government was able to finance projects out of the public purse – and 
as a matter of fact did so. Denmark witnessed a continuous and high level of economic growth 
throughout the period (PE1 and CE1 of figure 2), and in contrast to Ireland, EU funds had never 
been a substantial source of finance in the development of the country’s infrastructure. Furthermore, 
Denmark’s physical infrastructure was relatively developed with more need for minor and medium-
scale renovations and maintenance rather than the erection of a great deal of new infrastructure 
(PE2), and a number of major potential PPP projects in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as the Belt 
Bridges and the Copenhagen Metro, had in fact been financed by public money (PE3). So the 
concept of PPP never really arose on the agenda in the problem stream. 
The political environment was to some extent reshuffled when the liberal-conservative government 
assumed office in late 2001 with a pro-marketisation policy programme (CE2). In reality, however, 
the new government eventually came to focus more on traditional contracting out and free choice 
than on partnerships. In the policy stream, the Ministry of Finance was the single authority 
considering the potential use of PPPs in Denmark, but the interviews carried out for this research 
demonstrate that the ministry was indeed quite sceptical towards the PPP model. So there was no 
policy entrepreneur actively pushing PPP on the decision agenda, and as private investments in 
physical infrastructure never became a serious issue in the problem stream, the three streams were 
never coupled in a sufficient way to facilitate a substantial decision. The Ministry of Finance, being 
traditionally a very strong public sector modernisation policy entrepreneur, chose to introduce the 
PPP model in one of the last chapters of a budget report read by few people outside government. 
Interestingly, the decision to publish a chapter on PPP came completely out of the policy stream 
with no link to either the problem or politics streams. The launch of PPP in 1999 in this sense 
mostly resembled a symbolic decision rather than a substantial one leading to policy and regulation 
for the use of PPPs in Denmark. As we have seen, no concrete initiatives were taken and no projects 
launched at this stage (E1), and the policy window remained closed until early 2004. 
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Denmark 2004-2009: Policy entrepreneurs, veto-players, and a half-open policy window 
How, then, can the decisions taken by the Danish government when launching the PPP Action Plan 
in January 2004, be explained? To understand this, we must examine the fundamental change of 
roles that took place in the policy stream in the years between 1999 and 2004. After 1999, the 
Ministry of Finance gradually stepped back from the PPP agenda whereas the Ministry of Economic 
and Business Affairs stepped up to actively endorse PPPs in official documents and publications. 
By this underlying shift of roles, the Ministry of Finance’s scepticism towards the long-term 
financial effects of PPPs gradually changed the its role into an influential veto-player, whereas the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs turned into an active pro-PPP policy entrepreneur 
(Kingdon, 1995). The changing role of the Ministry of Finance must be seen against the background 
of continued strong government budgets (CE2) and the local government scandal over sale and-
lease-back arrangements, which resulted in amended regulations that considerably narrowed the 
scope for local governments’ PPP projects (CE3).  
Meanwhile, in the political stream, the pro-marketisation government was still attempting to 
increase the involvement of private business in the public sector. Thus, when the PPP Action Plan 
was published in 2004 and seven pilot projects were announced (E3), the political environment was 
now more favourable to PPPs than it had been in 1999, and an underlying shift in the policy stream
had taken place, whereby a pro-PPP policy entrepreneur materialised. But continuous growth in the 
short- and long-term fiscal indicators (CE1) still limited the prospects for private finance of public 
projects, and the problem stream was thus more or less unchanged. The interviews in fact 
demonstrate that the central ministries in the process leading up to the launch of the PPP Action 
Plan had serious difficulties in identifying relevant PPP projects. So the policy solution was clearly 
there and the political stream provided a supportive environment for PPP initiatives, but the 
problem which the solution could be linked to was still not so obvious.  
The result was that the PPP Action Plan was launched with a tentative problem to be solved – to see 
if PPP would deliver value-for-money and innovation in major construction and infrastructure 
schemes compared to traditional procurement models (Danish Government, 2004). This was 
illustrated by the fact that the seven PPP pilot projects were only to be tested for PPP relevance, in 
contrast to Ireland, where the government’s pilot projects were actually to be commenced as PPPs. 
As an influential supplement to the Ministry of Economic of Business Affairs, which took the role 
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as policy entrepreneur in this process, the Ministry of Finance actively engaged as a veto-player 
attempting to limit the scope of the PPP initiatives. This evident conflict between the two dominant 
actors in the policy stream resulted in the formal oversight of the policy and regulation framework 
being split between the Ministry of Finance, which came to host the Interdepartmental Group on 
PPPs, and the Danish PPP Competence Unit being placed under the Ministry Economic and 
Business Affairs (E4). The Competence Unit was given responsibility  for general competence 
building, guidance material and disclosure of information and guidance of local municipalities 
engaging with PPPs (E4), but major initiatives would have to be coordinated in the 
Interdepartmental Group, which was (and still is) hosted by the Ministry of Finance. When serious 
regulatory difficulties, such as tax and value-added tax for PPP projects emerged, this disagreement 
among central actors seriously hindered an effective resolution of these issues which were only 
slowly resolved after long negotiations among the various regulators (E5). Indeed, the tax and 
value-added tax issue has never been finally resolved as no generic solution has been found, which 
means that Danish PPP projects still have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis before a PPP 
contract is signed (Petersen, 2010a).  
The gap between the positive policy rhetoric of the PPP Action Plan and the subsequent reluctance 
towards solving fundamental regulatory challenges for Danish PPP projects can thus largely be 
interpreted as a result of disagreement among central actors in the policy stream, a political stream
which favoured market-based solutions but was mostly occupied with other marketisation issues 
and did not intervene in the specific PPP policies and regulations, and a problem stream in which a 
problem that PPPs could be linked to was never really identified. This resulted in the development 
of PPP policy and regulation which built on the formulation that PPPs might increase value-for-
money and innovation in major construction and infrastructure schemes, but few concrete initiatives 
to promote the actual implementation of PPPs in Denmark. The related events in Figure 2 clearly 
mirror this interpretation: the Danish government continues to endorse PPPs in various policy 
documents and speeches, but meanwhile, more than ten years after the introduction of PPPs and six 
years after the PPP Action Plan, only four PPP projects have become operational, and a few more 
have been signed. Let us now turn to the Irish case to conduct the same analysis.  
Ireland 1999-2001: Temporal coupling of streams and influential policy entrepreneurs 
In Ireland, in the late 1990s, the political stream was significantly more favourable towards the 
introduction of policy and regulation which supported a large scale use of the PPP model. EU funds 
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had constituted a major source of finance for infrastructure projects (PE1 in figure 3), but a rapid 
economic development (PE2, CE1) combined with the eastern enlargement of the EU, resulted in 
Ireland facing significantly falling shares of EU funds by the late 1990s (PE3). Moreover, in 
contrast to Denmark where PPPs never rose to a high point within the political stream, the political 
environment was fuelled by public dissatisfaction with the major physical infrastructure gap (CE2) 
which had developed due to significant underinvestment during the economic upturn (PE4). Thus, 
in the problem stream, the relatively poor condition of the Irish physical infrastructure compared to 
other European countries, which Ireland now matched in terms of prosperity and often surpassed in 
terms of growth rates, increasingly came to be identified as a major problem for the government 
(CE2).
Meanwhile, in the policy stream, the major business organisations were actively lobbying for a 
more active role for private business in addressing the infrastructure gap (CE3), and Ireland’s 
tradition of actively including business and labour organisations in major policy programmes gave 
the private policy entrepreneurs an institutionalised platform for direct access to the Irish 
government, where PPP could be proposed as the preferred policy solution to Ireland’s 
infrastructure gap. The successful role of the Irish business organisations was manifested when 
these partners were invited by the Irish Government to join the Informal Advisory Group (E2) that 
were set up to counsel the Central PPP Unit and the Inter-departmental Group on PPPs. In direct 
line with the active role of Irish business and the establishment of the Informal Advisory Group, the 
Framework for PPPs was launched in 2001 (E4), basically stating that all major policies and 
regulations were to be discussed among the partners in the group. Thereby, the three streams were 
coupled at this particular point to open a policy window which resulted in the introduction of 
ambitious PPP policy and regulation to support implementation of PPPs in Ireland, and eight 
concrete pilot projects through which to test the PPP model (E1). Moreover, in the National 
Development Plan 2000-2006, a rolling seven year plan for major investments in services and 
infrastructure, the Irish government earmarked a substantial amount of money for PPP projects 
(E3).
Ireland 2002-2009: Policy and regulation centralises Ireland’s PPP framework 
In the further development of Ireland’s PPP programme, a number of decisions were taken to 
gradually centralise procurement competencies in central government, and particularly in the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government. After introducing PPP policy and 
204 
regulation from 1999-2001, concrete PPP projects were now under the remit of planning. Moreover, 
with the Public-Private Partnership Arrangements Act (E5), clear legal conditions for public 
authorities entering into PPP deals were laid out, and local government use of the PPP model was 
made subject to approval from the Ministry of Local Government. Regulatory competencies were 
thus from the very early phase centered at the national level, and in 2005 procurement competencies 
were further centralised with the National Development Finance Agency Act (E6), which gave the 
agency the competencies to procure projects on behalf of other departments and agencies (except 
for roads and railways). Why did this centralisation take place? 
Part of the explanation can be found in the political stream, where the current state of the 
infrastructure continued to be an issue with high saliency on the political agenda. Furthermore, the 
business organisations which actively pushed for PPPs before 1999 kept the issue high on the 
decision agenda by publicly criticising the government for being too passive in the subsequent 
process. Moreover, as the government initiated the planning and procurement of the first PPP pilot 
projects, it turned out that it would be more complex to carry out these projects than first 
anticipated. One thing was that the PPP model was new, which significantly increased the 
transaction costs and the time involved in planning the projects. Another factor was that some of the 
first pilot projects ran into difficulties with the EU’s accounting regulations for PPP projects, which 
the Statistical Office of the European Societies (Eurostat) launched in early 2004 (Eurostat, 2004). 
These EU regulations basically required that PPP projects could only be regarded as private – and 
thus taken off the government’s balance sheet - if the majority of risks were in fact transferred to the 
private partner. This was an important issue for the Irish government because, as we have seen, PPP 
was launched in a situation where the government actively tried to replace public investments in 
physical infrastructure with private investments provided via the PPP model.  
Thus, as infrastructure deficit continued to be a major issue in the problem stream, the Irish 
government and the Ministry of Finance now actively engaged to open another policy window to 
set  a solution in place which could further support Irish PPPs by making sure that such projects 
were removed from government balance sheets. This coupling of the streams to change Ireland’s 
PPP policy and regulation subsequently happened twice. The first time was with the 2002 PPP Act, 
which removed the leverage of local authorities in terms of planning and signing concrete PPP 
projects (E5). By this token, the Irish government could control the flow of the deal, ensure that 
risks were sufficiently transferred to make the projects private, and thus safeguard itself against the 
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criticism from business federations that it was doing too little to implement PPPs. The second time 
was in 2005, when a government-wide PPP procurement organisation - the National Development 
Finance Agency - was established to take over the planning and procurement of most local and 
central government PPP projects, with a few exceptions within roads and railways (Irish 
Government, 2007a). We thus see that the three streams were coupled on several occasions, each 
time to open a policy window in which further PPP initiatives were taken to gradually centralise 
Ireland’s PPP policy and regulation and concrete procurement functions within a few central 
government departments and agencies.  
NATIONAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: THE TWO CASES COMPARED  
How, then, do the two cases compare? Denmark and Ireland both officially launched PPPs in 1999 
and are both subject to a common set of EU regulations on public procurement, risk transfer and 
on/off-balance sheet accounting. However, despite these and other similarities, PPP policy and 
regulation has developed very differently in the period in the two countries. Barzelay’s event 
centered approach was utilised as a methodological heuristic to breakdown the cases in a number of 
events arising from the empirical analysis of the data collected for the two case studies (Barzelay et 
al., 2003).  
The analysis of the context events (the prior and contemporaneous events) revealed that the launch 
of PPPs in Denmark took place against a combination of strong fiscal indicators, a relatively built-
up infrastructure, the existence of a well-tested and successful public building-model, and a local 
government scandal relating to the sale and lease-back model, which generated a general unease 
with private finance arrangements within the Danish government. In Ireland, the fiscal indicators 
were also relatively strong, but Ireland moreover faced a major infrastructure gap due to years of 
underinvestment in the country’s physical infrastructure. Furthermore, EU funds were declining due 
to the forthcoming enlargement, and public demands for an upgrade of Ireland’s physical 
infrastructure were rapidly increasing. Thus, despite their relative similar points of departure in 
terms of fiscal indicators and being late adopters of PPPs, the systematic breakdown of the context 
events illustrates a number of differences in the background settings against which PPP policy and 
regulation developed over time in Denmark and Ireland (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Overview of context, policy entrepreneurs, and the three streams.  
Denmark Ireland 
Context 
events
(prior and 
contempo-
raneous 
events)
Strong short- and long-term fiscal indicators 
Public infrastructure relatively well-developed: few 
relevant projects 
An existing well-tested public model: two major 
bridge projects and the Copenhagen Metro financed 
by public bonds and guarantees 
A local government scandal over sale and lease-back 
infuse reluctance among government regulators 
 Medium-strong short- and long-term fiscal indicators  
Major infrastructure gap as a result of years of under-
investments 
EU funds a major source of physical infrastructure 
development 
Fiscal transfers from the EU in decline because of the 
EU enlargement 
Problem 
stream 
1999-2003: No clear problem identified in terms of 
financing Denmark’s physical infrastructure 
development; a well-tested model  already exists 
2004-2009: Problem still not identified. Policy 
entrepreneurs attempt to redefine the problem in 
terms of improving value-for-money and innovation 
of major construction and infrastructure projects 
1999-2001: The poor condition of Ireland’s 
infrastructure is increasingly seen as a major problem 
2002-2009: Ireland’s infrastructure gap is still defined 
as a major issue. Several of the first pilot PPP projects 
run into problems with EU regulations regarding the 
on/off-balance sheet issue 
Policy 
stream 
1999-2003: Inspired by the UK PPP/PFI experiences 
the Ministry of Finance officially launches PPPs. No 
coupling with problem or political streams 
2004-2009: A seemingly ambitious PPP Action Plan 
launched, but regulations remained unresolved and 
few projects were implemented 
1999-2001: An ambitious PPP programme is launched 
with 8 pilot projects, institutional underpinnings in the 
Ministry of Finance, and money earmarked for PPP 
projects  
2002-2009: Further PPP policy and regulation launched 
which centralises policy and procurement functions 
within the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury  
Political 
stream 
1999-2003: Low political attention to PPPs. The 
incoming liberal-conservative government 
announces a pro-marketisation agenda but focuses 
more on free choice and traditional contracting out 
than on PPPs.  
2004-2009: Rising political attention to PPPs but 
still more focus on free choice and traditional 
contracting out 
1999-2001: Combination of context variables make the 
political environment favourable to private investments 
in public infrastructure (off-balance sheet) 
2002-2009: Combination of context variables still make 
the political environment favourable to PPPs  
Policy 
window 
1999-2003: Policy window remains closed. PPPs are 
only symbolically launched in Denmark  
2004-2009: Policy window is semi-open, but the 
three streams are only loosely coupled  
1999-2001: Policy window stays open. Several 
decisions are taken to launch PPP policy and regulation 
and pilot PPP projects 
2002-2009: Policy window opens occasionally to 
launch new policy and regulation which centralises 
Ireland’s PPP programme 
Policy 
entrepre-
neurs and 
policy 
veto-
players 
1999-2004: The Ministry of Finance officially 
launches PPP but takes no concrete action 
2004-2009: The Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit takes over the 
role as policy entrepreneurs.  
Policy veto-players: The Ministry of Finance 
Private business organisations: low activity, few 
initiatives, no formalised institutional platform for 
dialogue with the government 
1999-2001: Ministry of Finance, Central PPP Unit and 
business federations are important policy entrepreneurs 
2002-2009: Ministry of Finance, Central PPP Unit, 
National Development Finance Agency and roads and 
rail authorities 
Policy veto-players: No veto-players 
Private business organisations: high activity, several 
submissions, a formalised institutional platform for 
dialogue with the government 
Kingdon’s (1995) model provides an analytical framework for the analysis of the streams and for 
examining the role of policy entrepreneurs and policy veto-players (Greve & Hodge, 2007) in the 
development of Ireland and Denmark’s PPP policy and regulation. In Denmark, as a result of the 
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context within which PPPs were introduced, no clear problem was identified in the problem stream, 
which PPP as a solution in the policy stream could potentially be linked to. Moreover, in Denmark 
the political attention to PPPs was generally low, and although the incoming liberal-conservative 
government announced a focus on marketisation and private sector involvement, the focus was 
more on free choice (in the delivery of welfare) and traditional contracting out. Accordingly, the 
streams were not coupled in any sufficient way to open a policy window, which resulted in a merely 
symbolic launch of PPPs in Denmark, with no policy and regulation initiatives and no concrete 
projects announced. This was very different from the Irish case, where a clearly identified problem 
– to remedy Ireland’s major infrastructure deficit – became a major issue in the problem stream as 
Ireland saw its share of EU funds dropping. In the meantime, the political stream was highly 
influenced by the popular dissatisfaction with the state of the infrastructure and strong lobbying 
from the Irish business federations. Accordingly, under the influence of strong policy entrepreneurs 
from within government and the private sector, the three streams were successfully coupled to open 
a policy window which stayed open for a long time, during which several decisions were taken to 
launch comprehensive PPP policy and regulation and money was earmarked for PPP projects.  
In reality, the Danish government took no concrete PPP initiatives before 2004, with the launch of 
the PPP Action Plan. The launch was in itself somewhat paradoxical, because a problem was still 
not identified in the problem stream. However, the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs and 
the PPP Competence Unit, which in the meantime took over the Ministry of Finance’s role as policy 
entrepreneurs, now attempted to redefine the problem as a matter of improving value-for-money 
and innovation in major public construction and infrastructure projects. Not least because of a rising 
attention to PPPs in the political stream, the policy entrepreneurs this time partly succeeded with 
coupling the streams and opening up a policy window in which the PPP Action Plan was launched. 
Underlying the launch of the action plan was a rising conflict of interest between the two policy 
entrepreneurs and the former policy entrepreneur, the Ministry of Finance, which had changed its 
role from entrepreneur to policy veto-player. Accordingly, in the aftermath, when the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs and the PPP Competence Unit struggled to open yet another policy 
window in which further PPP policies could be launched and Denmark’s unclear PPP regulations 
could be resolved, the Ministry of Finance attempted to dissemble the three streams by arguing that 
Denmark’s strong finances made private finance through PPPs largely redundant.  
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This was, indeed, very different from the Irish case, where the problem stream was fuelled both by 
the infrastructure gap and by the fact that some of the first pilot PPP projects (for example Cork 
School of Music) ran into serious problems with the EU’s regulations of PPPs, most importantly in 
relation to removing PPPs from government balance-sheets, whereby investments made though the 
PPP route would not affect General Government Debt (Kay & Reeves, 2004). Accordingly, as the 
political stream continued to be supportive to a large-scale adoption of PPPs, a number of further 
decisions were taken in the subsequent period. In 2002 and again in 2005, new legislation was 
launched, which centralised PPP procurement competencies within the National Development 
Finance Agency under the auspices of the Treasury. By this token, the central policy entrepreneurs 
gained control over PPP policy and regulation as well as the concrete procurement and signing of 
PPP contacts in all sectors except roads and railways, where the EU per definition defines that these 
concession PPP schemes can be registered off the balance sheet because the private partner bears 
the majority of risks (Eurostat, 2004; Petersen, 2010b). A successful coupling of the three streams 
thus produced a number of decisions which step-by-step embedded Ireland’s PPP programme 
within the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, in contrast to the Danish case, where policy and 
regulation competencies were split between the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs and the 
PPP Competence Unit serving as policy entrepreneurs, and the Ministry of Finance as a strong 
policy veto-player (Greve & Hodge, 2007).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past fifteen years, public-private partnerships have become an increasingly popular means 
of organising major construction and infrastructure projects with reference to various forms of 
design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM), design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) and 
design-build-operate (DBO) models. As a result of this development, PPPs are now subject to 
growing attention in academic literature and policy practice alike, and ever more public and private 
resources are now being directed to the formation of PPPs. However, there seem to be at least two 
different interpretations of this phenomenon. The first, which is often rehearsed in academic 
literature as well as in policy practice, is that PPPs is indeed a new form of public governance with 
international application and acceptance. This claim builds, sometimes implicitly but often 
explicitly, on the idea of national convergence – some would say policy learning – towards a 
common and uniform PPP approach, inspired primarily by Anglo-Saxon PPP experiences. The 
second, which is found less frequently in the literature and even more seldom in official government 
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documents, is that underneath the reports about PPPs as a phenomenon with universal acceptance, 
we do in fact see a more heterogeneous and divergent pattern in the actual attempts being made by 
governments to form PPPs.  
However, few academic studies have focused on how and why national similarities and differences 
have developed over time. This is partly due to the observation made by Greve and Hodge that so 
far “much of the literature has been preoccupied with the performance of PPPs and the legal aspects 
of PPPs”, whereas less attention has been centred on the broader policy and regulation aspects of 
PPPs (Greve & Hodge, 2010: 158). The other reason is that this field of research, although 
international in its character, has hitherto been dominated by studies operating with single case or 
single country research designs, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. see Greve & Hodge, 2007; Ysa, 
2007). As this research field moves along, there is clearly a need for comparative research designs 
and more academic reflection about how and why, within a global upsurge of PPP activity, we see 
these significant and enduring national differences.  
A modest contribution towards this endeavour has been attempted in this paper by studying the 
development of PPP policy and regulation in Denmark and Ireland. Despite their similarities in a 
number of dimensions, within a time-period of just ten years, PPP policy and regulation developed 
very differently in these two countries. Whereas PPPs in Denmark are subject to a loosely organised 
institutional framework with a number of fundamental policy and regulation issues being either 
unresolved or not very supportive to the uptake of PPPs, Ireland on the other hand now presides 
over one of the most ambitious PPP programmes in the world, with major policy, regulation and 
procurement functions centralised within the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury. The use of 
Barzelay’s event-centred method and Kingdon’s framework for policy analyses allowed me to 
analyse how and why these differences developed over time. A major reason, it turned out, was the 
politico-economic background settings against which PPPs were introduced in the two countries. 
Denmark’s strong public finances and well-built physical infrastructure made private finance 
through the PPP model largely redundant, whereas Ireland by the end of the 1990s faced a major 
infrastructure gap and declining shares of EU funds. Accordingly, whereas the three streams were 
only loosely coupled in Denmark to generate a semi-open policy window, the streams in Ireland 
were coupled on several occasions to create a policy window through which a number of PPP 
policies and regulations were launched.  
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While I would not claim generalisability in the findings derived from two case studies (Yin, 2003), 
the research findings have a number of important implications, which should be further scrutinised 
in future research. The first relates to the objectives pursued by governments engaging in PPP 
activity. This is important because PPPs are often seen as a tool for the accomplishment of 
innovation, value-for-money, mutual added value and collaborative advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 
2004; Klijn & Teisman, 2005). Based on the comparative analysis, it seems that the primary 
rationale for forming (or not forming) PPPs was a macro-economic one in Ireland, with a focus on 
placing major infrastructure investments off government balance sheets, whereas Denmark’s strong 
public finances and well-built infrastructure made such a manoeuvre largely redundant. This clearly 
raises a number of crucial questions relating to why governments in reality form PPPs, which 
should be further investigated in academic literature. A second implication from the comparative 
analysis is the importance of policy entrepreneurs as well as policy veto-players in decisions about 
PPPs. Whereas the findings in relation to the Irish case are in line with the common interpretation of 
the role envisaged by the policy entrepreneur in coupling the problem, policy and political streams, 
a main finding from the Danish case was that PPP policies and regulations were largely impeded by 
the predominance of a strong policy veto-player. As research on PPPs moves on, with an increased 
focus also on broader policy and regulation aspects, there is a need to further scrutinise the role of 
policy veto-players, especially in countries which have adopted more reluctant PPP approaches. 
Ideally, such research would contribute to a further understanding of why some countries have 
embraced PPPs, but equally importantly, also why other countries have been much more sceptical.  
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APPENDIX 1: EUROSTAT GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 
Source: Eurostat ‘Government statistics’ data (searched 18/06/2010):Available from  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/data/main_tables
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL SOURCES (THE DANISH CASE) 
Expert interviews 
 Danish PPP Competence Unit, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Tax Authority, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Construction Association, 6 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Danish Ministry of Finance, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Chamber of Commerce, 8 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 Local Government Denmark, 10 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of Transport, 15 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior, 21 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Danish Transport and Logistics Association, 22 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 Confederation of Danish Industry, 28 October 2008, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Policy papers 
 Danish Government (2001). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse [Growth, welfare - innovation].   
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2002). Vækst med vilje [Dedication to growth].   
 Danish Goverment, Danish People’s Party, Danish Social-Liberal Party and Christian People’s Party (2003). Trafikaftalen 
af 5. november 2003 [Trafic Agreement of November 5th 2003] 
 Danish Government (2003). Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse II: Supplerende regeringsgrundlag [Growth, welfare – innovation 
II: Supplementary government platform].  
 Danish Government (2003) Investeringsplanen [Investment Plan] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Staten som bygherre [The government as building manager]. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). Handlingsplan for en mere virksomhedsnær offentlig sektor 
[Action Plan for a business responsive public sector] 
 Danish Government (2004). Handlingsplan for Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber (OPP) [Action Plan for Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs)]. 
 Danish Government (2005). Nye mål – regeringsgrundlag VK-regeringen II [New Goals – Government Platform II] 
 Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2007). Bedre og billigere byggeri [Better and Cheaper Building 
Activity]. 
Legislation, government orders and other binding decisions  
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (1971). Lov om statens byggevirksomhed m.v. 
(Statsbyggeloven).[Law about government building activity]. Act. No. 228, 05/19/1971. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior (2000). Bekendtgørelse om kommunernes låntagning og meddelelse af garantier m.v. 
(lånebekendtgørelsen) [Government order on loan-taking in the local municipalities and announcement of garantees etc.].   
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2002). Cirkulære om udbud og udfordring af statslige drifts- og anlægsopgaver 
[Government circular on procurement and challenge of government service and construction works]. Government circular 
no. 159, 12/17/2002. 
 Danish Competition Authority (2004). Udbudsdirektivet [Public Procurement Directive]. Government order no. 937, 
09/16/2004. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Bekendtgørelse om anvendelse af offentlig-privat partnerskab 
(OPP), partnering og oplysninger svarende til nøgletal [Government order on public-private partnership (PPP), partnering 
and key indicators]. Government order no. 1394, 12/1/2004. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2005). Lov om ændring af lov om statens byggevirksomhed m.v. 
[Amendment to law about government building activity]. Act. No. 413, 06/01/2005.  
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2005). Bekendtgørelse af merafgiftsloven (momsloven) [Announcement of the Law on 
Value Added Tax] Government order no. 966, 10/14/2005. 
 Danish Ministery of Taxation (2007). Bekendtgørelse af lov om skattemæssige afskrivninger [in English]. Government 
order no. 1191, 10/11/2007 
 Danish Tax Authority (2007). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregistrering [PPP-
project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. Binding tax answer 
SKM2007.234.SR.  
 Danish Tax Authority (2008). OPP-projekt - afskrivning på bygninger m.v., ejerskab, frivillig momsregistrering [PPP-
project – depreciation on buildings etc., ownership, voluntary registration of value-added tax]. Binding tax answer. 
SKM2008.563.SR. 
Framework contracts and comparator tools 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). OPP relevans vurdering [PPP relevance assessment] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Basiskontrakt. [Public-private 
partnership. Basis contract] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Offentlig Privat Partnerskab. Vejledning til basiskontrakt. [Public-
private partnerships: Guidance notes to a basis contract]  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Vejledning. Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-Private Partnerskaber 
[Guidance Note: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). Teknisk manual: Vurderingsværktøj til Offentlig-Private 
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Partnerskaber [Technical Manual: Evaluation tool for Public-Private Partnerships]
Guidance notes 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Bistand til offentlig-privat-partnerskab på drift og vedligehold af 
bygninger og velfærdsservice [Assistance for public-private-partnership for operation and maintenance of buildings and 
welfare services]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Partnerskaber om kommunale driftsopgaver [Partnerships for local 
government operational tasks].     
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Vejledning om OPP til bekendtgørelse om OPP, partnering og 
nøgletal [Guidance note about PPP for in relation to government order about PPP, partnering and key indicators] 
 Danish Ministery of Finance (2006). Budgetvejledning 2006 [Budget Instruction 2006]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Vejledning til ansøgning om medfinansiering til offentlig-private 
samarbejdsprojekter 2007 [Guidance note on co-financing of public-private collaborative projects] 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2007). Fem modeller for offentlig-privat samspil. En guide til 
kommunerne [Five models of public-private collaboration: A guide to the local municipalities] 
 Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2009). Vejledning om kommunal og regional udbudsstrategi og 
opfølgningsredegørelse [Guidance note on the local and regional government procurement strategy and follow-up review].  
Reports and major analysis 
 Danish Ministry of Finance (1999). Budgetredegørelse 1999 [Budget Report 1999]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2003). Offentligt-privat samspil om skolebygninger [Public-private 
collaboration for school buildings]. 
 KPMG for the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2005). OPP-Markedet i Danmark 2005-2010 [The Danish 
PPP Market 2005-2010]. 
 Birch&Kroghboe, Grant Thornton and Karin Skousbøll (2005). Indsamling og analyse af udenlandske erfaringer med 
OPP i byomdannelse. Rapport udarbejdet for Socialministeriet og Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen maj 2005 [Overview and 
analysis of international experiences with PPP within urban redevelopment]. 
 Danish Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (2008). Rapport om Offentlige-Private-Partnerskaber (OPP) og de 
kommunale låneregler samt visse øvrige spørgsmål i relation til lånebekendtgørelsen [Report on Public-Private 
Partnerships and local government lending regulations and related issues]. 
 Local Government Denmark (2008). Kortlægning af udfordringer vedrørende offentlig-privat partnerskab (OPP) [A 
mapping of challenges in relation to public-private partnership (PPP)].  
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Selvom der er forskel…kan du lære noget af udenlandske OPS-
projekter [Despite the differences…something can be learned from international PPP-projects]. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2009). Plan + Projekt: Offentlig-private samarbejde og planlægning [Plan 
+ Project: Public-private collaboration and planning]. 
Press releases, speeches, etc. 
 Danish Ministery of Economic and Business Affairs (2006). Pressemeddelelse: Fælles offentlig-private selskaber skal 
give fornyelse og innovation [Press release: Joint public-private companies should lead to renewal and innovation]. 
06/02/2006. 
 Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority (2004). Danske kommuner vil gerne offentlig-privat samarbejde (OPS) 
[Danish local municipalities are ready for public-private collaboration] 
 Parliament Committee on Transport (2008). Question to the Transport Minister [Question to the Transport Minister]. Nr. 
554.  
 Danish Government and Local Government Denmark (2008). Aftale om kommunernes økonomi for 2010 [Agreement 
about the local government sector’s economy for 2010]. 
Sources in relation to the schools sector cases 
 PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2008). OPP-forundersøgelse. Ny Høng Skole. April 2008. 
 Rambøl (2005). Trehøje Kommune, Vildbjerg Skole. Beskrivende dokument, Dialogfasen. January 2005.  
 Branchearbejdsmiljørådet Undervisning & Forskning (2009). OPP på Vildbjerg Skole, retrieved 10 June, 2009, from 
http://www.godtskolebyggeri.dk/Byggeriets_faser/Udbudsformer/OPP.aspx
 MT Højgaard (2006). Vildbjerg Skole klar på rekordtid, retrieved 11 April, 2008,from 
http://www.mth.dk/pressemeddelelser/vildbjerg_klar_paa_rekordtid
 Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen (2009). Håndtering af skat og moms, retrieved 16 December 2009, from 
http://www.ebst.dk/haandtering-af-skat-og-moms
 DG Market (2005). Request For Proposals DK-Vildbjerg: construction work for school buildings, retrieved 11 December 
2007, from http://www.market.gov.rw/tenders/np-notice.do~843591      
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL SOURCES (THE IRISH CASE) 
Expert interviews 
 Irish Department of Finance (Central PPP Policy Unit), 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Roads Authority, 4 November 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Ernst & Young, 6 November 2008, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
 Irish Department of Education and Science, 7 November 2008, Tullamore, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish National Development Finance Agency, 15 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Irish Business Confederation, 16 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 
 Cork Institute of Technology, 18 December 2008, Dublin, Republic of Ireland.
Policy documents and government reports 
 Farrell Grant Sparks and Goodbody Economic Consultants in association with Chesterton Consulting (1998). A Report 
submitted to the Inter-Departmental Group in relation to Public Private Partnerships. July 1998 
 Interdepartmental Group on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (2000). Framework for PPP Awareness and Training: 
Background and Explanatory Note 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2001). Framework for Public Private Partnerships.  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2002). Public Private Partnership National Communications Strategy, 2002 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2003) Policy Framework for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Ireland. Evolution of PPP 
Policy in Ireland. 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2006). Public Private Partnership. Guidelines for the Provision of Infrastructure and Capital 
Investments through Public Private Partnerships: Procedures for the Assessment, Approval, Audit and Procurement of 
Projects 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2007). Guidelines to State authorities regarding the National Development Finance Agency 
 PPP Policy Unit (2008). PPP Projects Update 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 1. What is a Public Private Partnership? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 2. What are the potential benefits of Public Private Partnerships? 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 3. The Development of Public Private Partnership in Ireland  
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 4. The Framework for Public Private Partnership in Ireland 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 5. The Current Status of the PPP Programme in Ireland (Updated 
July 2008) 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008) Briefing Note Number 7. PPP and the National Development Plan 2002-2006 
 Central PPP Policy Unit (2008). Briefing Note Number 8. The National Development Finance Agency  
 Cross-Departmental Team on Infrastructure and PPPs (2002) Fourth Progress Report 
 Department of Education (2005). Section 15 - Guide to the Department's functions.  
 Department of Finance and Price Waterhouse Coopers (2001) Review of PPP structures. 
 Irish Central PPP Unit (2006), Assessment of Projects for Procurement as Public Private Partnership.  
 Irish Government (2001). The Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act 2001 
 Irish Government (2003). Sustaining Progress. Social Partnership Agreement 2003-2005.  
 Irish Government (2000). National Development Plan 2000-2006.  
 Irish Government (2007). National Development Plan 2007-2013. 
 Irish Government (2007) National Development Finance Agency. Annual Report 2007 
 Irish Ministry of Finance (2009). PPP Project Tracker.  
 National Development Plan (NDP) (2009). How much money has Ireland received from the Structural Funds since joining 
the E.U.? 
Business and labor union reports and documents  
 Central Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) (1998), 
Submission to the Irish Government about Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
 IBEC (1998). First Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/01 1998 
 IBEC (1999). Second Report on Public Private Partnerships. 01/04 1999 
 IBEC (1999). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) A Further Submission by IBEC and CIF to Government. April 1999. 
 Submission to the Cabinet Comittee on Infrastructure/PPPs on the Guidance Notes (2000). “A Policy Framework for 
Public Private Partnerships” and other Issues. 
 IBEC Press Centre (2003). Survey finds progress on PPP programme poor. 02/10 2003 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2005). Guidelines for Unions on consultations with State Agencies and Public 
Authorities in the Republic of Ireland concerning Public Private Partnerships 
 IBEC (2006). Promoting private sector involvement. In: PFI/PPP 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 2007-2013 
 IBEC Transport (2008): Now is the time for Public-Private Partnerships. In: Public Affairs Ireland. October 2008 
 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (2006). Investing for All. Submission on the National Development Plan 2007-2013. 
03/14 2006 
 Irish Business News (1999). Immediate action is crucial to improve infrastructure. 04/28 1999 
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 Irish Business News (1999). McCreevy urged to target private sector for infrastructural funding. 04/28 1999 
 Hochtief (2008). Public Private Partnership. Concessions business at Hochtief. Position paper  
Legislation 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Service Contracts. S.l. n. 378 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Supply Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 379 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (1998). Award of Public Works Contracts (Amendments). S.l. n. 380 of 1998 
 Ministry of Finance (2002). Public Contract Notices (Standard Forms). S.l. n. 343 of 2002 
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DANISHSUMMARY
Denne ph.d.-afhandling undersøger nationale ligheder og forskelle i politik og regulering af 
offentlig-private partnerskaber (OPP), med et empirisk fokus på Danmark og Irland. 
Udgangspunktet og motivationen for undersøgelsen er den observation, at mens OPP'er ofte er 
afbildet i den akademiske litteratur og i politisk praksis som et globalt udbredt fænomen, så viser en 
nærmere gennemgang store forskelle i de nationale regeringers OPP politik og regulering og i 
antallet af faktisk gennemførte OPP-projekter. Ved at sammenligne Irland, som har en ambitiøs 
politik og reguleringsramme og mange gennemførte projekter, og Danmark som har været en OPP 
skeptiker, stiller denne afhandling de grundlæggende spørgsmål hvordan, hvorfor og med hvilke 
konsekvenserne nogle regeringer har udviklet omfattende politik og regulering til at støtte 
gennemførelsen af OPP'er, mens andre regeringer har været langt mere tilbageholdende. 
Afhandlingen behandler fire forskningsspørgsmål: (i) hvilke centrale aktører, strategier og 
institutioner er involveret i dannelsen af politik og regulering for OPP?; (ii) hvordan udvikledes 
OPP politik og regulering over tid, og hvordan kan national ligheder og forskelle forklares?; (iii) i 
hvilket omfang understøtter eller hindrer disse politik og reguleringsrammer gennemførslen af OPP-
projekter, eksemplificeret ved fire case studier fra skolesektoren?; (iv) hvilke rammebetingelser og 
regulering har EU sat for OPP initiativer på nationalt og lokalt niveau?  
Hovedformålet med afhandlingen er at undersøge hvordan og hvorfor nationale regeringers OPP-
politik og regulering blev udviklet over tid. På nationalt niveau indeholder afhandlingen derfor både 
diakron og synkron analyse. I tillæg til det nationale fokus ser afhandlingen i overensstemmelse 
med tidligere forskning også politik og regulering som konstituerende elementer, der sætter 
generelle rammebetingelser og institutionelle ’spilleregler’ for gennemførelsen af konkrete OPP-
projekter. Den sammenlignende interesse på nationalt niveau suppleres således af en analyse (a) af 
samspillet mellem beslutninger om politik og regulering på nationalt plan og udformningen af 
konkrete OPP-projekter, og (b) af EU's rolle i reguleringen af OPP'er på nationalt plan og i relation 
til gennemførelsen af konkrete OPP-projekter. En hovedkonklusion på undersøgelsen er, at mens 
akademisk OPP litteratur ofte skildrer regeringers rationaler for at anvende OPP i form af at opnå 
innovation, gensidige samarbejdsfordele, ’value for money’, nye markedsandele for de private 
virksomheder, bedre risikodeling, mv., så viser resultaterne i denne afhandling, at en primær 
målsætning med at anvende OPP er at fjerne store bygge- og infrastrukturinvesteringer fra de 
offentlige budgetter og regnskaber og dermed mindske presset på de offentlige budgetter og levere 
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mere infrastruktur, end det ellers ville være muligt. Men nylig forskning har vist, at dette rationale 
langt hen af vejen er misforstået, fordi der altid er en regning at betale for de offentlige 
myndigheder og skatteborgerne på langt sigt. Anvendelsen af OPP med det formål at muliggøre 
investeringer, som ellers ikke ville være mulige, accentuerer derfor en række bredere legitimitets og 
ansvarlighedsspørgsmål når offentlige myndigheder indgår langvarige OPP-aftaler med privat 
finansiering.  

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ENGLISHSUMMARY
This PhD dissertation studies national similarities and differences in policy and regulation of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), with an empirical focus on Denmark and Ireland. The starting 
point and motivation for the study is the observation that whereas PPPs are often depicted in the 
academic literature and in policy practice as a globally disseminated governance scheme, in reality, 
a closer examination of the PPP reform landscape reveals significant differences in national 
governments’ PPP policy and regulation and in the amount of actually implemented PPP projects. 
By comparing the initiatives taken by the Irish government, which has embraced PPPs, with those 
of the Danish government, which has been a PPP sceptic, this study inquires into the fundamental 
questions as to how, why and to what consequences some governments have developed widespread 
policy and regulation frameworks to support the implementation of PPPs, whereas others have been 
much more reluctant. The dissertation addressed four research questions: (i) what are the key actors, 
strategies and institutions that create policies and regulations for the formation of PPPs?; (ii) how 
did governments’ PPP policies and regulations develop over time, and how can their similarities 
and differences be explained?; (iii) how do differing national policy and regulation frameworks 
serve to facilitate or hinder the formation of PPPs, exemplified by four case studies from the 
schools sector?; (iv) what framework conditions does the EU set for PPP initiatives at national and 
sub-national levels?  
The main aim of the dissertation is to study how and why national PPP policy and regulation 
frameworks developed over time. At the national government level, the study thus contains both 
diachronic and synchronic analysis. Furthermore, in line with previous research within what has 
been called the governance approach within PPP studies, policy and regulation are also seen as 
constitutive elements that tap into and set the general framework conditions and institutional ‘rules 
of the game’ for the realisation of concrete PPP projects. The comparative interest at the central 
government level is thus supplemented by an analysis (a) of the interplay between decisions about 
policy and regulation at the national level and the formation of concrete PPP projects, and (b) of the 
EU’s role in regulating decisions about PPPs at national level and in relation to the formation of 
concrete PPP schemes. A main finding is that whereas academic PPP literature often portrays 
governments’ rationales for resorting to PPPs in terms of achieving innovation, collaborative 
advantage, value-for-money, new market possibilities, improved risk sharing etc., the findings 
brought to the fore in this dissertation suggest that a primary objective indeed was to remove major 
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public infrastructure investments from governments’ balance sheets, and thereby reduce the 
pressure on public capital budgets and provide more infrastructure than would otherwise be 
possible. However, as the off balance sheet rationale has been shown to be largely false, because 
there is always a bill to pay in the long term, this raise a number of broader legitimacy and 
accountability issues, which the present PPP policy and regulation frameworks of governments do 
not seem to adequately address. 
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